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Thomas N. Wisdom 
 
Incentives, Innovation, and Imitation: Social Learning in a Networked Group 
 
Humans’ extraordinary talents for learning from their environments and from each 
other are the basis of cultural and technological development, but factors affecting 
the use of these skills such as time, information differences, group size, and material 
incentives are not yet completely understood. We used a series of laboratory 
experiments to investigate the causes, consequences, and dynamics of social 
learning strategies employed by groups of people in complex search environments, 
and how individual imitation and innovation behaviors affect results at the group 
level. In these experiments, participants played a simple computer-based puzzle 
game with others, in which guesses were composed of sets of discrete units that had 
both linear and interactive effects on score, and each player could view and imitate 
entire guesses or parts of guesses from others in the group. Players received round-
based score feedback about the quality of their own guesses, and in some cases, 
others' guesses. Our results showed that participants used several social learning 
strategies previously studied in other species, as well as strategies studied in the 
context of innovation diffusion, such as imitation biases toward solutions similar to 
one’s own, and toward increasingly popular solutions. We found that the risk of 
exploring in a large and complex problem space caused participants to take a 
conservative approach, with small amounts of innovation and imitation used to 
acquire good solutions and make incremental changes in the search for better ones. 
v 
Finally, we found that imitation, rather than merely being used to copy others and 
avoid exploration, was often used by group members to improve on each others’ 
guesses. Contextual factors that disrupted or discouraged imitation generally 
resulted in poorer outcomes for the entire group, because of a reduced capacity for 
participants to create such cumulative improvements. These results are discussed in 
the context of knowledge as a commons, with implications for the promotion of 
innovations and intellectual property policy. 
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1. (A)social Learning 
1.1. Introduction 
Penguins are thought to be warm-blooded animals like other birds, but an 
often-told tale suggests otherwise. As the story goes, a group of penguins will often 
hesitate before leaving the ice to forage for krill, because a leopard seal may be 
waiting in the water to forage for them. Each penguin would prefer to find krill as 
soon as possible and never meet a leopard seal, but the only way to be sure the 
water is fine is for at least one of them to jump in. The penguins' simple solution to 
this dilemma is to push one of their fellows over the edge and observe it for signs of 
being devoured (Dawson, 1974). 
Thankfully, human societies have developed in such a way that going out to 
find food does not typically require nudging our neighbors into the jaws of a hungry 
predator. But we do depend heavily on information about the experiences of others 
that we expect to share in some form. In fact, there are few activities that humans 
participate in that do not depend in some way on knowledge obtained from others. 
This is evident upon casual reflection about how people gather information and 
make choices about things like restaurants or movies, candidates for a job or 
political office, a new city to live in or a large household purchase. Such "social 
learning" allows people to obtain information about available options without 
undertaking the costly process of directly evaluating each one, though without the 
increased accuracy that such evaluation might provide. This prompts the question of 
how decisions are made between the options of learning about the environment 
directly through experience, or indirectly via information provided by others.  
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Learning directly from the environment often carries a cost for the learner in 
terms of risk or resources, so when possible, people will often prefer to obtain 
information indirectly through others without individually bearing the cost of 
learning on one’s own. If too many people avoid the costs of direct individual 
learning but continue to make use of the information available through indirect 
social learning, an undesired stagnation or reduced adaptation to complexity and 
change in the environment may result.  
On the other hand, when learners are in competition for resources, each 
learner may have an incentive to prevent imitation by others of their costly, 
individually-obtained information. A different problem may result from this 
avoidance of information sharing, because learners are prevented from building 
upon and improving others' solutions, which can lead to repeated "reinvention of 
the wheel," another kind of stagnation.  If an individual can prevent other 
individuals from imitating their solutions, then the collective benefits of their 
innovations will be underutilized. 
These tradeoffs between short-term self-interest and group interest can be 
treated as an example of the well-studied class of phenomena known as social 
dilemmas. Such dilemmas apply to use of natural resources such as fisheries 
(Acheson, Wilson, & Steneck, 1998) as well as artificial resources such as irrigation 
systems (Siy, 1982). A large literature of theory, field research and laboratory 
experimentation has been built around the study of social dilemmas, and the 
environmental and institutional factors that can contribute to their solutions 
(Ostrom, 1990). Recently, the methods and frameworks used to analyze social 
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dilemmas of physical resources have been productively brought to bear on the 
question of knowledge as a resource (Hess & Ostrom, 2007).  
Though not always formally treated as such, the social dilemmas of social 
learning are addressed in the political economy of knowledge as a tradable 
commodity, in the form of intellectual property (IP). In theory, IP law and policy 
attempt to balance the interests of knowledge creators and users in order to further 
the progress of knowledge, given their environments and incentives. However, the 
distinction between knowledge creators and users is not always clear, because 
knowledge can be used as a foundation or scaffolding for creating further 
knowledge. So restrictive property rights granted to incentivize knowledge creators 
can actually have the effect of impeding the process of creation, reducing benefits 
for all. Thus a dilemma arises in the conflict between the private interests of 
individuals and the collective interests of their groups in the use of current 
knowledge and the creation of future knowledge. 
The complexity of real-world learning and decision making makes it difficult 
to tease apart the effects of factors such as individual differences, group influence, 
and environmental characteristics, as well as changes in learning and interactions 
over time. The series of experiments reported in this dissertation will attempt to 
bridge the individual and group perspectives, by exploring the dynamic 
interrelationships of actions, incentives, and institutions involved in the exchange of 
ideas, and their consequences for both individuals and groups, through a series of 
controlled laboratory experiments on humans. 
 
4 
1.2. (A)social learning: Definitions and background 
Boyd and Richerson (2005) defined "social learning" as "the acquisition of 
behavior by observation or teaching from other conspecifics."  Social learning has 
been studied extensively in humans (e.g. Hurley & Chater, 2005), as well as non-
human animals, including foraging choices in starlings (Templeton & Giraldeau, 
1996), food preferences in various rodent species (Galef & Giraldeau, 2001), and 
mate choices in black grouse (Höglund, Alatalo, Gibson, & Lundberg, 1995). "Asocial 
learning" can be defined conversely as the acquisition of behavior by individual 
innovation or exploration of the environment, without recourse to information from 
others.  
Later in this paper, "asocial learning" and "innovation" will be used 
interchangeably, as will "social learning" and "imitation." However, a great deal of 
research has gone into attempting to define and disambiguate the varieties of 
learning that organisms exhibit. Before we go on, we will survey some of this 
research and clarify which areas we will be exploring in detail, and what we will be 
neglecting in order to achieve this focus. 
 
1.2.1. Social learning / imitation 
Galef (1988) reviewed many studies of social learning in various species in 
an attempt to clarify the definitions and explanations that have been used for these 
phenomena. Galef noted in his review the futility of using the word "imitation" in a 
general and unambiguous way, because of the overabundance of uses and 
definitions it has acquired over the years. Galef discusses this abundance beginning 
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in the modern era with Romanes (1884), Morgan (1900), and Thorndike (1911), 
whose differences were rooted in differing views about the evolution of humans, 
and the evidence of precursors of human abilities in other animals.   
Similarly to Boyd and Richerson (2005), Box (1984) suggested "social 
learning" as a generic descriptive term, to distinguish socially-influenced learning 
from learning that is not influenced by others, though Galef (1988) notes that this 
distinction is not necessarily clear, since "it is always the individual who learns;" 
behaviors may be initially acquired from others but subsequently maintained by 
individual learning of favorable consequences. We do not intend to attempt to 
resolve this ambiguity; it must remain in the background to help explain learning 
behaviors in any particular context as a mixture of influences.  
It is important to distinguish between two major descriptive terms for social 
influence: (1) "social enhancement," in which others influence the performance of 
behaviors already established in an individual's repertoire (Galef, 1988); and (2) 
"social transmission," in which social interaction increases the likelihood that an 
individual will come to independently perform a behavior initially in the repertoire 
of another, such that there is an "increased homogeneity of behavior of interactants 
that extends beyond the period of their interaction" (Galef, 1976). For example, in 
the mid-20th century when it was common for milk to be delivered and left outside 
of homes, it was noticed that increasing numbers of birds were learning to open 
milk bottles to drink the cream from the top (Fisher & Hinde, 1949). This was found 
to be a case of social enhancement rather than social transmission: later 
experiments showed that for the purposes of learning how to open containers, 
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allowing naïve individuals to feed from containers opened by others was just as 
effective as allowing them to observe a conspecific opening a container. So 
conspecifics' actvities focused others' subsequent foraging on similar containers, 
whose tops were vulnerable to existing feeding behaviors such as pecking (Sherry & 
Galef, 1984, 1990). 
The phenomena that this paper will examine generally fall under the 
description of "social transmission" rather than "social enhancement;" we are 
interested in the spread of locally novel information via peer observation, rather 
than the influence of social interaction on use of information possessed by all group 
members.  
A large variety of explanatory terminology has developed to refer to 
theorized behavioral mechanisms that could underlie the above descriptive terms. 
This collection of terminology, according to Galef (1988), is "extensive, 
contradictory, and vague", and though it has not proved adequate for exhaustively 
classifying or effectively explaining social learning behavior, it has been helpful in 
suggesting approaches for experimental analysis of the myriad ways in which social 
interaction influences behavior. Following are several of the more widely-used 
terms in this area.  
"Stimulus enhancement" (Spence, 1937) and "local enhancement" (Thorpe, 
1963) refer to situations in which observation of a demonstrator's actions, or 
evidence thereof in the environment, cause the observer to direct a greater 
proportion of its behavior toward the location or object of the demonstrator’s 
activity. "Social facilitation" refers to situations in which the presence of others 
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"energizes all responses made salient by the stimulus situation confronting the 
individual at the moment" (Zajonc, 1965). "Contagious behavior" is used for 
situations in which "the performance of a more or less instinctive pattern of 
behavior by one will tend to act as a releaser for the same behavior in others and so 
initiate the same line of action in the whole group," such as yawning in humans 
(Thorpe, 1963).  "Copying" refers to situations in which an observer is sensitive to 
the degree of similarity between its own behavior and its model's, and its responses 
are reinforced positively with greater similarity and negatively with dissimilarity 
(Miller & Dollard, 1941; Thorndike, 1911).  
"True" or "reflective" imitation, also known as "observational learning," 
requires that the performance of an act is sufficiently instigated simply by observing 
it, and involves purposeful, goal-directed copying (Galef, 1988). Bandura (1965) 
called humans' rare talent for such imitation "no-trial learning," because it is even 
faster than the one-trial learning observed in animals with a strong built-in 
tendency to form certain associations (e.g. between the taste of a food and a 
subsequent stomach ache). Evidence for "true" imitation in other animals has so far 
been unconvincing (Davis, 1973; Hall, 1963) because of the difficulty of controlling 
for all of the alternative social learning processes (Galef, 1988; Heyes, 1993).  
This dissertation is concerned mainly with phenomena that fall under the 
description of "social transmission," so of the above explanatory terms, we will be 
looking mainly to "true" imitation. The experiments described herein will be 
designed such that participants are given sufficient information, ability, and 
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opportunity to purposefully observe and imitate others. These aspects will be 
explained in more detail in later sections. 
 
1.2.2. Asocial learning / innovation 
As mentioned above, our use of the term "asocial learning" is essentially 
defined negatively as the process of obtaining or generating information from 
sources other than one's fellow learners. The term "innovation" is used as a 
shorthand out of the need for a concise and familiar descriptor for the implied 
individual introduction of information that is locally novel (given a very large space 
of options to explore) among a group of learners, as opposed to the transmission of 
existing information between learners. Using "innovation" in this way involves some 
risk of confusion, however, because this term is also used heavily in the broader 
study of creativity and its instantiation in scientific, industrial, and artistic practice. 
(See Sternberg (1999), Kounios and Beeman (2009), Paletz and Schunn (2010), 
Dunbar (1999), and Garcia and Calantone (2002) for hints as to the breadth of this 
field.) 
In the interest of brevity, the complexity and specificity of analysis in this 
literature will be omitted. We will try to retain some clarity by limiting our 
definition of innovation to the use of locally novel solution elements by individual 
sampling from the environment in a problem-solving context, as opposed to 
obtaining locally known solution elements through observation of others.  
 
1.3. Learning strategies and tradeoffs 
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Gabriel Tarde, one of the forefathers of social psychology, considered 
innovation and imitation to be "the fundamental social acts" (Tarde 1903/1969). 
Innovation (generating locally novel approaches to solving problems) produces a 
diversity of solutions, though often at a cost in resources (such as time or energy) or 
risk (in giving up the opportunity to exploit more reliable solutions in favor of 
something new or unknown). Imitation allows a decision maker to employ solutions 
discovered and passed on by others without having to develop them independently 
using costly trial-and-error learning. When a decision maker acquires information 
from others about possible solutions to a problem, the resources not expended in 
information gathering can be used for other aspects of problem solving, thus 
improving performance overall.  
Of course, domination of a community by either innovation or imitation can 
be problematic. Excessive innovation is unhelpful because good ideas are not 
propagated and extended by others. Excessive imitation is maladaptive because 
good but suboptimal solutions are spread to the exclusion of better alternatives that 
are left unexplored. A common assumption is that the collective costs of excessive 
imitation within a group are particularly detrimental – there are typically strong 
incentives for individuals to pursue largely imitative strategies to avoid risk, which 
may lead to a dearth of good new solutions that would benefit everyone in the 
group. So the group may be better off if imitation is not universally chosen, but each 
individual is better off by choosing imitation. This idea has strong parallels in the 
large body of research on social dilemmas, in which individuals’ self-interests are in 
conflict with the shared interests of themselves and others facing the same problem. 
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Research on social dilemmas has consistently shown that when such interactions 
are repeated over time, and participants are able to recognize the dilemma they 
share with others, they are often able to adapt their behavior to ameliorate or avoid 
social dilemmas (Ostrom, 1990). 
Laland (2004) reviewed studies of animal (including human) social learning 
strategies, and their interactions with asocial learning in various food foraging 
behaviors, as well as mate choice, food preferences, and other important decisions. 
In general, it was found that the default strategy (that is, the preferred option 
whenever available) is the simplest possible behavior: exploitation of an existing 
solution or known resource continues until it is no longer productive, at which point 
either innovation or imitation can be used to acquire a new solution. Most of the 
strategies studied for making such decisions can be divided into “when” and “who” 
strategies; that is, heuristics that dictate under what circumstances social learning is 
favored over asocial learning, and, when it is favored, those that determine from 
which others an individual will learn.   
 
 
1.3.1. When to imitate: Costly information  
Deciding when to use social learning often depends on a relative assessment 
of asocial learning as an alternative. Often, there is greater reliance on social 
learning when acquiring information through asocial learning is costly (Boyd & 
Richerson, 1985). These costs can be in the form of the resources required to carry 
out asocial learning, the risk of acquiring information that will not be reliable in the 
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future, and the risk associated with learning about hazards directly (e.g. predators). 
As might be expected, social learning about predators has evolved in a wide variety 
of animals (Mineka & Cook, 1988). Returning to the Adelie penguins mentioned at 
the beginning of Chapter 1, it is difficult to prove that they intentionally push one 
another into the water to test for leopard seals (rather than accidentally jostling one 
another off the edge), but they do avoid the water temporarily when one of their 
fellows is eaten (Dawson, 1974). It has also been shown that they are sensitive to 
the effects of predators on group size: they are less likely to enter the water if a 
group returning from a foraging run is unusually small, indicating that it has been 
attacked and dispersed by a leopard seal (Müller-Schwarze, 1984). Perhaps more 
surprising is the fact that predator avoidance learning has evolved in some cases 
between different species vulnerable to the same predators (Mathis, Chivers, & 
Smith, 1996). This strategy is beneficial because it allows minimal individual contact 
with hazards, though if one individual learns the “wrong” hazards, imitation by 
others may be inefficient or dangerous.  
A related strategy is to rely on social learning when a task is difficult to learn 
asocially. Such a strategy has been observed in the processing of foods with physical 
and chemical defenses by gorillas (Byrne & Russon, 1998) and in an experimental 
visual identification task in humans (Baron, Vandello, & Brunsman, 1996). Again, 
this strategy can save valuable risk and effort for imitators, but if the examples they 
learn from are flawed, inefficient or harmful behaviors can spread in a group.  
 
1.3.2. When to imitate: Resolving uncertainty  
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Another "when" strategy is to copy others when one is uncertain about the 
relative value of available options. For instance, Beck and Galef (1989) showed that 
when presented with two novel foods, rats showed a bias for the one that had been 
consumed by conspecifics, as evidenced by the odor on their breath; when the foods 
were familiar, this bias was much weaker. Such strategies are especially useful 
when, as above, information is costly to gather asocially – sampling foods without 
regard to others’ decisions can result in insufficient nutrition or even poisoning.  
An early study of social influence in humans found that in a simple 
perceptual task, the less certain an individual was of his own judgment, the more 
likely he was to be susceptible to the influence of others (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). 
Likewise, when an individual is uncertain about the appropriate response in a 
particular situation (because of either a lack of information or the failure of previous 
responses), it is more likely that the individual will resort to imitation (Thelen, 
Dollinger, & Kirkland, 1979). While randomly trying out social behaviors is not 
usually poisonous, social mistakes (violations of norms) can result in ostracism, 
which has been shown to cause neurological responses similar to those of physical 
pain (Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004). This is thought to be due to the evolutionary 
necessity of group inclusion for survival (MacDonald & Leary, 2005). However, if 
norms are harmful, their costs may outweigh the benefits of inclusion in the group.  
 
1.3.3. Benefits of imitation depend on selectivity  
It may be that once a decision is made to imitate others via one of the 
strategies above, individuals do not mind who they copy, as long as they avoid the 
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costs of asocial learning. However, a simulation by Rogers (1988) of agents in a 
nonstationary environment showed that if avoidance of learning costs is the only 
benefit of imitation, then the addition of agents who persistently imitate (and 
choose targets of imitation randomly) to a population of individual learners does 
not improve the average fitness of the population. This is because over time, the 
costs avoided through imitation will be balanced by costs resulting from the use of 
information that is no longer accurate. Thus at equilibrium, a mixed population of 
social and asocial learners has the same average fitness as an asocial-only 
population. (A similar conclusion was reached in a theoretical analysis of foraging 
behavior by Giraldeau, Valone, & Templeton (2002).) 
Boyd and Richerson (1995) and Kameda and Nakanishi (2002) confirmed 
these results, but also extended them to show that when social learners can imitate 
selectively (e.g. imitating when individual exploration is relatively unreliable and 
thus more costly), the overall fitness of the population can increase, because both 
individual and social learning can become more accurate.  
 
1.3.4. Who to imitate: Frequency-biased strategies  
Frequency-dependent imitation takes into account the relative prevalence of 
behaviors when deciding which to imitate. This often entails conformity to the 
behavior common to the greatest number of observed models. Such behavior has 
been observed in many species, including guppies (Lachlan, Crooks, & Laland 1998), 
rats (Beck & Galef, 1989), and humans (Hurley & Chater, 2005). Granovetter's 
(1978) theory of innovation diffusion is based on a "threshold" proportion of group 
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members necessary for an individual to adopt an innovation. Such conformity can 
result from a goal of obtaining information about the utility of a solution from its 
apparent popularity (informational conformity), or avoiding the appearance of 
deviance from a group and its norms (normative conformity).  
 
1.3.5. Who to imitate: Payoff-biased strategies  
Many selective strategies involve observing the success of models in order to 
determine which to imitate. Such "payoff-biased" strategies can use any of several 
criteria, depending on the information about others' success that is available. An 
individual can simply imitate any “successful” individual (which requires only some 
minimal threshold or criteria for success), as has been shown in unsuccessful bats' 
tendency to follow previously successful bats to feeding sites (Wilkinson, 1992). 
Adding a bit of complexity, one might compare the payoffs of all individuals and 
copy the most successful, as assumed in many theoretical models of human decision 
making (Schlag, 1998). An individual may also imitate any demonstrator more 
successful than itself (which requires evaluation of, and comparison between, the 
individual's own performance and the demonstrator's).  
While such strategies may allow an imitator greater certainty in the payoff of 
a particular choice, they may also require great effort in information-gathering and 
calculation, and these requirements may grow exponentially with the size of a social 
group and their responsiveness to each other. The feasibility of such strategies is 
questioned in theories of bounded rationality, which posit "fast and frugal" 
heuristics that allow decision makers to prosper with limited information and 
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computational resources (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). In practice, such 
limitations may substantially change the cost-benefit calculation for complicated 
strategies, and lead decision makers to fall back on simpler strategies or face 
reduced performance in the face of excess information processing requirements. 
Heise and Miller (1951) showed that in a difficult communication task, the removal 
of some participant communication capacity led to increased performance. The 
broader phenomenon of reduced performance in the presence of large amounts of 
information has become known as "cognitive overload" (Sweller, 1988).   
Though many models suggest that copying successful individuals can be an 
effective strategy, the behavior responsible for success may not be apparent, and 
thus unproductive or maladaptive behaviors may accompany successful ones (Boyd 
& Richerson, 1985). Even if accurate information about a good solution is available, 
its use or exploitation by too many users may reduce the benefits available to each. 
Thus simple payoff-biased strategies may have costs in the form of crowding and 
overuse, which are not remediable in the long run without more complex contingent 
strategies that recognize the effects that other users have on the payoff of some 
solutions.  
 
1.4. Conformity and culture 
Research on human social learning is fairly widely dispersed across a variety 
of focal behaviors and methodologies, which is understandable given the myriad 
possible functions for socially-mediated information in such a socially complex 
organism. Below is a focused summary of some of this research.  
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1.4.1. Innovation diffusion 
In his studies of the diffusion of innovations across populations, Rogers 
(2003) posits several features of an innovation that can affect its adoption, among 
them the relative advantage obtained by replacing a previous solution with the 
adopted innovation, and the compatibility of the innovation with previous solutions. 
The former is a clear analog to the simple payoff-biased imitation strategies 
mentioned above, but the latter deals with more complex costs of adoption. 
“Backward compatibility” with a previous solution may be desired to minimize the 
costs of adaptation by the adopter, such as learning how to use it, or replacing items 
used complementarily with it. Compatibility may also be desired to maintain 
continued interactions with others who have not adopted the innovation yet.  This 
minimizes social costs, and may allow the preservation of "network effects," benefits 
of an innovation which scale according to the number of users (Katz & Shapiro, 
1985). Examples of backward compatibility in innovation include the ability to play 
games from an older video game system with a newer one, or the ability of users of 
newer technologies such as cellular telephones and voice-over-IP to connect to 
users of land-line telephones. When these compatibilities are not available, adoption 
of new technologies will presumably proceed more slowly. 
 
1.4.2. Conformity as an adaptive bias  
Imitation in human social activities brings to mind "conformity," which has 
negative connotations in both common usage and in much of the social psychology 
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literature. Some of these negative connotations can be traced back to Asch's (1951) 
classic studies of conformity involved measuring the effect of a group of unanimous 
confederates on the visual judgments of naïve individual participants. However, the 
early emphasis on the prevalence of undesirable behaviors in the results of 
experiments such as Asch's has been moderated in recent re-evaluations of the data 
(Hodges, 2004), and calls for a more balanced examination of the complexity of the 
environmental moderators and motives of biases like conformity (Krueger & 
Funder, 2004). For instance, a recent meta-analysis of 125 studies using tasks 
similar to Asch's experiment showed that the effect of the size of the confederate 
majority group depended on whether responses were given publicly and face-to-
face or privately and indirectly, which is thought to determine the type of 
conformity process (normative or informational, respectively) that dominates the 
situation (Bond, 2005). 
Modeling has shown that the tendency to imitate others rather than innovate 
(“conformity bias”) can be adaptive in uncertain environments (Boyd & Richerson, 
1985; Kameda & Nakanishi, 2002). Similarly, socially-influenced "informational 
herding" behavior has been proposed as an explanation for phenomena such as fads 
and financial panics (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1992; Eguíluz & 
Zimmerman, 2000), but it has been argued that such behavior is the result of 
otherwise adaptively rational Bayesian reasoning in uncertain conditions (Anderson 
& Holt, 1997; Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992). 
Kameda and Tindale (2006) argue that conformity bias has evolved in 
humans and several other taxa because of its tendency to promote a net average 
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benefit for individuals rather than error-free performance. Cultural conventions are 
thought to be a form of large-scale conformity to behaviors that evolve along with 
their associated populations, subject to accompanying adaptive pressures (Boyd & 
Richerson, 2005).  Often the group-level or population-level outcomes associated 
with decisions that are individually rational are not immediately apparent or 
predictable. Much like the social learning strategies studied by Laland (2004), many 
complex cultural mechanisms have evolved to deal with this dilemma. When the 
interaction of a group of individuals in a certain environment is fairly stable over 
time, traditions can develop which dictate expectations for "sensible" behavior in 
that environment, and discourage innovation. Traditions may be related to 
interactions with the environment such as hunting or farming, or interactions with 
other individuals such as marriage customs or dominance hierarchies. Such 
traditions can be reinforced through punishment of those who violate them, 
rewards for those who follow them, or both. Traditions can also be stabilized 
through simple conformity, the tendency to imitate behaviors that are common in a 
group. When members of a group imitate, adaptive solutions to problems can be 
effectively preserved within a culture. 
 
1.5. Studying innovation and imitation in a laboratory setting 
1.5.1. Previous work 
How can we project the infinite space of human ingenuity and social 
complexity onto the circumscribed stage of a controlled experiment? Aside from 
flaws in the interpretation of Asch's (1951) studies of confederate influence on the 
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judgments of naive individuals (Krueger & Funder, 2004; Friend, Raferty, & Bramel, 
1990), a larger problem with this kind of experiment is in its treatment of 
conformity as a static influence rather than part of a dynamic, interactive process. 
Changes in culture and technology involve large numbers of agents interacting over 
long time scales, and the generation and exchange of information between people 
cannot realistically be treated as a series of isolated events. While ignoring socially 
mediated information in a laboratory setting may yield a clear study of important 
cognitive processes of individual problem solving and choice, in many situations it 
represents an unrealistic constraint, and may limit the relevance or applicability of 
the conclusions. Asch, and the vast majority of the subsequent research inspired by 
his studies of conformity, made the methodological choice of creating judgment 
situations with a single human subject surrounded by accomplices of the 
experimenter who were scripted to give specific judgments. This method is justified 
from the perspective of creating a well-controlled experimental environment for 
exploring factors affecting isolated individual choices to imitate.  However, the costs 
of this method are roughly twofold. First, constraining the judgments of all but one 
participant in a group means that mutual influences in innovation and imitation 
cannot be revealed.  Second, limiting the opportunities for response to a single trial 
for each judgment means that changes in these mutual influences are difficult to 
study. The impact of individual innovation and imitation choices on the group’s 
performance can best be revealed by allowing all participants in a decision making 
task to be naturally, spontaneously, and repeatedly influenced by one another. 
Understanding the group dynamics of imitation and innovation is one of the main 
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goals of our study, and so we allow all group members’ the opportunity to influence, 
and be influenced by, each other over time.  
The extensive literature on “group dynamics” (e.g. Hare, 1976; Forsyth, 
2006) provides insight into many interesting processes of interaction in groups, but 
much of it is focused on interpersonal variables and specific settings such as 
classroom discussion, jury deliberation, or workplace collaboration. While these are 
certainly fascinating and worthwhile topics, they often prioritize realism and 
application to these settings at the expense of control and generalizability, and thus 
for our purposes they remain an indirect influence. A more direct inspiration is 
derived from studies of the “emergence” of collective behavior from relatively 
simple interaction of individuals (Holland, 1999). Mason, Jones, and Goldstone’s 
(2008) study of group exploration of a one-dimensional space serves as a 
foundation for our study in a more complex domain, and we will will use it for 
comparison to our results later. 
 
1.5.2. Experimental design and goals 
Conceptually, we can distinguish between the options (behaviors, tools, 
foods, etc.) available to be explored, and the learning strategies (individual or social 
learning of various types) used to explore and exploit those options. We can also 
think of changes in such strategies over time as a form of learning at a higher level. 
In the context of an experiment, we would like to be able to clearly design and 
manipulate the options and strategies available to participants, without excessively 
constraining behavior. 
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Many learning tasks can be seen as combinatorial puzzles -- choosing a 
combination of more or less well-known parts or subtasks to create a more complex 
behavior. Such combinatorial problems are analogous to exploration of a large space 
of possible combinations. If participants have the ability to sample options from the 
environment through asocial learning strategies, or adopt them from others through 
social learning strategies, we can observe several important phenomena: varying 
combinations of elements in participants' tentative solutions, varying mixtures of 
learning strategies in participants' choices, and varying proportions of participant 
strategies in groups attempting to solve problems simultaneously. These variations 
can be observed within groups over time, or between groups (e.g. those with 
different numbers of members, or having access to different amounts or kinds of 
information). 
With this in mind, we constructed two experimental paradigms with 
recognizable parallels in real-life exploratory and learning activities, in which 
participants can sample and share combinations of elements from a large (but finite, 
well-defined, and stably related) set, such that all choices can be evaluated 
according to an objective function, while allowing for a large degree of flexibility and 
variation in choices and learning strategies over time and across individuals and 
groups. 
In contrast to several previous studies (e.g. Rogers, 1988; Boyd & Richerson, 
1995; Kameda & Nakanishi, 2002), we used a task environment that does not 
change over time, and enabled provision of regular, reliable score feedback about 
participants' own solutions, as well as those of their peers. These features could be 
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expected to discourage exploration of the problem space, in that there is no penalty 
for perpetual exploitation of existing solutions or repeated imitation of others' 
solutions. In addition, the problem space was designed to be larger and more 
complex than in those models, in order to provide greater realism in the form of a 
larger number of options for exploration, as well as substantial uncertainty about 
optimal solutions and strategies. 
However, by implementing the above changes and explicitly instructing 
participants to focus on a goal of maximization of cumulative performance, we 
hoped to simplify the task while mimicking characteristics of real-world problem-
solving environments. In our task, solution information cannot become outdated in 
the sense of inaccuracy, but its performance can become relatively less satisfactory 
given continuing opportunities to find better solutions. This is analogous to practical 
technological progress, in that older technologies often still function adequately for 
their designed purpose, but newer technologies can provide improvements such as 
extra features or more reliable performance. If the goal is to maximize cumulative 
performance, some risk may be rationally justified to enable greater future rewards. 
This approach is of course not ideally suited for answering all questions 
relating to human social learning, but it allows us to approach a variety of issues 
which might otherwise be too abstract, varied, and subtle to reasonably approach in 
a controlled laboratory experiment, such as the role of imitation in conformity, the 
effect of individual differences in risk tolerance or incentive responsiveness in the 
discovery of innovations, and the characteristics of learning as a complex, dynamic, 
social endeavor. 
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1.5.3. General predictions 
Based on the social learning strategies and tradeoffs discussed earlier, we 
can discuss some preliminary predictions about participants' behavior and 
performance. First, given that every participant was subject to the same choice 
possibilities and payoff structure, and the payoff structure was fixed for a given 
game, we expected that imitation would be more common than innovation, because 
the former offers immediate risk-free returns, while the latter offers more risky and 
variable returns. Imitation would be biased primarily toward higher-scoring 
solutions (according to payoff-biased strategies), and secondarily toward relatively 
similar solutions to the imitator's own (due to compatibility strategies). As for 
outcomes, an intuitive prediction based on the above behavioral expectations is that 
the high rates of imitation and small amounts of innovation would lead to stagnant 
group learning processes, and a lack of substantial improvements in performance 
over time. This prediction is in line with a negative view of imitation as static, idle 
informational conformity, but at odds with the potential for groups to solve 
collective action problems given sufficient information and incentives (Ostrom, 
1990). These predictions will be revisited and elaborated upon later in this 
dissertation.   
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2. Experiment 1 – Picture Game  
2.1. Experiment 1 overview 
In order to explore the dynamics of innovation and imitation in groups, and 
to attempt to arbitrate between the competing predictions regarding individual 
incentives and group consequences, we designed an experiment in which 
networked groups of people explored a high dimensional problem space over a 
series of time-limited rounds. Participants received score feedback about their 
guesses after each round, and passively shared information about their guesses and 
scores with others. Participants could observe and copy the most recent guesses of 
their neighbors as they formed their own guesses. 
The difficulty of the problem was manipulated across conditions by changing 
the size of the problem space. A range of group sizes was tested to investigate the 
effects of the amount of social information on individual performance and 
strategies. The in-game interaction between players was limited to the simple 
passive exchange of guess information only, so as to allow examination of imitation 
and innovation behavior unencumbered by more complex social interactions, such 
as direct communication among players.  
 
2.1.1. Predictions 
Performance was predicted to improve over rounds within each game, and 
across games within an experiment session, due to score feedback and simple 
learning effects. Conversely, solution turnover (the amount of change in a solution 
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between rounds), and the diversity of solutions within a group, were expected to 
decrease over time as participants found more parts of the correct solution, 
narrowed their search to smaller areas of the board, and refined their search 
strategies. 
Imitation was expected to be more common of peer guesses with higher 
scores, because utilities of guesses are explicit and thus imitators can maximize 
their expected utilities by choosing the highest scoring guesses. Imitation was also 
expected to be focused on guesses that were more similar to the imitator's own 
previous guess, as noted above. Participants who imitated most often were expected 
to obtain better score performance (relative to those who imitated less often), 
because they would presumably imitate good solutions while taking fewer risks. The 
average scores of participants in large groups (greater than 4 participants) were 
expected to be greater than those in small groups, because the larger groups would 
produce a greater diversity of solutions, and thus be able to search the problem 
space more efficiently, contingent on the ability of participants to make use of this 
increased diversity through selective imitation. 
 
2.2. Experiment 1 Methods 
145 participants were recruited from the Indiana University Psychological 
and Brain Science Department undergraduate subject pool, and were given course 
credit for taking part in the study. Participants populated each session by signing up 
at will for scheduled experiments with a maximum capacity of 9 persons, and were 
distributed across 39 sessions as shown in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1: Distribution of Participants Across Group Sizes 
Group size 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
# Sessions 8 6 9 3 3 5 1 2 2 
# Participants 8 12 27 12 15 30 7 16 18 
 
We implemented the experiment using custom software run in a web 
browser, and each participant used a mouse to interact with the experimental game. 
All participants’ computers communicated with a game server, which recorded data 
and updated scores and team information for participants at the end of each round. 
The task was a round-based picture-matching puzzle game with score feedback 
given after each round. The goal picture that participants attempted to match was a 
randomly generated spline quantized to a grid of square pixels. The squares making 
up the spline were colored black, and the remaining squares colored white (see Fig. 
1 for examples). 
 
               
Figure 2.1: Examples of randomly generated goal pictures in Experiment 1. 
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The participant’s game board was a grid of the same dimensions as the goal 
picture, with each square initially colored white. The color of each square on the 
game board could be toggled between black and white by clicking it with the mouse. 
Each participant’s display included their own game board and most recent score 
(given as the number of squares, both black and white, marked correctly out of the 
total number of squares on the board), their neighbors’ game boards and scores, and 
indications of the current round in the game and the amount of time remaining in 
the current round (see Fig. 2). Players could copy a neighbor’s most recent solution 
to their own at any time during the game by clicking the chosen neighbor’s board 
with the mouse. Each game consisted of 24 rounds of 10 seconds each1. After the 
last round in each game, participants were shown their guesses and scores for each 
round, along with the goal picture, and a button to click when they were ready to 
begin the next condition. When all participants had clicked this button, the next 
condition began. 
                                                        
1 In a pilot study, we found that using a game structure with half this number of rounds and twice the time per 
round yielded fairly low average and final performance measures, and a great deal of observed participant 
idleness toward the end of each round, which prompted the change to providing more frequent feedback in the 
current game structure. 
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Figure 2.2: Example of a participant’s display. 
 
Participants were instructed to maximize their scores over all rounds by 
matching the hidden goal picture as closely as possible. They were also informed 
that the picture they were supposed to match in each game was randomly generated 
and not representative of any particular object, shape, or symbol, and was generally 
not symmetrical; that the black squares were all connected to each other vertically, 
horizontally, or diagonally; and that the number of black squares was small relative 
to the size of the grid. Following the instructions, the participants were given the 
first condition, after which the experimenter confirmed that each of the participants 
understood the mechanics of the game, and answered any questions that arose. The 
participants then played the remainder of the conditions, in an order that was 
randomized within each session. At the end of each game, participants were shown 
the goal picture, along with their guesses and scores in each round. 
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A participant’s score in each round was defined as a cell-by-cell comparison 
(overlap) between the participant’s guess for that round and the hidden goal picture 
(i.e. the number of cells which the two pictures had in common), divided by the total 
number of squares in the goal picture, to give a percentage which could be 
compared between conditions of varying grid size (see Fig. 3). An improvement was 
defined as an instance of a participant obtaining a score higher than all prior scores 
of all players within a particular condition. Each participant’s normalized 
improvement share was defined as their individually achieved proportion of the total 
improvements achieved by all participants in a session, multiplied by the number of 
participants in the session. A value of 1 indicated a “fair” share, e.g. a participant 
achieved one third of the improvements in a three-person session. A participant’s 
score rank in a particular round was defined as the rank of their score (one being the 
best) among all scores in the group in that round; individuals with the same score 
had the same rank. Turnover for each round (after the first) was a measure of the 
amount of change between a participant’s guesses over successive rounds. It was 
defined conversely to similarity, except that the two pictures compared were the 
participant’s guesses from the current round and the previous round. 
 
               
30 
Figure 2.3: Score / overlap calculation: the first two pictures have 20 out of 25 
squares in common (shown in dark grey on the right), so they have an overlap of 
80%. 
 
Imitation (a measure of whether a participant copied a neighbor’s guess in a 
particular round) was defined as follows: 
 

Ipr 
1:max i(overlap(Gp,r,Gi,r-1))  overlap(Gp,r,Gp,r-1)
0 :max i(overlap(Gp,r,Gi,r-1))  overlap(Gp,r,Gp,r-1)



;p  i   
 
Where Gp,r is the guess of Participant p for Round r, Gi,r-1 is the guess of 
Neighbor i for the Round prior to Round r, and overlap is the comparison described 
above for the score calculation. In other words, a participant has imitated in a 
particular round (Ipr=1) if the participant’s guess is closer to the most similar 
neighbor’s previous guess than to the participant’s own previous guess.  
Diversity (a measure of the spread of group members’ guesses over the 
problem space within a particular round) was defined as follows: 
 

Dr 1
majority(Gspr)
p

s

StotPtot  
 
Where Gspr is the binary value (black or white) of square s in the guess of 
participant p in round r, Stot is the total number of squares in the game board, Ptot is 
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the total number of participants in the group, and majority is a binary function that 
conveys whether the value of Gspr is in agreement with the majority of participants 
in the group for that square in that round (0 = not in majority, 1 = in majority).  
Diversity as defined above is constrained to be within the 0 to 1 range, and higher 
values of diversity indicate more deviation of individuals’ guesses from the majority 
guesses. 
The number of squares in the game board was manipulated across two 
conditions: in the small board size condition, the game board was 7 squares on each 
side for a total of 49 squares, and in the large board size condition, the game board 
was 9 squares on each side for a total of 81 squares.  The larger board was 
hypothesized to be more difficult to fully search. There were 4 repetitions of each 
condition, for a total of 8 games in each session. The probability distribution of 
scores among all possible game board states in each of the board size conditions 
described above is shown in Fig. 4. The size of the group participating in each 
session was treated as a covariate; group size ranged between 1 and 9. Another 
factor considered was the (randomized) position of each condition in an experiment 
session; this was called the game order. 
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(a) Board size of 49    (b) Board size of 81 
Figure 2.4: Distribution of scores for all possible game board states in each board 
size condition. Note that due to the number of possible game board states in each 
condition (approximately 5.6x1014 and 2.4x1024, respectively) the mean overall and 
final scores appear to fall outside of the distributions, but in fact are just very rare 
scores in the upper tails. 
 
2.3. Experiment 1 Results 
For most analyses, dependent variables were averaged across all participants 
within a group to give measures for the group’s aggregate activity. In this manner, 
the fundamental level of analysis was the group, not the individual, and 
dependencies between individuals within a group do not lead to elevated Type I 
statistical errors. 
 
2.3.1. Board size / difficulty 
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In the aggregate, participants achieved final scores of .893 (i.e. 89.3% of the 
way from the worst score to the best score), and average scores (over all rounds) of 
.833. Mean final scores were slightly but significantly (about 2 percentage points) 
lower in the larger board size condition (t(38)=-2.88, p=.006; see Fig. 2.4). The 
average guess turnover rate per round was 7.3% of the game board, and 
participants engaged in imitation on 25.8% of guesses. There were no significant 
differences in turnover or imitation rate between the two board size conditions. 
 
2.3.2. Rounds 
The data were averaged across all participants and all conditions in each 
group to give dependent variable measures for each group within each round. 
Linear mixed-effects models were used to examine trends across rounds for each 
dependent variable, with a random effect of group membership on the slope over 
rounds. A preliminary examination of guess content confirmed experimenter 
observations that participants’ first round guesses often (approximately 18.5% of 
the time) consisted of all white squares, because the resulting score would reveal 
how many squares were correctly marked as white, and thus how many black 
squares were in the solution. This was a clever and useful tactic for participants, but 
tended to skew trends across rounds. For this reason, the first round was excluded 
from analysis. 
Analysis of score versus round showed a strongly significant positive trend 
(F(1,857)=139.91, p<.0001, B=0.577; see Fig. 2.5a). Similarly, a strongly significant 
negative trend was observed for turnover versus round (F(1,857)=169.06, p<.0001, 
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B=-0.527; see Fig. 2.5b). A significant negative trend was also found for imitation 
rate versus round: participants tended to imitate each other less often as each game 
progressed (F(1,713)=14.37, p=.0002, B=-0.182; see Fig. 2.5c). Guess diversity was 
subjected to a similar analysis after normalizing it for participant group size, which 
was accomplished by dividing all values by the mean diversity value in the second 
round for the appropriate group size, which was generally at or near the maximum 
due to the first-round blank-board phenomenon noted above. The analysis showed 
that the diversity of guesses in a group decreased significantly over the course of a 
game (F(1,713)=33.38, p<.0001, B=-0.415; see Fig. 2.5d).  
  
 
(a)      (b) 
35 
 
(c)      (d) 
Figure 2.5: (a) Mean score increased, while (b) turnover, (c) imitation rate, and (d) 
guess diversity decreased as more rounds were played within a game. 
 
2.3.3. Game order 
Similar linear mixed-effects models were used to examine trends for 
dependent variables across game order within sessions, averaged across all 
participants and all rounds in each game. Once again, participant group was used as 
a random effect in each model. Analysis of score versus game order showed a 
significant positive trend (F(1,272)=52.69, p<.0001, B=0.437; see Fig. 2.6a), while a 
similar analysis of turnover showed a significant negative trend (F(1,272)=23.08, 
p<.0001, B=-0.305; see Fig. 2.6b). Imitation increased significantly across game 
order (F(1,246)=11.86, p=.0007, B=0.214; see Fig. 2.6c), while guess diversity 
decreased significantly across game order (F(1,111)=7.27, p=.0081, B=-0.282; see 
Fig. 2.6d). 
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(a)      (b) 
 
(c)      (d) 
Figure 2.6: (a) Mean score and (c) imitation rate increased, while (b) turnover and 
(d) guess diversity decreased as more games were played within an experimental 
session. 
 
2.3.4. Group size 
A mild upward linear trend was observed for score versus participant group 
size (F(2,36)=4.56, p=.0395), as well as a marginal quadratic trend which peaked at 
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a group size of 4 (F(2,36)=4.33, p=.0446; see Fig. 2.7a). Similar, stronger upward 
linear (F(2,28)=24.07, p<.0001) and quadratic (F(2,28)=16.94, p=.0003; see Fig. 
2.7c) trends were also found for imitation rate versus group size. No significant 
trends were found for turnover or guess diversity across group size, although both 
displayed substantial variance across group sizes, and both seemed to be generally 
inversely associated with score (see Fig. 2.7b & 2.7d).  
 
 
(a)      (b) 
 
(c)      (d) 
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Figure 2.7: (a) Mean score and (c) imitation rate showed significant quadratic trends 
across participant group sizes, while (b) turnover (d) guess diversity showed no 
significant trends. 
 
2.3.5. Score difference and rank in imitation 
Analyses of the targets of imitation showed that nearly all instances of 
imitation were of those with higher scores than the imitator’s (see Fig. 2.8a), 
implying that imitation behavior was generally purposeful and not random. 
However, there was a strong bias for imitating the top-scoring solution in smaller 
groups that weakened substantially (indicating that it was more difficult) in larger 
groups (see Fig. 2.8b). 
 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 2.8: (a) Nearly all imitation was of guesses with higher scores than the 
imitator’s, and (b) there was a strong bias toward imitating top-scoring participants, 
which weakened in larger groups. 
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2.3.6. Learning strategy 
To further investigate the relationship between strategy and performance, 
we performed regression analyses of score versus mean rates of imitation and 
turnover for individuals and groups. Noting the peaking trends for score and 
imitation across group size in section 2.3.4, and the difference in imitation targets 
across group size in section 2.3.5, we split group sizes approximately in the middle 
of the range covered in the experiment, into those with 4 or fewer participants, and 
those with 5 or more. A linear regression of mean individual score versus mean 
individual imitation rate showed a significant positive relationship for those in 
group sizes of 4 or less (F(1,49)=7.69, p=.008, B=0.368), but none in groups of 5 or 
larger (see Fig. 2.9a). Likewise, a significant positive relationship was found 
between mean group score and mean group imitation rate in groups of 4 or smaller 
(F(1,16)=9.92, p=.006, B=0.619) but none in groups of 5 or larger (see Fig. 2.9b). 
Across all group sizes, there was a significant positive relationship between an 
individual’s score and the mean imitation rate of all other group members, excluding 
the individual (F(1,135)=11.68, p<.001, B=.282; see Fig. 2.9c); that is, regardless of 
what an individual did, she/he was likely to have a higher score if the others in 
her/his group imitated more often. Similar analyses of score versus mean turnover 
showed strong negative relationships for all group sizes, at all levels: for individual 
score versus individual turnover (F(1,143)=198.9, p<.0001, B=-0.763; see Fig. 
2.10a), group mean score versus group mean turnover (F(1,29)=34.59, p<.0001, B=-
0.738; see Fig. 2.10b), and individual score versus group others’ mean turnover 
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(F(1,135)=40.0, p<.0001, B=-0.478; see Fig. 2.10c). In addition, for imitative guesses, 
we estimated a value for “innovation” by calculating the proportion of an imitative 
guess that was different from both the imitator’s previous guess and the guess that 
was imitated. The correlation of scores with this value were nearly identical to those 
found for turnover above.  
 
 
(a)          (b)             (c) 
Figure 2.9: For smaller groups (< 5 participants), higher scores were associated with 
higher imitation rates for both (a) individuals and (b) groups; however, these 
relationships did not hold for larger groups. (c) For all group sizes, regardless of a 
particular individual’s imitation rate, the individual’s score tended to increase as the 
imitation rate of others in the group increased. 
 
 
(a)          (b)             (c) 
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Figure 2.10 Higher scores were associated with lower turnover rates for (a) 
individuals and (b) groups, as well as for (c) individuals relative to the turnover 
rates of others in the group (regardless of the individual’s turnover rate). 
 
2.3.7. Improvements 
An examination of participants’ normalized improvement share showed a 
distribution with an unequal skew; approximately 57.7% of all participants 
achieved less than a “fair” improvement share of 1, while a small minority achieved 
much higher shares (see Fig. 2.11). In order to compare the distributions of 
improvement sums with an outcome generated from a random process, we 
constructed a Poisson distribution of improvement sums for each participant group 
with lambda (mean value) equal to the mean improvement sum for that group, and 
found the range of values which contained 50% of the density in this artificial 
Poisson distribution. In over 80% of groups with more than one participant, the 
50% density range from the associated Poisson distribution contained less than 
50% of the density of the actual individual improvement sums, indicating that they 
had a greater skew than would be expected by chance.  
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Figure 2.11: Histogram showing the unequal distribution of improvements across 
the participants within groups. (A value of 1 indicates an even share, e.g. an 
individual achieved one-third of the total improvements in a three-person group.) 
 
Mean overall score showed a strong positive correlation with improvement 
share (F(1,105)=46.89, p<.0001, B=0.350) The mean turnover rate for guesses that 
resulted in improvements was significantly smaller than that of non-improvements 
(0.055 for improvements vs. 0.074 for non-improvements; t(2040)=12.11, p<.0001). 
No significant difference was found for mean imitation rate. 
 
2.3.8. Guess similarity 
A comparison between the similarity of imitators’ most recent guesses to 
those which they imitated, and to those which they did not imitate, revealed that 
there was significantly greater similarity to imitated guesses than to non-imitated 
guesses (.777 for imitated vs. .723 for non-imitated; t(4914)=-18.23, p<.0001; see 
Fig. 2.12a). In other words, imitation tended to be biased toward guesses that were 
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more similar to the imitator’s own prior guess. This difference held over all rounds 
within a game (see Fig. 2.11b), even though mean guess diversity decreased over 
rounds such that solutions generally converged (see Fig. 2.5d). No significant trends 
were observed in linear regressions of similarity versus imitated score rank, or the 
score difference between imitator and imitated participants. 
 
  
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 2.12: Similarity bias for imitation.  (a) Imitators’ previous guesses showed 
greater similarity to the guesses they imitated than to those they did not imitate. (b) 
The bias toward imitating more similar guesses was consistent across all rounds in a 
game. 
 
2.4. Experiment 1 Discussion 
2.4.1. Dynamics and strategies  
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The larger board size had a significant negative effect on final scores, which 
confirmed its use as a proxy for problem difficulty, but this change in difficulty had 
no significant effect on the other dependent variables. However, we observed 
revealing patterns in participants’ behavior that gave some clues about their 
strategies. 
Increasing mean scores across rounds and game order showed that 
participants in groups learned the task and their drawings converged upon the 
computer’s “secret” picture over rounds of one game and over the course of the 
entire session. Participants accomplished their improvements through the use of 
fairly conservative strategies, as evidenced by the low mean turnover rate. 
Furthermore, the dynamics of these strategies caused solutions to become 
increasingly entrenched over the course of the game. This happened in two ways 
(which may have been mutually reinforcing): participants’ rates of imitation and 
general turnover decreased across rounds, and the imitation that did occur was 
biased toward more similar solutions. This entrenchment carried over to the group 
level as well, shown by the decreasing group solution diversity across rounds. Of 
course, this result is likely partially due to participants converging toward the goal 
picture, but the average final score of approximately 89% of the maximum suggests 
that group members’ solutions often converged before finding the optimal solution. 
The problem space used in this task is quite large (on the order of 5x1014 
possible solutions for the smaller board size), and any change to a solution by more 
than one pixel can easily result in a situation where score-decreasing changes cancel 
out score-increasing changes, which makes score feedback difficult to interpret. In 
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addition, the nature of the problem is purely linear – each correct square adds the 
same amount to the total score, and there are no interactions that make the search 
problem more complex, or incentivized large changes over small ones. Thus it 
makes sense that high scores were consistently associated with low turnover, and 
that mean turnover was significantly lower for guesses that resulted in 
improvements. Rather than large, revolutionary changes, participants made small, 
incremental improvements by changing only a few cells, typically just one. These 
small changes allowed participants to make accurate inferences about their effects 
on score. 
The unequally skewed distribution of improvements within each group 
showed that not all participants were skilled at finding good new solutions, though 
imitation allowed some participants to take advantage of other participants’ 
innovations and maintain high mean scores. The fact that average turnover was 
higher for non-improvement guesses shows, however, that non-improvers were not 
just idly waiting to imitate others’ improvements. 
 
2.4.2. Benefits of imitation 
Imitation was biased toward higher-scoring and more-similar guesses, as 
expected. The latter allowed participants a way to take advantage of others' good 
solutions while maintaining low turnover and higher continuity with their own 
previous guesses, preserving the value of their existing knowledge of the problem 
space. 
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The association of higher scores with greater imitation rates at both the 
individual and group levels in smaller groups (who were better able to distinguish 
the top-scoring guess when imitating) shows that imitation is not necessarily 
harmful to innovation and performance improvements. In addition, the association 
of high individual scores with high imitation rates by others in the group (regardless 
of the individual's behavior) indicates a systemic benefit for imitation that does not 
accord with a view of imitation as a purely self-benefiting act. It may be that, 
regardless of the intentions of individuals, imitation benefits the group by acting as 
a filter for propagating and preserving the better solutions available in a group at a 
given time, as was found in a recent competition of social learning strategies in a 
simulated environment (Rendell et al., 2010). Though it was reasonable to expect 
improvements to be associated with a lower imitation rate (because those who only 
imitate others cannot do better than those they imitate), we found that the rate of 
imitation was about the same among improvements and non-improvements, which 
means that imitators were often building on the guesses they imitated to create 
improvements.  Improvements were often achieved by imitating a relatively 
successful participant’s solution and then slightly tweaking this solution.  Once 
tweaked, the improved solution was then available to other participants, including 
the individual who was originally imitated. 
 
2.4.3. Imitation information overload? 
There was an unexpectedly lower benefit for imitation in larger groups, as 
shown by the lack of association between imitation and score in larger groups, 
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which was present for smaller groups. Larger groups can be thought to provide 
more information about the distribution of solutions to their members, because 
there are more models for each group member to observe. This can allow each of 
them to make more informed decisions about whom to imitate and what changes to 
make to their guesses. However, it may have been that for larger group sizes, the 
amount of information provided was more difficult to search and compare, which 
led to more random imitation decisions (as indicated by the weaker bias toward 
imitating the top-scoring guess) and thus poorer convergence on good solutions. It 
is unlikely that this was purely a statistical artifact of random choice among more 
options, because there was a universal tendency (across all group sizes) to imitate 
better-scoring peers than oneself, a relatively easier thing to accomplish than 
finding the best score, but decidedly non-random. So, though score information was 
readily available, it may have been subject to cognitive load effects (Sweller, 1988). 
Larger groups would be expected to show a greater variance in solution quality by 
chance, but an increasing inability to properly distinguish good solutions would 
cancel out this benefit. 
 
 
2.5. Conclusions 
Though our assumptions about participants' imitation strategies (favoring 
higher-scoring and similar guesses) were empirically supported, the related 
predictions of poor performance were not borne out. There was a consistent benefit 
for individuals to be in high-imitation groups regardless of their own behavior, and 
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imitation was also associated with better individual and group performance when it 
could be done selectively and accurately.  
In short, the theoretical imitation-related social dilemma did not cause a 
tragic outcome, which is consistent with the benefit for "conformity bias" found in 
previous models and experiments of social learning  (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; 
Kameda & Nakanishi, 2002), and with the literature on social dilemmas with 
repeated interactions and recognition of a collective action problems (Ostrom, 
1990). In fact, the degraded performance of larger groups was likely due to an 
impediment to imitation. 
 
2.5.1. Modifications and motivations 
The first-game discontinuity for trends in score, turnover, and imitation 
indicated that the first game in each session might have functioned as a practice 
game, during which participants were still learning the mechanics of the 
experiment. This suggested that explicit practice should be included in future 
experiments before data gathering begins, in order to obtain more consistent data. 
In addition to the first-round blank board strategy noted above, participants were 
occasionally observed attempting to create images on the grid corresponding to 
patterns, symbols, and alphanumeric characters, despite instructions to the 
contrary. This is an understandable response given natural human creativity, the 
presumably low visual or conceptual interest in the goal pictures, and potential 
suspicion about experimenter deception.  These behaviors added some noise to the 
data. The linear nature of the problem and lack of interactive effects between 
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solution elements may have resulted in a lack of variation from the slow and 
incremental strategies we observed in this experiment. 
These issues suggest several modifications for subsequent experiments: (a) a 
more engaging task, with (b) less possibility for performing the task in a way that 
departs from its intended purpose, (c) a clearer and more intuitive interface and 
instructions, (d) more explicit recording of participant choices for imitation, 
innovation, etc., and (e) a smaller, more discrete problem space (to improve both 
participant comprehension and tractability of analyses) with (f) interactive effects 
between some solution elements (to observe possible variations in exploration 
strategies from those in this experiment). 
In this study we found that the behavior of isolated individuals attempting to 
solve a complex problem differs markedly from that of people connected in groups, 
and that differences in the size of a group can have significant effects on behavior. 
Overall, there are strong implications in these data for testing the predictions of past 
work in the area of group problem-solving behavior, and potential applications to 
many real-world problems. The results present several intriguing areas for further 
study, which we decided to explore using a task modified according to the 
guidelines above. 
 
50 
3. Experiment 2 – Creature Game A 
3.1. Experiment 2 Overview 
 In order to address some of the issues in Experiment 1 noted above, we 
designed a new task that incorporated thematic elements of popular games such as 
virtual pets and fantasy sports leagues (though the parameters of the task were 
limited to make it much simpler than either of these). The paradigm involves 
participants trying to maximize the score of a chosen subset of individual units from 
a larger set over a series of rounds. Participants can see the selections of others in 
each round and imitate them in whole or in part, and the units that participants 
choose from are assigned individual as well as pairwise interaction point values. 
The size and complexity of the problem space (and thus the task difficulty, as in 
Experiment 1) were manipulated via the sizes of the set of selectable units and the 
subset that could be chosen and evaluated at one time, as well as the number of 
pairwise interactions. We included thorough written and oral instructions to 
participants, as well as opportunities for hands-on practice with the task before data 
collection began. We changed the interface to make score feedback clearer 
(providing emphasis on the size and direction of score changes after each round). 
We also unambiguously defined and determined (rather than having to estimate) 
instances of imitation, innovation, and so forth, by recording the source of each 
player’s selections in the interface. 
 
3.1.1. Predictions 
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The new task also allowed us to gather additional explicit data about the 
proportions of the sources of participants’ solution element choices, including 
Innovation (the introduction of solution elements without prior associated score 
feedback), and Retrieval (the reinstatement of previously used solution elements 
after changing them), which were not available as separate classifications in 
Experiment 1, as well as Imitation and Retention (roughly the inverse of turnover 
from Experiment 1).  
Imitation was expected to be greater in greater difficulty conditions 
(reflecting the greater risk in a larger and more complex problem space), and 
Innovation was expected to decrease. In general, Innovation was expected to be 
relatively rare compared to Imitation, due to its relatively higher risk. Retention and 
Retrieval were expected to increase over rounds (and thus Innovation and Imitation 
were expected to decrease), as participants narrowed their search to smaller areas 
of the problem space.  We expected decreases in Innovation and Retrieval and an 
increase in Imitation in larger participant group sizes, because participants would 
be able to rely on a larger pool of good peer solutions to imitate, which would 
reduce the need to explore or rely on their own previous solutions.  
The new task was generally intended to maintain the same overall character 
of the task in Experiment 1, while correcting a few issues. Therefore we expected 
that the results would show the same general patterns observed in Experiment 1, 
with the exception of (1) smoother trends of dependent variables across game order 
(as opposed to the discontinuity in the first condition in Experiment 1) due to better 
instruction and hands-on demonstrations; and (2) roughly monotonic trends across 
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group size (as opposed to the peaked quadratic trends in Experiment 1), due to 
interface improvements allowing participants to search and compare peer solution 
and score information more efficiently. 
 
3.2. Experiment 2 Methods 
201 participants were recruited from the Indiana University Psychology 
Department undergraduate subject pool, and were given course credit for taking 
part in the study. Participants populated each session by signing up at will for 
scheduled experiments with a maximum capacity of 9 persons. 49 sessions were 
run, and 10 sessions (containing a total of 48 participants) were discarded due to 
network or software problems. The remaining 153 participants were distributed 
across 39 sessions as shown in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1: Distribution of participants across group sizes in Experiment 2 
Group size 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
# Sessions 8 6 5 5 5 2 4 3 1 
# Participants 8 12 15 20 25 12 28 24 9 
 
We implemented the experiment using custom software run in a web 
browser, and each participant used a mouse to interact with the experimental game. 
All participants’ computers communicated with a game server, which recorded data 
and updated scores and team information for participants at the end of each round. 
In the game itself, participants attempted to maximize the number of points earned 
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by their chosen subsets (“teams”) from a set (“league”) of creature icons over 24 
rounds. The display included an area for the participant’s own current team, 
another area that could be toggled to show the participant’s previous round team or 
their best-scoring team so far in the game (along with the associated score), a league 
area which showed all of the icons (potential team members) that were available for 
selection, and indications of the current round in the game and the amount of time 
remaining in the current round. 
If a session included more than one participant, each participant’s display 
also showed the team and associated score for all other participants in the previous 
round. Icons could be copied from any part of the display to a participant’s current 
team by dragging and dropping them with the mouse, except for those already on 
the participant’s current team, which were faded in the display and non-clickable. 
The current team could be replaced entirely by another team by selecting the score 
box above the latter as a “handle” and dragging it to the current team area. The 
ordering of peers’ teams in each participant’s display was not kept constant across 
conditions, to avoid imitation based on past behavior. A screenshot of the 
participant interface is shown in Fig. 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: Example of experiment interface in Experiment 2. 
 
At the beginning of each session, players were given a hands-on demo of the 
game (including the various ways to move creatures to one’s current team), and 
further informed about the mechanics of the game and what to expect in the 
remainder of the experiment session, including the following information. Each 
game consisted of 24 rounds, and each round was 10 seconds long, as in Experiment 
1. Score feedback was given after each round: if the participant’s score had 
improved from the previous round, the numerical score display counted up to the 
new score and turned green, and if it had worsened, the display counted down to 
the new score and turned red. At the end of each game, the display showed the 
player’s final score, along with a table of the scores of each player in each round of 
the game, which was sorted by average score. The player’s own scores were 
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highlighted to show their relative performance without placing competitive 
emphasis on it. Players were instructed to do their best to maximize their teams’ 
scores over all 24 rounds. At the beginning of each game, each player’s team was a 
random selection of creature icons from the league. 
Each group played 8 games, of which half had a large league and team size 
(48 and 6, respectively), and half were smaller (24 and 5). These two parameter 
settings were intended to vary the level of difficulty of the game, with the former 
being more difficult. This was because although the score distribution and 
combinatorics made higher numerical scores possible, it also made high-scoring 
teams rarer than in the latter case: for the smaller league size, about 4% of all 
possible teams had scores greater than 70% of the maximum, while for the larger 
league size this figure was 0.4% (see Fig. 3.3).  That is, with the larger league and 
team size, it was harder to find good solutions because of the relatively large 
number of poorer solutions. 
In each game, each icon was associated with a certain positive number of 
points, and several special pairs of icons were associated with separate score 
bonuses or penalties that captured interactions between icons. The score for a team 
was computed by summing the individual point values for each icon, and then 
adding or subtracting the value of any special pairs present. The pairs did not 
overlap, and the distribution was designed to be challenging: pairs which gave large 
positive bonuses were distributed among icons with small individual point values, 
and pairs which gave large negative penalties were generally found among icons 
with large individual point values (see Fig. 3.2).  
56 
 
 
(a) League size of 24  
(b) League size of 48 
 
Figure 3.2: Point distribution for individual icons (boxes) and interaction bonuses 
and penalties (ovals), for league sizes of (a) 24 and (b) 48. 
 
Individual point values per icon ranged from 1 to 8 points, and pair 
interaction values ranged from -20 to 20 points, so that the possible score ranges for 
the large and small league and team size combinations were [-6,60] and [-6,51], 
respectively. For ease of comparison and analysis, all scores were normalized to the 
range [0,1] according to the range of scores possible with the associated league and 
team size combination. The combinations of such individual and pair values resulted 
in the probability distribution of scores among all possible teams for each league 
size shown in Fig. 3.3. 
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Participants were not given information about the maximum score, the score 
distribution, or the position of the interaction terms, though they could potentially 
have been deduced during play. The icons’ display position and associations with 
the point distribution were shuffled randomly for each game, so that their 
appearance and placement in the display did not give clues as to their point values 
during the course of an experiment session. 
 
 
(a) League size of 24    (b) League size of 48 
Figure 3.3: Distribution of scores for all possible teams in each difficulty (league 
size) condition. 
 
In each round, the following data were automatically recorded for each 
player: the icons on the current team at the end of the round (or choices), the source 
of each icon, and the resulting score. The source information indicated whether each 
icon was unchanged from the previous round (Retained), copied from the player’s 
own previous round team after initially being removed from the team (Returned), 
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copied from the player’s own best-scoring team so far (Retrieved), chosen from the 
league display (Innovated), or copied from another player’s team (Imitated). When 
Imitation was chosen, the persistent identifier of the copied player was recorded to 
allow further analyses of imitation decisions.  
In the case of a player replacing the entire team with Imitated icons, all 
choices were recorded as Imitated, even if one or more of them were already on the 
player’s previous round team. (The same was true of replacing an entire team with 
Retrieved icons, or removing an icon and then putting it back on the team via a 
League choice.) However, a comparison with the player’s previous round team 
allows the determination of a corrected choice source for each icon, effectively 
revealing a potential increase in the Retain choice source, and a potential decrease 
for all other choice sources except the Return choice source. In essence, the original 
uncorrected choice sources reveal the literal actions of players, while the corrected 
choice sources reveal their effects. Score improvements and score ranks were defined 
identically to those in Experiment 1. 
Similar to Experiment 1, guess diversity for a particular round was defined as 
the proportion of icons in the league represented on one or more participants’ 
teams during a given round. This value was normalized by the average expected 
value of this proportion for each participant group size, generated by a Monte Carlo 
simulation assuming independent random teams. (It should be noted that this 
calculation and the associated solution spaces in Experiments 1 and 2 are of 
different types and sizes due to the nature of the task in each.) 
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3.3. Experiment 2 Results 
Participants achieved a mean overall score of .596 (i.e. about 60% of the way 
from the worst score to the best score), and a mean final score of .690. The average 
guess choice source proportions (original and corrected) are shown in Table 3.2. 
The very low Return rate suggested that an average turnover rate defined 
equivalently to that in Experiment 1 could be approximated as one minus the mean 
Retention proportion, or 26.1%. (All further analyses of choice source refer to the 
corrected versions, except where noted.) 
 
Table 3.2: Average Original and Corrected choice source proportions 
Choice Source Imitation Innovation Retention Retrieval Return 
Original 20.6% 14.0% 59.5% 6.5% 0.5% 
Corrected 9.8% 13.7% 73.9% 2.6% n/a 
Difference -10.2% -0.3% +14.4% -3.9% n/a 
 
For the initial analysis, dependent variables were averaged across all 
participants and all rounds to give measures for the group’s aggregate activity in 
each game. These data were analyzed using a repeated-measures ANOVA, treating 
each group as a single subject, with difficulty (league size) as a within-groups factor, 
the group size used as a covariate, and the participant group (session identifier) 
included as a random effect in the model for each dependent variable. Data from the 
first round of each game was excluded from analyses of choice source, because 
several choice sources (Imitated, Retrieved, Retained, and Returned) are only 
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defined relative to a previous round. The above analyses revealed significant main 
effects of difficulty and group size on score and several choice sources, and a 
significant main effect of group size on guess diversity, as well as a significant 
interaction effect between difficulty and group size on guess diversity. These results, 
as well as dependent variable trends over rounds, game order, choice source use, 
score performance, and guess similarity are described in detail below. 
3.3.1 League size / difficulty 
Participants achieved mean overall scores (averaged across all rounds) and 
mean final scores for each League Size as shown in Table 3.3 and Fig. 3.3. Scores 
were normalized as described above, and percentiles were defined as the 
percentage of all possible teams with lower scores than the associated mean score. 
 
 
Table 3.3. Mean score, guess diversity, and choice source proportions in each 
condition. 
League 
Size 
Mean Overall 
Score 
(Percentile) 
Mean Final 
Score 
(Percentile) 
Mean 
Guess 
Diversity 
Mean 
Imitation 
Mean 
Innovation 
Mean 
Retention 
Mean 
Retrieval 
24 .606 (90.1%) .693 (95.7%) 67.6% 6.8% 16.8% 69.5% 6.3% 
48 .539 (93.7%) .634 (98.5%) 63.4% 7.1% 14.9% 72.1% 5.3% 
Diff. -.067*  -.059*  -4.2%* +0.3% -1.9%* +2.6%* -1.0% 
* significant differences 
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 A two-sample t-test was used to examine the main effect of difficulty on each 
dependent variable. It was found that relative to the lower difficulty condition, the 
higher difficulty condition resulted in significantly lower Innovation (t(306.8)=2.71, 
p=0.007), and significantly greater Retention (t(307.5)=-2.02, p=.0445), but no 
significant differences were found for Imitation or Retrieval between difficulty 
conditions, and trends for all were unchanged for uncorrected choice sources. The 
higher difficulty condition resulted in significantly lower guess diversity 
(t(233.8)=2.16, p=.0320), and significantly lower scores (t(305.8)=7.55, p<.0001; 
see Fig. 3.3). The score percentiles achieved are actually higher for the larger League 
Size, but this is most likely due to the difference in the shapes of the two score 
distributions used. 
3.3.2. Rounds 
 Linear mixed-effects regression models were used to examine trends across 
rounds for each dependent variable, with a random effect of group on the slope. 
Analysis of score vs. round showed a strong positive trend (F(1,919)=897.05, 
p<.0001, B=0.717; see Fig. 3.4). The average improvement in score across rounds 
within a game was 23.7%, and trends in scores over rounds were positive for all 
group sizes. Guess diversity showed a significant decrease across rounds 
(F(1,735)=188.62, p<.0001, B=-0.404; see Fig. 3.4), and such trends over rounds 
were more strongly negative for increasing group size. 
As for choice sources, Imitation showed a significant decrease over rounds 
(F(1,681)=126, p<.0001, B=-0.453), as did Innovation (F(1,857)=70.78, p<.0001, 
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B=-0.277). The overall incidence rate of imitation decreased similarly. Retention 
increased significantly across rounds (F(1,857)=21.43, p<.0001, B=0.214), as did 
Retrieval (F(1,857)=9.67, p=.0019, B=0.128; see Fig. 3.5). Using uncorrected choice 
sources revealed no significant changes to these trends, except for slight differences 
in slope.  
 
 
Figure 3.4: Mean score increased and mean guess diversity decreased as more 
rounds were played within a game; stronger effects were observed for larger 
participant group sizes. 
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Figure 3.5: Mean proportions of Retention and Retrieval increased and Imitation 
and Innovation decreased as more rounds were played within a game. 
 
3.3.3. Game order 
 Similar linear mixed-effects models were used to examine trends across 
game order within sessions for each dependent variable. Score displayed a 
significant upward trend across game order (F(1,272)=14.69, p=.0002, B=0.186; see 
Fig. 3.6a). The average improvement in score across game order within a session 
was .056. Guess diversity displayed a corresponding downward trend 
(F(1,216)=20.02, p<.0001, B=-0.180; see Fig. 3.6b). No significant trends were found 
for original or corrected choice source proportions over game order.  
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Figure 3.6: As more games were played within an experimental session, (a) Mean 
score increased, and (b) the diversity of guesses decreased. 
 
3.3.4. Group size 
 Trends across participant group size for each dependent variable were 
examined using linear mixed-effects models, with the group (session identifier) 
used as a random effect on the intercept. Score showed a significant upward trend 
across group size, with an average score difference of 11% between isolated 
participants and those in the largest group size of 9 (F(1,37)=73.62, p<.0001, B 
=0.466; see Fig. 3.7a). Guess diversity decreased significantly for larger groups 
(F(1,29)=38.25, p<.0001, B=-0.663; see Fig. 3.7b).  
As for choice sources, Imitation increased significantly for larger groups 
(F(1,29)=22.35, p=.0001, B=0.565),  and Retention increased as well 
(F(1,37)=12.09, p=.0013, B=0.433), while Innovation decreased (F(1,37)=28.95, 
p<.0001, B=-0.563), and Retrieval decreased as well (F(1,37)=12.46, p=.0011, B=-
0.464; see Fig. 3.8). Original (uncorrected) choice sources showed no trend for 
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Retention across group size, but otherwise maintained the same pattern of results 
noted above, with slight differences in slope.  
 
Figure 3.7: (a) As participant group size increased, mean scores in a group 
increased, and (b) the diversity of offered solutions decreased. 
 
 
Figure 3.8: As participant group size increased, mean proportions of Retention and 
Imitation increased, and Innovation and Retrieval decreased. 
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 Given the results for Imitation above, it is important to determine whether 
the score advantage for larger groups was simply an artifact of the greater chance of 
observing a better score than one’s own given the larger number of guesses being 
made, leading to more imitation and thus higher scores. In order to determine 
whether this was the case, we calculated the score difference variance (SDV): the 
variance of the differences between the top-ranked participant and all other 
participants within each round, averaged within each game. Using a linear mixed-
effects model like the others used for group size analyses above, we confirmed a 
slight but significant upward trend of SDV across group size (F(1,29)=11.37, 
p=.0021, B=0.262). However, a similar analysis of Imitation proportion vs. SDV did 
not reveal any significant trend, and controlling for SDV in the Imitation proportion 
vs. group size model above did not alter it significantly. In other words, the greater 
Imitation in larger groups did not appear to be due to increased score variance. 
 
3.3.5. Score difference and rank in imitation 
 The analyses in this section refer to original uncorrected choice sources, 
because their intent is to capture participants’ awareness of other players’ scores, 
not the content of their guesses. Of all guesses with greater than zero Imitation 
proportion, 94.3% imitated only one other participant, 5.1% imitated two 
participants, and 0.6% imitated more than two participants. Of all instances of 
single-participant imitation, 82.4% involved imitation of participants whose score 
rank was 1 (the top score in the group), 10.7% whose score rank was 2, and 7% 
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whose score rank was 3 or below (see Fig. 3.9a). At the time of such single-source 
imitations, the score of the imitated participant was greater than that of the imitator 
in 89.6% of cases, equal to it in 2.6% of cases, and less than that of the imitator in 
7.8% of cases (see Fig. 3.9b). No significant differences across group size, round, etc. 
were observed in these values. 
 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 3.9: There were biases toward imitating (a) better-scoring participants than 
oneself, and (b) the best-scoring participant, and these biases were unaffected by 
group size. 
 
3.3.6. Choice source strategy 
 The choice sources of each non-isolated participant over the entire session 
were analyzed, and each participant’s choice source strategy was categorized 
according to their proportion of each source.  Participants whose choices contained 
one source in an average proportion greater than the global average for that source 
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plus one standard deviation, were labeled with that strategy. For example, a player 
whose guesses over the course of a session consisted of a greater proportion of 
Imitate choices than the average for all other participants in the experiment, plus 
one standard deviation, were labeled as having an overall strategy of “Imitate.” 
Those who fit the above criteria for more than one choice source, or none, were 
labeled as having a “Mixed” strategy. The score distribution for players in each 
strategy category is shown in Fig. 3.10(a), with the Retain strategy scoring the best, 
followed by Mixed, Imitate, and Retrieve, with Innovate scoring the worst. Analysis 
of original uncorrected choice source strategies showed a similar pattern, except 
that the Imitate and Retain strategies switched places (see Fig. 3.10(b). 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 3.10: Score vs. (a) corrected choice source strategy and (b) uncorrected 
choice source strategy, showing that a conservative and imitative strategy resulted 
in the best performance. 
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The above-mentioned figures summarize the results of simple regression 
analyses performed for score vs. individual and group use of each choice source. A 
linear regression of mean individual score vs. mean individual Imitation guess 
proportion showed a significant positive trend – the greater a participant’s average 
proportion of Imitation, the better the participant’s score (F(1,143)=8.64, p=.0038, 
B=0.239; see Fig. 3.11a). A similar positive trend held for Retention 
(F(1,143)=55.72, p<.0001, B=0.530; see Fig. 3.12a). The opposite was true for 
individual score vs. Innovation, which displayed a significant negative trend 
(F(1,143)=119.8, p<.0001, B=-0.675; see Fig. 3.13a), as did Retrieval 
(F(1,143)=10.93, p=.0012, B=-0.267; see Fig. 3.14a). Analyses of score vs. original 
uncorrected choice sources showed similar trends for Imitation and Innovation, but 
none for Retention or Retrieval. 
A very similar pattern of results was shown in analyses of mean group score 
vs. mean group guess proportion for each choice source, with upward trends for 
Imitation (i.e. the higher a group’s mean Imitation, the higher its mean score) and 
Retention, and downward trends for Innovation and Retrieval (all p<0.001; see Figs. 
3.11b-3.14b). The only difference for analyses of uncorrected mean group choice 
sources was the lack of a trend for Retention. Likewise, a very similar pattern of 
results was found for analyses of mean individual score vs. mean group (excluding 
the individual) guess proportion for each choice source. There was a positive trend 
for Imitation (i.e. the more an individual’s fellow group members imitated, the 
higher the individual’s score), as well as Retention, and negative trends for 
Innovation and Retrieval (see Figs. 3.11c-3.14c). Once again, the only difference for 
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analyses of uncorrected mean group choice sources was the lack of a trend for 
Retention. All trends noted above were generally monotonic; that is, there were no 
thresholds or inflection points beyond which the relationships changed.  
 
 
(a)          (b)             (c) 
Figure 3.11: Higher scores were associated with higher imitation rates for (a) 
individuals and (b) groups, as well as for (c) individuals relative to the imitation 
rates of others in the group (regardless of the individual’s imitation rate).  
 
 
(a)          (b)             (c) 
Figure 3.12: Higher scores were associated with lower innovation rates for (a) 
individuals and (b) groups, as well as for (c) individuals relative to the innovation 
rates of others in the group (regardless of the individual’s innovation rate). 
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(a)          (b)             (c) 
Figure 3.13: Higher scores were associated with higher retention rates for (a) 
individuals and (b) groups, as well as for (c) individuals relative to the retention 
rates of others in the group (regardless of the individual’s retention rate). 
 
 
(a)          (b)             (c) 
Figure 3.14: Higher scores were associated with lower retrieval rates for (a) 
individuals and (b) groups, as well as for (c) individuals relative to the retrieval 
rates of others in the group (regardless of the individual’s retrieval rate).  
 
3.3.7. Improvements 
 As in Experiment 1, improvements were tallied for each participant in each 
session. A histogram of normalized improvement share showed that just over half 
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(54.5%) of participants achieved less than the “fair” share of 1; however, the 
distribution was peaked strongly around 1, and there were no participants who 
obtained zero improvements (see Fig. 3.9). Just as in Experiment 1, in order to 
compare the distributions of improvement sums with an outcome generated from a 
random process, we constructed a Poisson distribution of improvement sums for 
each participant group with lambda (mean value) equal to the mean improvement 
sum for that group, and found the range of values which contained 50% of the 
density in this artificial Poisson distribution. In just over 60% of groups with more 
than one participant, the 50% density range from the associated Poisson 
distribution contained less than 50% of the density of the actual individual 
improvement sums, indicating that they generally had only a slightly greater skew 
than would be expected by chance. 
 
 
Figure 3.15: Histogram showing relatively equal achievement of improvements 
within groups. (A value of 1 indicates an even share, e.g. an individual achieved one-
third of the total improvements in a three-person group.) 
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The mean choice source proportions for guesses that resulted in score 
improvements and those that did not are shown in Table 3.6.  
 
Table 3.6. Mean choice source proportions for improvement and non-improvement 
guesses. 
Choice Source Imitation Innovation Retention Retrieval 
Proportion in non-
improvement 
guesses 
9.9% 12.9% 74.9% 1.7% 
Proportion in 
improvement 
guesses 
8.0% 20.2% 70.0% 1.4% 
Difference -1.9%* +7.3%* -4.9%* -0.3% 
* significant differences 
3.3.8. Guess similarity 
 A comparison between the mean similarity of participants’ most recent 
guesses to those whom they imitated, and to those whom they did not imitate, 
revealed a slight but significant difference: .550 for imitated vs. .503 for non-
imitated (t(5029)=-7.10, p<.0001; see Fig. 3.20). In other words, prior to imitation, 
the average imitators’ guess was more similar to that of the imitated participant(s) 
than to those of others. In addition, the difference between mean similarity for 
imitated and non-imitated participants remained over rounds (see Fig. 3.21). No 
significant trends were observed in linear regressions of guess similarity vs. 
imitated score rank, or similarity vs. the score difference between imitator and 
imitated participants. 
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Figure 3.16: Similarity bias for imitation.  (a) Imitators’ previous guesses showed 
greater similarity to the guesses they imitated than to those they did not imitate. (b) 
The bias toward imitating more similar guesses was consistent across rounds in a 
game. 
 
3.3.9 Frequency and momentum bias 
 In order to measure the bias of participants to choose an icon according to its 
frequency in neighbors’ choices, we tallied the number of players in the group 
whose teams included each icon in the previous round (NR-1), as well as the number 
of the remaining players who added it to their team in the current round via 
Imitation or Innovation. To convert these figures to normalized frequencies, the first 
number was divided by the participant group size (N), and the second number was 
divided by the number of participants who did not possess the icon in the previous 
round (N – NR-1). In this way we were able to measure the mean probability of 
Imitation and Innovation for any icon not already included on a player’s team, based 
on the frequency of its appearance on neighbors’ teams in the player’s display.  
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The chance probability of imitation (resulting from choosing an icon at 
random from among all neighbors’ teams) scales with the choice frequency of an 
icon relative to the team size. The chance level of innovation (resulting from 
choosing an icon at random from the league display) is a constant at one divided by 
the league size. Since league and team size conditions were balanced in all sessions, 
we used the average value of each to calculate the chance baselines. A linear mixed-
effects analysis of imitation probability versus choice frequency showed a positive 
frequency-dependent Imitation bias that was significantly greater than chance 
(F(1,1128)=1648, p<.0001, B=.300; see Fig. 3.17a), as well as a similar but much 
smaller frequency-dependent Innovation bias (F(1,1128)=268.7, p<.0001, B=.062; 
see Fig. 3.17b). Interestingly, the probabilities of Imitation and Innovation only rose 
above chance when the majority of a participant’s neighbors possessed an icon (i.e. 
when Choice Frequency was greater than 0.5). 
 
 
(a)      (b) 
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Figure 3.17: There were biases toward choosing elements that were more 
frequently represented on other teams in (a) Imitation and (b) Innovation decisions, 
showing a copy the majority strategy. 
 
 In a similar analysis of “choice momentum,” we tallied the change in the 
number of players whose teams included the icon in the previous two rounds (NR-1 - 
NR-2), as well as the number of the remaining players who added it to their team in 
the current round via Imitation or Innovation. To convert these figures to 
normalized frequencies, the first number was divided by the participant group size 
(N), and the second number was divided by the number of participants who did not 
possess the icon in either of the previous two rounds (N – max(NR-1,NR-2)). In this 
way we were able to measure the mean probability of Imitation and Innovation for 
any icon not already included on a player’s team, based on the change in frequency 
of its appearance on neighbors’ teams in the player’s display over the previous two 
rounds.  
The distribution of frequency changes for all icons was very nearly 
symmetrical around zero, such that an equivalent number of positive and negative 
proportion changes occurred, with small absolute changes more common than large 
ones. After log-transforming the Imitation probability data to achieve a normal 
distribution, a t-test of Imitation probability for negative and positive changes in 
choice frequency showed a significant positive momentum bias (t(1236)=18, 
p<.0001; see Fig. 3.18a), and a small but non-significant momentum bias for 
Innovation (see Fig. 3.18b). There was also a significant diminishing of the positive 
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momentum-biased Imitation effect across rounds, but no change across game order 
or participant group size. 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 3.18: There were biases toward choosing elements whose representation on 
other teams was increasing in (a) Imitation and (b) Innovation decisions. 
 
3.4. Experiment 2 Discussion 
3.4.1. Dynamics and strategies 
As in Experiment 1, participants’ increasing mean scores across rounds and 
game order assured us that they learned the task and were not guessing randomly. 
The overall character of their strategies shared the conservative pattern of those in 
Experiment 1, as evidenced by the high mean proportion of Retention (which 
increased across rounds); this cautious approach was accentuated in the higher 
difficulty condition. Likewise, the corrected choice source results showed that many 
guess elements that were initially classified as Imitation or Retrieval were actually 
composed of largely Retained elements.  
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Our prediction of a higher mean proportion of Imitation relative to 
Innovation was borne out in participants’ intentions (as recorded in their 
uncorrected choice sources), but contradicted in their effects (corrected choice 
sources) – the actual proportion of solution elements devoted to Innovation was 
higher than Imitation. As predicted, we did find significantly lower Innovation in the 
higher difficulty condition, but as in Experiment 1, there was no significant 
difference in Imitation between conditions. 
Individual guesses became increasingly entrenched over time, as evidenced 
by the decreasing proportions of Innovation and Imitation, and increasing 
proportions of Retention and Retrieval, across rounds. This behavior is consistent 
with the copy when uncertain strategy in that more imitation occurred early on in 
each game when participants had less experience with the current problem. Guesses 
became entrenched at the group level across rounds as well (as shown by 
decreasing group solution diversity) despite decreasing amounts of imitation, 
because the remaining imitation was increasingly driven by convergent biases 
toward greater guess similarity, higher choice frequency, and positive choice 
momentum. These biases also help explain the decrease in guess diversity in the 
greater difficulty condition without an accompanying increase in the incidence of 
imitation. Whereas Baron, Vandello, and Brunsman (1996) found that increasing 
task difficulty increased the incidence of imitation, in this experiment it appears to 
have instead changed the focus of the imitation that occurred to favor increased 
group solution homogeneity. 
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The fact that average final scores are less than 70% of the maximum possible 
score implies that, especially in larger groups, participants are settling on good but 
suboptimal solutions due to insufficient search of the multimodal, “rugged” problem 
space. This result agrees with the findings of Mason, Jones, and Goldstone (2008), 
that fully-connected groups (like the ones in this experiment) performed relatively 
poorly on a multimodal problem space, whereas more sparsely-connected groups 
(lattices and small-world networks) found optimal solutions more reliably, though 
more slowly. 
 The lack of significant changes in choice source proportions across game 
order within sessions implies that learning in the combined context of the problem 
space and the group occurred anew for each game, without major adaptations of the 
members of the group to each other over the course of experiment. This may have 
been due to the lack of communication available for discussing or coordinating 
actions within the group during the session (Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 1994). 
However, guess diversity decreased across game order, suggesting (as with the 
decrease across difficulty conditions noted above) mechanisms of convergence that 
may have operated through the above biases in imitation. 
 
3.4.2. Group size effects (and lack thereof) 
The predicted increase in Imitation with larger group size (after accounting 
for artifactual score variance explanations), along with decreased Innovation and 
Retrieval indicate a bias toward social learning that scales with the number of model 
solutions to compare, choose from, and integrate, and the accompanying increase in 
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score indicates that this was a beneficial strategy for this task. Conversely, the 
reduction in Retrieval with increasing group size indicates a greater dependence by 
isolated individuals and those in smaller groups on the built-in “memory” of the Best 
Score option in the game as a source of reliably good solutions on which to build. 
The combination of these results implies that in larger groups, this function of 
memory may be “outsourced” to others who imitate and thus propagate and 
preserve good solutions within the group. This phenomenon has been explored 
previously as a “division of cognitive labor” in the theory of “transactive memory” in 
group cognition (Theiner, 2009; Wegner, 1986). A different approach to the copy 
when uncertain strategy is shown here: Imitation is favored when the payoff for 
innovation is relatively uncertain, compared to the abundant information available 
about the content and utility of neighbors’ guesses.  
We confirmed the intuitive predictions (and the general pattern from 
Experiment 1) that most imitation events were of the top-ranked neighbor 
(confirming the use of the copy successful individuals strategy), and of neighbors 
with higher scores (confirming the use of the copy if better strategy). The actions of 
imitators who chose non-top-ranked or even lower-scoring neighbors to imitate 
were not explained by similarity between their guesses, and may have been due to 
random errors. The lack of influence of participant group size on this result (as well 
as the roughly monotonic increases in score and Imitation across group size , and 
the more equitable distribution of improvement shares) indicates that the task 
modifications we implemented in this experiment seemed to have the intended 
effect of clarifying the comparison of peer solutions and scores.  
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3.4.3. Choice strategies and cumulative innovation 
The relationship evident between performance and choice strategy, in which 
above-average Retention and Imitation produce higher scores, while above-average 
Innovation and Retrieval produce lower scores, reinforces the evidence from 
Experiment 1 that the overall conservative (but not regressive) approach noted 
above is beneficial for this task. However, a counterpoint for this seemingly simple 
result is provided by the comparison of choice source proportions between 
solutions which generated improvements and those that did not, which showed that 
a replacement of significant amounts of Imitation and Retention with Innovation 
was required to create new and improved solutions. The fact that substantial 
amounts of each of the above three choice sources were present in such improved 
solutions shows that improvements were cumulative, relying on individuals’ own 
past solutions as well as borrowing from others. This, in turn, implies that the 
adaptive value of Imitation in this context is due to its facilitation of selective 
learning and the generation of cumulative improvements with less risky Innovation 
(Boyd & Richerson, 1995; Kameda & Nakanishi, 2003). 
 
3.4.4. Improvements, free-riding, and an absence of tragedy 
The results regarding improvements and their distribution within groups 
indicate that participants shared the task of finding better solutions more equitably 
than if most participants were pursuing a pure social loafing strategy. However, the 
decrease in Innovation and increase in Retention in larger groups, suggest 
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adaptations by group members to limit risky Innovation to what was required to 
achieve “good enough” results given the efforts of others. In fact, it may be that the 
lower end of the distribution of Innovation that actually occurred was nearly 
optimal for the very thin-tailed distribution of scores in the space of possible 
solutions (see Figure 23). Only 4.3% and 1.6% of possible solutions have higher 
scores than the participants’ average final score in the lower and higher difficulty 
conditions, respectively. Thus, although the results showing inequality in individual 
improvement shares indicate a substantial amount of free-riding in this experiment, 
there was no associated “tragedy of the commons” for Innovations (Hardin, 1968; 
Ostrom, 1990). This also offers a plausible explanation for the increased Innovation 
and corresponding lower performance of participants in smaller groups -- having 
fewer fellow players to copy from also provides fewer clues as to the distribution of 
possible scores, which prompts further risky exploration at a higher cost in average 
performance. 
 
3.5. Experiments 1 and 2 – General Discussion 
3.5.1. Factors that influence imitation – when and whom to imitate 
 Participants in both Experiments 1 and 2 displayed fairly conservative 
strategies, typically preserving a large proportion of each guess from round to 
round (through low turnover and high retention, respectively). The entrenchment 
dynamics seen in both experiments showed this characteristic intensifying over 
time, as increasing proportions of guesses were preserved in later rounds. As for the 
changes that were made, Laland (2004) describes several strategies that are 
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observed across a wide range of species. The copy when uncertain strategy seemed 
to be the default at the beginning of both experiments, but for those who learned the 
risks of innovation firsthand, the copy when asocial learning is costly strategy was a 
very likely next resort. Participants almost universally employed the copy when 
better and copy the best strategies as well, and a strategy of frequency-dependent 
imitation that closely resembled copy the majority was prevalent in Experiment 2. 
Participants also showed a positive “momentum bias” toward imitation of solution 
elements that were increasing in overall frequency in the group rather than 
decreasing. This phenomenon has also been shown to occur in an examination of 
baby-naming decisions by parents as revealed by 130 years of social security data 
(Gureckis & Goldstone, 2009). 
 Characteristics of the problem space and the information environment 
played a substantial role in the dynamics of these strategies and their consequences. 
The participant group size-dependent patterns of imitation and its effects in 
Experiment 1 (and the lack thereof in Experiment 2) showed the importance of clear 
and sharable solution information. 
It is useful to note that the task design in both experiments allowed 
participants to pursue hybrid strategies within a single round, in which they 
retained some parts of a solution while changing others using both social and 
asocial learning. One particularly interesting way this was accomplished was 
through similarity-biased imitation. This allowed the imitator to make use of social 
information while keeping a solution partially compatible with previous solutions 
and existing knowledge of the problem space, a phenomenon discussed at length in 
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relation to innovation propagation by Rogers (2003).  A bias toward borrowing 
from similar rather than dissimilar solutions has also been incorporated into 
general machine learning algorithms featuring multiple agents simultaneously 
searching for solutions (Goldberg, 1989).  When agents borrow solution elements 
from other agents pursuing substantially different solutions, there is a strong risk 
that the resulting blend of solutions will be a sub-optimal hybrid not well adapted to 
the niche of either of the original solutions.  By analogy, two solutions to predation 
for a small mammal might be evolve large claws for climb trees effectively or to 
develop large wings for flying.  However, a half-breed that combines both solutions 
might well enact neither solution effectively.  Likewise, given the complex problem 
search landscapes used in the experiments, participants may have been biased to 
copy solution elements from similar rather than dissimilar solutions to ensure 
greater solution compatibility. 
 
 
 
3.5.2 Group-level effects of imitation and innovation 
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that imitation can be individually 
counterproductive when social information cannot be readily compared, integrated, 
and adapted to create new solutions. This situation may arise for several reasons: 
(1) evaluative information is either actually unavailable, or presented in such a way 
that cognitive load effects hinder its use; (2) the problem space is too large or 
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complex for parts of different solutions to be easily analyzed and combined; or (3) 
the problem space is too large for substantial changes to be effectively evaluated.  
The results of Experiment 2 show that when the above-mentioned problems 
can be avoided or ameliorated, imitation can be productive for individuals as well as 
groups, because it enables the preservation of good tentative solutions in “group 
memory” and their further improvement through cumulative innovation. These 
results also showed that the risks of innovation can outweigh the benefits for both 
individuals and groups, and thus become counterproductive when used too much. 
Obviously, a complete lack of innovation will result in a lack of improvements 
(because strategies that combine imitated elements from different models will often 
lose beneficial interactions), but this experiment suggests that in a large and 
complex problem space, at both the individual and group levels, innovation is best 
used sparingly, along with the retention of previous good solutions and imitation of 
others, to improve overall outcomes while maintaining high average performance. 
These two results taken together with the reductions in diversity over time 
imply a view that is at odds with those predicted from a simple Tragedy of the 
Commons (Hardin, 1968) or producer-scrounger dilemma (Kameda & Nakanishi, 
2002) interpretation of social learning. Much like “conformist,” being a “scrounger” 
often carries a negative connotation or denotation, such as “social loafing” (Latané, 
Williams, & Harkins, 1979). However, such behavior may be appropriate when not 
all group members’ full efforts are required to produce sufficient benefit. In a 
complex but relatively stable environment, the best outcome for the group may 
result from most group members converging on a “good enough” solution quickly to 
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achieve high mean performance, and then introducing productive innovations when 
possible. Thus, in some circumstances a tragic (or at least distinctly suboptimal) 
outcome can result from too much innovation and not enough imitation, rather than 
the other way around, because innovation is risky and possibly redundant (and thus 
wasteful of resources), and imitation helps to concentrate efforts and improve the 
thoroughness of search in the proximity of known good solutions. Given some 
baseline inclination to a minimum amount of individual exploration, the limiting 
factor in improving search performance may be the amount of information sharing 
and coordination among searchers, which allow them to pool both the benefits and 
the risks of asocial learning (Hess & Ostrom, 2007). 
Of course, the results obtained here are likely to be highly dependent on the 
problem space and the information environment in use. Though the benefits of 
social learning in a temporally stable environment are often assumed to be evident 
(e.g. Kameda & Nakanishi, 2002), this study illuminates some details about the 
dynamic individual and group-level mechanisms by which these benefits can accrue 
(or not, in some circumstances). Given imperfect individual memory, the “cultural 
knowledge pool” (Kameda & Nakanishi, 2003) requires not only provision of 
information by asocial learning, but also its amplification and preservation through 
mechanisms like frequency-biased adoption, or “conformist transmission” (Boyd & 
Richerson, 1985). Our task, in which solutions have multiple components with 
epistatic relationships, also allowed us to examine how such solutions are built 
cumulatively using selectively varying proportions of different information sources. 
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This adds realistic complexity beyond that provided by models and experimental 
settings with simpler problem structures or less flexible learning strategies.  
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4. Exploration as a Social Dilemma 
4.1 Dilemmas of knowledge 
So far we have found evidence for several important learning strategies 
discussed in previous models and animal research. We have also explored the idea 
that collective search problems like the ones in our experimental tasks are 
potentially susceptible to social dilemmas (though we have not observed evidence 
for such a dilemma). However, we have not sufficiently elaborated upon the 
characteristics of the "resource" involved, how it is created and maintained, or how 
it might be degraded or destroyed. At this point it will be useful to return to the 
literature on social dilemmas to pursue this further. 
 
4.1.1. Stories and assumptions 
Social dilemmas can be said to occur "whenever individuals in 
interdependent situations face choices in which the maximization of short-term self-
interest yields outcomes leaving all participants worse off than feasible alternatives" 
(Ostrom, 1998). Contemporary examples of large-scale social dilemmas include the 
failure to limit the production of atmospheric pollutants, and the overharvesting of 
ocean fish stocks. But such dilemmas can arise in many everyday situations, from 
traffic jams at rush hour to fibbing at tax time. Social dilemmas have often been 
framed in terms of three metaphorical stories: the Prisoner's Dilemma (Poundstone, 
1992), the Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968), and the Logic of Collective 
Action (Olson, 1965). 
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The Prisoner's Dilemma is based on a hypothetical situation in which two 
individuals accused of committing a crime together are questioned separately and 
offered two choices: confess to the crime or keep silent. If both keep silent, the 
authorities can only convict them on minor charges and the penalty for both is mild. 
If both confess, they are convicted for the crime and receive substantial jail 
sentences. If only one confesses, he goes free while the other receives a harsh 
sentence. This set of possibilities is such that whatever the other does, the rational 
(or dominant) option for each individual is to confess. However, if both individuals 
follow this reasoning, the best option for both (keeping silent) is unavailable. (It 
may be that we do not want criminals to be able to escape such a dilemma, but this 
situation can be re-framed in any number of other ways, e.g. an arms race between 
countries, steroid use among competitive atheletes, etc.) The actions of the two 
agents are interdependent such that either can independently increase his own 
payoff at the expense of the other, but the best outcome can only be obtained if both 
have some way to trust the other and jointly increase their payoffs. 
The Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968) is another hypothetical 
situation, in which a pasture (or commons) is available for use by many individuals 
to graze their animals. Each additional animal added to the commons increases its 
owner's payoff in the short term, but reduces the amount of fodder available for all 
of the other animals. In the long term, overgrazing can lead to the ruination of the 
pasture, so that no fodder is available. The marginal benefit of adding another 
animal is obtained by one individual, but the short-term cost is spread across all 
individuals using the commons (a negative externality). This means that the short-
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term benefits outweigh the costs for each individual; if all individuals follow this 
reasoning symmetrically, the long-term benefits (continued grazing capacity) are 
unavailable. Again, this model is not only important for cattle farmers in agrarian 
villages, as it can be re-framed to fit many other situations more relevant to modern 
society (e.g. using lawn sprinklers supplied by a common reservoir during a 
drought). Once again, the important point is that the actions of multiple agents are 
interdependent such that each can increase his or her own short-term payoff at the 
expense of others, but the best long-term outcome can only be obtained if all find 
some way to cooperate. 
The Logic of Collective Action (Olson, 1965) portrays the conflict inherent 
between the self-interests of a large number of firms selling the same good. The 
market for this good is presumed to be perfectly competitive, but in a 
"disequilibrium" state, so that price exceeds marginal cost for all firms. Each would 
like to maximize profits by selling as much of the good as they can produce at the 
highest price possible. However, (under certain assumptions such as high barriers 
to market entry, inelastic demand, and so forth), firms that increase production will 
sell more but also increase the overall supply, which will eventually lower prices. 
Any firm that attempts to unilaterally restrict its own output in order to lower 
supply will simply reduce its revenues, given that no firm has enough market power 
individually to affect prices. All of the firms have a common interest in higher prices, 
but each would rationally prefer that the others bear the cost of lowered production 
in order to get it. (Once again, if one has trouble feeling empathy for the firms 
depicted here, the framing can be changed to that of workers who cannot all earn a 
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sufficient wage if each offers his full capacity to exploitative employers.) In Olson’s 
formulation, the only way to keep prices high is through some external intervention, 
such as government price supports, tariffs, or cartel agreements, the creation of 
which requires costly lobbying or organization. Assuming that the firms somehow 
foresee the problem and band together to collectively create the price-supporting 
intervention (a slight departure from the previous two models), a problem remains. 
Because the market for the good is indivisible, each firm once again has the rational 
incentive to enjoy the benefits of such intervention without contributing to create or 
maintain it, if such contributions (lobbying firm fees or union membership dues) are 
voluntary. Thus the first-order dilemma (agreeing to organize to control prices) is at 
least temporarily solved, but the second-order dilemma (maintaining the costly 
organization) is vulnerable to a “free-riding” problem. 
Each of the above three models illustrates an important point about social 
dilemmas, and the nontriviality of their solutions. Though they can each be adapted 
to resemble familiar situations, problems arise when these models are taken to be 
realistic representations of human behavior. Without denying that social dilemmas 
can have tragic outcomes, it must be noted that the stories above (and the theories 
they represent) involve several overly simplistic assumptions about social 
dilemmas: (1) resource users are strictly selfish maximizers of short-term gains, 
who will not cooperate to overcome a social dilemma, (2) it is a relatively simple 
analytical task to change the incentives of resource users by designing new rules, 
and (3) centralized direction and coercion is required to successfully overcome 
social dilemmas (Ostrom, 1999). In general, the three assumptions above have not 
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been borne out by data gathered on human responses to social dilemmas, in the 
laboratory or in the field. People can in fact recognize the dilemmas they face, and 
change rules and incentives to avoid them (Ostrom, 1990). However, doing so can 
be quite a complex and uncertain process, involving much trial and error, and may 
not always be successful (Sandberg, 2001). Finally, centralized solutions have 
generally not been as successful as those designed using the knowledge and 
participation of local resource users (Sneath, 1998). 
 
4.1.2. Types of goods 
Social dilemmas deal with potential conflicts between agents over a valuable 
resource or good. Two pertinent dimensions over which goods can vary are 
subtractability (whether the use of some portion of the good by one individual 
precludes its use by others), and excludability (the extent to which potential users 
can be prevented from using the resource). Subtractability is generally a binary 
characteristic, and subtractable goods are also known as rivalrous goods, because 
potential users are necessarily rivals when any portion of a good can only be used 
by one of them, but is desired by all. When a subtractable good is scarce and no 
measures are in place to prioritize its use among individuals (such as property 
rights or other rules), the expected result is increased scarcity and conflict. 
However, the characteristic of subtractability can be used to monitor the use of a 
good, which can help in encouraging or enforcing cooperation in a dilemma. 
Excludability is a more continuous characteristic, and need not be absolute in order 
to be effective. Physical and technological means play a role, but legal, social, and 
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cultural norms are important as well; concepts of fairness, justice, and tradition can 
all affect the excludability of a good. 
"Private goods" are those that are both subtractable and excludable, such as a 
tool or a loaf of bread. "Club goods" are those that are excludable but not 
subtractable, such as access to copyrighted works, or a scenic view from fenced 
land. Private and club goods are generally presumed not to entail serious dilemmas, 
because their owners or providers can exclude potential users, and users can avoid 
those which are inefficiently provided. 
Goods which are subtractable but for which exclusion is imperfect or costly 
are known as "common goods" or "common pool resources" (CPRs). Instances of 
these include fisheries, forests, and the canonical example of pasture lands. 
Common-pool resources are typically self-renewing at some finite rate, but a 
dilemma may obtain if individual incentives do not sustain appropriation of the 
resource and avoid overuse or destruction. They have typically been thought of 
according to the Tragedy of the Commons model as described above. 
Goods that are imperfectly excludable and non-subtractable are known as 
"public goods." Instances of these include generally intangible or indivisible items 
such as television broadcasts and the light from lighthouses, respectively. The 
primary potential dilemma for public goods is the "free-riding" problem: how such 
goods can be sufficiently provided and maintained, since they can be used by 
individuals who don't contribute to their provision (free riders). A connected 
problem is how to assure those who wish to contribute (but don't want to waste 
their contribution) that others will do so as well, instead of free-riding (the 
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assurance problem). This dilemma is often modeled using the Logic of Collective 
Action paradigm described above. 
Public Goods and Common Pool Resources are conceptually and naturally 
related, in that a CPR often requires an initial or continuing investment in the 
provision of institutions and infrastructure related to appropriation. This 
investment allows current and future users to participate in the appropriation of the 
resource; that is, the inputs that create the benefit of the institution's continued 
existence are rivalrous even if the resource itself is not. The more general classes of 
provision and appropriation problems are typically modeled and treated separately 
in order to elucidate useful characteristics in alleviating each type of problem 
(Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 1994). 
 
4.1.3. Knowledge as a commons 
The task of understanding knowledge as a good according to the above 
taxonomy can be a bit tricky, because knowledge can take various forms that are 
subject to different uses and norms. Hess and Ostrom's (2007) treatment of 
"Knowledge as a Commons" begins by defining "knowledge" as "all types of 
understanding gained through experience or study" (p. 8). In this intangible form, 
knowledge appears to be a pure public good. Firstly, it is quite difficult to exclude 
potential users: as discussed in previous chapters, humans have a prodigious talent 
and inclination for gaining knowledge from each other, and once a particular idea 
has been understood, it is difficult to un-understand (or "derstand" (Currie, 2010)) 
it by any reliable means, voluntary or coercive. Secondly, one person's 
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understanding of an idea does not preclude or subtract from any other person's; if 
anything, the sharing of understanding can reinforce and preserve it. 
Of course, people have found ways to encode and record this intangible 
understanding in various physical forms (e.g. painted tomb walls, incised clay 
tablets, handwritten paper scrolls, printed books, pressed phonograph records, 
celluloid film, and documents and databases in any number of digital media) in 
order to archive it and pass it on to new potential understanders. The varying 
degrees to which these tools for instantiation of knowledge are subject to physical 
and legal constraint is what complicates the governance of knowledge as a resource. 
As physical objects, printed matter and audiovisual recordings can be 
privately owned by an individual and made inaccessible to others, or held by a 
public library collection for full and free use by one person at a time, or kept in a 
museum's display case where they are observable but not fully usable. Images, text, 
and sound can be encoded digitally and copied more or less effortlessly (though 
they must always be stored in some physical form). 
Despite the non-rivalrous nature of intangible knowledge (and as 
transmission and storage become cheaper, perhaps any digitizable knowledge) as a 
public good, some resources required to create it (money, tools, etc.) are certainly 
rivalrous. To the extent that knowledge depends on more than one person for its 
provision, the classical assurance problem of collective action obtains. To the extent 
that the creation of new knowledge depends on the use of previously existing 
knowledge and (1) the physical infrastructure of knowledge storage and access 
requires resources for maintenance, or (2) knowledge can be appropriated and 
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access prevented, dilemmas of underprovision and overappropriation become 
possible. 
Finally, if a "commons" is defined simply as a "a shared resource that is 
vulnerable to social dilemmas" (Hess & Ostrom, 2007, p. 13), it is easy to see 
"knowledge as a commons." For Hess and Ostrom (2007), analysis of any commons 
requires examinations of equity ("issues of just or equal appropriation from, and 
contribution to, the maintenance of a resource"), efficiency ("optimal production, 
management, and use of the resource"), and sustainability ("outcomes over the long 
term"). We will return to these three criteria to judge the results of our subsequent 
experiments and those of other studies. 
 
4.2. Influence of information environment on social learning strategies 
So far we have not found evidence for a "tragic" outcome in underprovision 
of individual exploration in our participants' collective search behavior over time, 
extreme inequity in provision, or unsustainability in longer-term results. Though 
participants were rather conservative in their strategies, innovation was more 
common on average than imitation, implying a relative lack of harmful "free riding." 
Improvement share was fairly equitably distributed within groups, and final scores 
were quite high in terms of percentiles in the distribution of possible outcomes. 
However, participants generally did not reach optimal solutions, so there could be 
possibilities for improving efficiency and absolute performance through changes in 
participants' incentives and information environment. There may also be important 
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factors that could harm participants' ability to contribute to the production and 
sharing of innovations. 
 
4.2.1. Inefficiency and information 
Previous work has shown that making social learning processes less efficient 
can actually improve the long-term performance of groups attempting to search a 
complex problem space, both in laboratory experiments (Mason, Jones, & Goldstone, 
2008) and agent-based models (Lazer & Friedman, 1997). The reduction in 
efficiency was implemented in these studies by changing the distribution of links in 
the social network connecting participants. This had the effect of slowing the spread 
of information via social learning, encouraging greater exploration, and maintaining 
greater solution diversity among group members, thus avoiding premature settling 
of the group's search on good but suboptimal regions of the problem space. Having 
observed some general dynamics and learning strategies of collective search in the 
experiments described so far, we wished to see whether this seemingly paradoxical 
effect would occur with conceptually similar changes to our experimental paradigm. 
Our previous experiments have also shown that the social learning strategies 
that participants pursue depend on the information available to each participant, 
specifically in terms of the number of other participants sharing information about 
their tentative solutions. Presumably, this is because larger numbers of peers 
sharing information increase the overall reliability of the information available to 
each. As previously discussed, this can be interpreted as an instance of the copy 
when uncertain social learning strategy (Laland, 2004), because greater certainty 
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about the validity of social information increases the relative uncertainty of asocial 
learning. Other work on diffusion of innovations has shown that the use and 
influence of social information depend on the relative ambiguity of the benefit of 
adopting a particular solution (Granovetter, 1978; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1997; Gibbons, 2004). In a model of social foraging 
behavior in a changing environment, Krebs and Inman (1992) showed that if there 
is a delay in an observer’s recognition of the foraging success of a demonstrator, 
there is a corresponding reduction in the information (and thus the benefit) 
provided by the social information provided by the demonstrator; with a long 
enough delay, the observer is better off ignoring the demonstrator and foraging 
asocially. Another result from modeling is that if personal (asocial) and social 
information cannot be gathered simultaneously, there may be no benefit to using 
social information, because they cannot be effectively combined; furthermore, when 
others’ actions are available to be observed, but not the resulting success-related 
cues, social information should be minimized to avoid information cascades 
(Giraldeau, Valone, & Templeton, 2002; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welsh, 1992).  
 
4.2.2. Motivation and conceptual description of changes in Experiment 3 
Having shown in previous experiments that participants can use a variety of 
learning strategies to solve a collective search problem, we wanted to see how these 
strategies would shift in response to changes in the information environment. 
Rather than changing the structure of the social network connecting our 
participants (as in the work cited just above), we decided to simply remove access 
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to score information about others' solutions. Participants would still be able to 
observe and copy their peers, but would have to wait for their own feedback to learn 
the value of imitated choices; information about others' solutions was entirely 
ambiguous, while information about their own solutions was entirely unambiguous. 
This is similar to contexts in which individual animals can observe the behavior of 
others, but not the cues or outcomes that motivate those actions, or situations in 
which private firms can withhold information about revenues (i.e. the success of 
their actions) from competitors. 
We wished to use this relatively small modification to ask questions about 
how the elimination of information supporting one kind of social learning would 
cause participants to change their learning strategies, and how such changes would 
affect performance. As the work above on improved collective search performance 
through reduced communication efficiency indicates, impeding social learning may 
increase asocial learning among most participants. Such an outcome would 
presumably reduce free-riding (improving equity of provision); but would this 
change cause participants to actually find better solutions, or would the reduced 
efficiency of access to previous knowledge (and the inability to use it simultaneously 
with asocial information) reduce the efficiency of knowledge production? 
Presuming that social learning is not displaced entirely by asocial learning, how 
would its prevalence and use change, and what information would be used to direct 
remaining imitation choices? Finally, would these adaptations in behavior improve 
overall individual and collective outcomes and improvements over time 
(sustainability)? 
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In order to avoid ceiling effects on performance and presumably make it 
easier to distinguish the performance of successful social and asocial learning, we 
changed the problem space slightly from the previous experiment to shift some of 
the mass of the score distribution to a longer and fatter upper tail (increasing the 
proportion of solutions with higher scores). This allowed the parallel discovery of 
higher-scoring solutions among participants without requiring as much 
convergence of solution content; performance could be increased without 
necessarily constraining solution diversity. 
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5. Experiment 3 – Creature Game B (score visibility) 
5.1. Experiment 3 Overview 
 The task used in this experiment was the same as the “Creature Game” of 
Experiment 2, with two major changes: (1) the scores associated with peers’ 
solutions were shown in half the games in each experiment session, and hidden in 
the other half; (2) the problem space was changed by adding more positive-scoring 
bonus interactions between solution elements, which had the effect of making the 
upper tail of the score distribution longer and fatter, so that there were relatively 
more solutions with high scores. Modification (1) allowed for the examination of 
differences in strategies and performance associated with differences in the 
available social information. Modification (2), though it made direct comparisons 
with Experiment 2 slightly more tenuous, allowed participants to achieve high 
scores without necessarily converging in their solutions. 
 
5.1.1. Predictions 
Because of the small changes we made to the task, we expected that results 
would be quite similar to those of Experiment 2 when peers’ scores were shown. 
When evaluative information about peer solutions was unavailable, participants 
would be unable to be sufficiently selective in imitation, and thus participants 
employing highly imitative strategies would have relatively lower scores than those 
with less imitation-heavy strategies, participants would employ less imitation and 
more innovation, and solution diversity would increase. Similarity-biased and 
frequency-biased imitation strategies would be stronger when peer scores were 
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invisible, in order to compensate for the lack of direct evaluative information. 
Overall, rather than improving exploration behavior, the impedance of social 
learning by making peer scores invisible would result in lower mean scores 
(including those of relatively successful asocial learners) because they would be 
unable to easily take advantage of good solutions found by others through selective 
imitation and further improve upon them. 
 
5.2. Experiment 3 Methods 
234 participants were recruited from the Indiana University Psychology 
Department undergraduate subject pool, and were given course credit for taking 
part in the study. Participants populated each session by signing up at will for 
scheduled experiments with a maximum capacity of 9 persons, and were distributed 
across 65 sessions as shown in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1: Distribution of participants across group sizes in Experiment 3 
Group size 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
# Sessions 16 8 11 11 7 2 4 4 2 
# Participants 16 16 33 44 35 12 28 32 18 
 
The task used was nearly identical to that of Experiment 2, with the following 
changes. To more easily fit the session in the one-hour time limit required for 
experiments using our subject pool, there were six games per session instead of 
eight. In three of these games (the invisible-scores condition), the scores of other 
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participants were not shown along with their solutions from the previous round; in 
the other three games (the visible-scores condition), other participants’ scores were 
shown. Of course, this distinction only mattered in sessions that included more than 
one participant. 
The distribution of individual point values for the icons was the same as for 
the larger league size in Experiment 2, but seven new positive bonus interactions 
were added between icons, and several existing interaction values were shifted to 
different pairs of icons, as shown in Fig. 5.1 (compare to Fig. 3.2b). These changes 
had the effect of increasing the complexity of the problem space, as well as 
increasing the number of possible high-scoring teams. As a result, the possible score 
range changed to [-6,88], but all scores were again normalized to the range [0,1] for 
ease of analysis. (Note that due to this shift, normalized scores cannot be directly 
compared between Experiments 2 and 3.) The combinations of these individual and 
pair values resulted in the probability distribution of scores among all possible 
teams shown in Fig. 5.2 (compare to Fig. 3.3b). 
 
Figure 5.1: Point distribution for individual icons (boxes) and interaction bonuses 
and penalties (ovals). 
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Figure 5.2: Distribution of scores for all possible teams. 
 
5.3. Experiment 3 Results 
5.3.1 Overall means 
Mean dependent variables in each condition are shown in Table 5.2 (see also 
Fig. 5.2). Of all grouped participants, 81.7% had higher mean scores in the visible-
scores condition than in the invisible-scores condition (see Figure 5.3). Isolated 
participants achieved mean overall and final scores of .356 and .395. 
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Table 5.2. Mean score, guess diversity, and choice source proportions by condition 
Cond. 
Overall Score 
(Percentile) 
Final Score 
(Percentile) 
Guess 
Diversity 
Imitation Innovation Retention Retrieval 
Visible .447* (92.6%) .523* (97.5%) 62.2%* 9.1% 13.4%* 75.0%* 2.4%* 
Invis. .394* (89.1%) .475* (94.6%) 79.0%* 8.4% 15.0%* 71.0%* 4.2%* 
Isolated 
Partic. 
.356 (81.4%) .395 (89.1%) -- -- 29.2% 55.8% 13.7% 
* significant differences between conditions 
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Figure 5.3: Scattergram of individuals’ mean scores in each condition, labeled with 
their participant group size. 
 
5.3.2. Rounds 
 Linear mixed-effects models were used to examine trends across rounds for 
score and guess diversity, with a random effect of participant group. Analysis of 
score versus round showed a strong positive trend for grouped participants in the 
visible-scores condition (F(1,1126)=521.82, p<.0001, B=.656, mean total 
increase=0.220), and a slightly shallower positive trend in the invisible-scores 
condition (F(1,1126)=446.53, p<.0001, B=.727, mean increase=0.172; see Fig. 5.4). 
Guess diversity showed a similarly strong decrease across rounds in the visible-
scores condition (F(1,1126)=304.78, p<.0001, B=-.443, mean change=-0.468), and a 
weaker decrease in the invisible-scores condition (F(1,1126)=97.31, p<.0001, B=-
0.453, mean change=-0.271; see Fig. 5.4). Isolated participants’ scores increased 
much less (though significantly) across rounds (F(1,751)=30.26, p<.0001, B=.348, 
mean increase=0.075; see Fig. 5.4). 
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Figure 5.4: Scores increased and guess diversity decreased more across rounds in 
the scores-visible condition than in the scores-invisible condition. 
 
Trends for choice sources across rounds showed very similar patterns to 
those in Experiment 2: Imitation and Innovation decreased significantly, and 
Retrieval and Retention increased significantly. There were no substantial 
differences in slopes between conditions, nor substantial differences with the slopes 
over rounds found in Experiment 2. 
 
5.3.3. Game order 
 Similar linear mixed-effects models were used to examine trends across 
game order for each dependent variable within conditions. For this analysis, the 
game order value for each game was corrected to its order within the condition, i.e. 
Game 1, 2, or 3 in each condition. Score displayed a slight but significant increase 
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across game order in the visible-scores condition (F(1,97)=16.57, p=.0001, B=0.264, 
mean change=+0.048; see Fig. 5.5), and a small but non-significant increase in the 
invisible-scores condition. Guess diversity displayed a corresponding decrease 
across game order in the visible-scores condition (F(1,97)=62.09, p<.0001, B=-
0.263, mean change=-0.103), as well as in the invisible-scores condition 
(F(1,97)=70.79, p<.0001, B=-0.363, mean change=-0.115; see Fig. 5.5). 
 As for choice sources, changes over game order within conditions were 
generally slight. Imitation decreased slightly but significantly over game order in the 
visible-scores condition (F(1,97)=6.24, p=.0141, B=-0.121, mean change=-0.011), 
while increasing significantly in the invisible-scores condition (F(1,97)=32.97, 
p<.0001, B=0.289, mean change=+0.040; see Fig. 5.6a). Innovation decreased 
significantly across game order within both the visible-scores (F(1,97)=26.82, 
p<.0001, B=-0.173, mean change=-0.028) and the invisible-scores (F(1,97)=41.04, 
p<.0001, B=-0.226, mean change=-0.036; see Fig. 5.6a) conditions. Retention 
increased significantly only in the visible-scores condition (F(1,97)=29.97, p<.0001, 
B=0.252, mean change=+0.041; see Fig. 5.6b), and Retrieval increased significantly 
only in the invisible-scores condition (F(1,97)=14.42, p=.0004, B=0.228, mean 
change=+0.012; see Fig. 5.6b). 
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Figure 5.5: Score increased significantly only in the visible-scores condition, and 
guess diversity decreased in both conditions. 
 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 5.6: (a) Imitation and Innovation decreased significantly in the scores-visible 
condition, while Imitation increased and Innovation decreased in the scores-
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invisible condition. (b) Retention increased significantly only in the visible-scores 
condition, and Retrieval increased significantly only in the invisible-scores condition 
 
5.3.4. Group size 
 Trends across participant group size for each dependent variable within 
conditions were examined using linear mixed-effects models, with the participant 
group used as a random effect on the intercept. Score increased significantly with 
group size in the visible-scores condition (F(1,63)=79.59, p<.0001, B=0.580), as well 
as in the invisible-scores condition (F(1,63)=15.45, p=.0002, B=0.309; see Fig. 5.7), 
though the latter trend was not as strong.  Guess diversity showed a corresponding 
decrease with increasing group size in the visible-scores condition (F(1,47)=68.83, 
p<.0001, B=-0.699), as well as a weaker trend in the invisible-scores condition 
(F(1,47)=17.28, p=.0001, B=-0.430; see Fig. 5.7). 
As for choice sources, Imitation increased significantly for larger groups in 
both the scores-visible (F(1,47)=41.47, p<.0001, B=0.597) and scores-invisible 
(F(1,47)=28.04, p<.0001, B=0.500; see Fig. 5.8a) conditions,  and Innovation 
decreased significantly for larger groups in both the scores-visible (F(1,47)=18.42, 
p=.0001, B=-0.492) and scores-invisible (F(1,47)=14.04, p=.0005, B=-0.436; see Fig. 
5.8a) conditions. Retention increased for larger groups only in the scores-visible 
condition (F(1,47)=5.91, p=.019, B=0.286; see Fig. 5.8b), while Retrieval showed no 
significant trend across  group size (see Fig. 5.8b). 
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Figure 5.7: As participant group size increased, mean scores in a group increased, 
and the diversity of offered solutions decreased, with slightly weaker effects for 
both in the invisible-scores condition. 
 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 5.8: As participant group size increased, (a) mean proportions of Imitation 
increased and Innovation decreased in both conditions, and (b) Retention increased 
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only in the visible-scores condition, and Retrieval showed no significant change 
across group size. 
 
5.3.5. Differences in imitation 
 Of all instances of single-participant imitation, the score of the imitated 
participant was greater than that of the imitator significantly more often in the 
visible-scores condition than in the invisible-scores condition (t(74)=16.07, 
p<.0001; see Fig. 5.9a); in the latter condition, the probability was about 54%, or 
approximately at chance. In addition, there was a significantly greater probability of 
imitating the top-scoring solution in the group in the visible-scores condition 
(t(80)=20.08, p<.0001; see Fig. 5.9b).  
To examine separately how often and how much participants imitated one 
another, we measured the mean proportion of guesses in which there was greater 
than zero Imitation (Imitation incidence), as well as the mean Imitation proportion 
in such cases  (Imitation proportion). Mean Imitation incidence was significantly 
higher in the visible-scores condition (F(1,229)=31.17, p<.0001), but the 
distribution of mean imitation proportions was weighted significantly more heavily 
toward higher values in the invisible-scores condition, as shown by a Kolmogorov-
Smirnoff test of equality of distributions (D=0.1893, p<.0001; see Fig. 5.10). In other 
words, participants in the scores-invisible condition copied one another less 
frequently but in larger amounts at a time. 
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(a)      (b) 
Figure 5.9: In the visible-scores condition there were strong biases toward imitating 
(a) better-scoring participants than oneself, and (b) the best-scoring participant, 
while imitation behavior in the invisible-scores condition appeared essentially 
random with respect to score difference and score rank. 
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Figure 5.10: For guesses that included at least some Imitation, participants in the 
invisible-scores condition had higher proportions of Imitation in their guesses. 
5.3.6. Choice source strategy 
 As in Experiment 2, the choice sources of each non-isolated participant over 
the entire session were analyzed, and each participant’s choice source strategy was 
categorized according to their proportion of each source.  Participants whose 
choices contained one source in an average proportion greater than the global 
average for that source plus one standard deviation, were labeled with that strategy. 
For example, a player whose guesses over the course of a condition consisted of a 
greater proportion of Imitate choices than the average for all other participants in 
that condition, plus one standard deviation, were labeled as having an overall 
strategy of “Imitate.” Those who fit the above criteria for more than one choice 
source, or none, were labeled as having a “Mixed” strategy. The score distribution 
for each strategy category in each condition is shown in Fig. 5.11. 
 
 
(a)      (b) 
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Figure 5.11: Score vs. choice source strategy in (a) visible-scores and (b) invisible-
scores conditions, showing that a conservative high-Retention strategy resulted in 
the best performance, though a similarly conservative high-Retrieval strategy 
(returning often to a personal best-so-far) showed good relative performance in the 
invisible-scores condition. 
 
The above-mentioned figures summarize the results of simple regression 
analyses performed for score vs. individual and group use of each choice source. A 
linear regression of mean individual score vs. mean individual Imitation guess 
proportion showed a significant positive relationship (that is, the greater a 
participant’s average proportion of Imitation, the better the participant’s score), but 
only in the visible-scores condition (F(1,216)=8.12, p=.005, B=0.190; see Fig. 5.12a); 
no significant relationship was found in the invisible-scores condition. The opposite 
was true for individual score vs. Innovation, which displayed a significant negative 
relationship in both the visible-scores (F(1,216)=146.2, p<.0001, B=-0.635; see Fig. 
5.12b) and invisible-scores (F(1,216)=67.88, p<.0001, B=-0.489) conditions. A 
positive relationship held for Retention in both the visible-scores (F(1,216)=64.6, 
p<.0001, B=0.480; see Fig. 5.12c) and invisible-scores (F(1,216)=13.81, p=.0003, 
B=0.245) conditions. Finally, a positive relationship was found for Retrieval in only 
the invisible-scores condition (SI: F(1,216)=12.73, p=.0005, B=0.236; see Fig. 5.12d). 
As in Experiment 2, analyses of mean group score vs. mean group guess 
proportion for each choice source showed similar relationships of the same 
significance and directions as those noted above, as well as analyses of mean 
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individual score vs. mean group (excluding the individual) guess proportion, with 
the exception of the absence of a relationship with Retrieval at both levels. All 
trends noted above were generally monotonic; that is, there were no thresholds or 
inflection points beyond which the relationships changed.  
 
 
(a)      (b) 
 
(c)      (d) 
Figure 5.12: Higher individual scores were associated with (a) higher individual 
Imitation only in the visible-scores condition, (b) lower Innovation in both 
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conditions, (c) higher Retention in both conditions, while (d) higher individual 
Retrieval only in the invisible-scores condition. Best fitting linear regression lines 
are only shown when the linear relation was significant. 
  
5.3.7. Improvements 
As in Experiment 1, improvements were tallied for each participant in each 
session and condition. Histograms of normalized improvement share showed a 
relatively equitable distribution of improvements within groups in the visible-
scores condition, with a distribution strongly peaked near a “fair share” of 1 (56% of 
participants were between 0.4 and 1.2), and only 6.4% of participants having zero 
improvements; in contrast, there was a strongly inequitably-skewed distribution in 
the invisible-scores condition, with only 36.2% of participants having improvement 
shares between 0.4 and 1.2, and 21.1% with zero improvements (see Fig. 5.13). A 
Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test of equality of distributions indicated that these 
distributions were significantly different (D = 0.1789, p=0.002). Mean overall score 
showed a strong positive correlation with improvement share in the invisible-scores 
condition (F(1,168)=64.49, p<.0001, B=0.369), but this relationship was not evident 
in the visible-scores condition. 
The mean choice source proportions for guesses that resulted in score 
improvements and those that did not are shown in Table 5.3. In both conditions, the 
proportion of Innovation choices was higher for guesses that yielded improvements 
relative to non-improvements (invisible-scores: t(733.20)=-14.03, p<.0001; visible-
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scores: t(907.73)=-17.14, p<.0001). In the invisible-scores condition, the proportion 
of Imitation choices was significantly lower for improvements than non-
improvements (t(916.77)=11.54, p<.0001), while in the visible-scores condition, the 
proportion of Retention choices was significantly lower for improvements than non-
improvements (t(916.33)=9.34, p<.0001). Of all improvements in the visible-scores 
condition, 24.2% resulted from guesses that included Imitation, versus 12.2% in the 
invisible-scores condition. In 52.3% of all improvements in the visible-scores 
condition, the focal player imitated at least one peer who had previously imitated 
the focal player, versus 41.5% in the invisible-scores condition. In other words, a 
player who was imitated by another player often later imitated that same player in 
the course of creating an improvement, but this happened substantially more often 
when scores were visible. 
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Figure 5.13: Histograms showing relatively equitable achievement of improvements 
within groups in the visible-scores condition, and an inequitable distribution in the 
invisible-scores condition. 
 
Table 5.3: Mean choice source proportions for improvement and non-improvement 
guesses in each condition. 
Condition Improvement % of guesses Imitation Innovation Retention Retrieval 
Visible 
Scores 
No 94.6% 9.1% 11.4%* 76.3%* 2.2% 
Yes 5.4% 8.2% 19.4%* 69.5%* 2.1% 
Invisible 
Scores 
No 95.6% 10%* 13.3%* 71.2% 4.4% 
Yes 4.4% 3.9%* 21.6%* 70.5% 3.5% 
* significant differences within condition 
5.3.8. Guess similarity 
 A comparison between the mean similarity of participants’ most recent 
guesses to those whom they imitated, and to those whom they did not imitate, 
revealed slight but significant differences in both conditions, but in opposite 
directions. In the scores-visible condition, there were similarity values of .563 for 
imitated vs. .524 for non-imitated guesses (t(5084)=-5.47, p<.0001; see Fig. 5.14a). 
In the scores-invisible condition, there were similarity values of .316 for imitated vs. 
.346 for non-imitated guesses (t(4267)=4.35, p<.0001; see Fig. 5.14b). In other 
words, prior to imitation, the average imitators’ guess was more similar to that of 
the imitated participant(s) than to those of others in the scores-visible condition, 
and less similar in the scores-invisible condition. 
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(a)      (b) 
Figure 5.14: (a) In the scores-visible condition, imitators’ previous guesses showed 
greater similarity to the guesses they imitated than to those they did not imitate, 
while (b) in the scores-invisible condition, the opposite effect was observed. 
 
5.3.9. Frequency and momentum bias 
 As in Experiment 1, we measured the bias of participants to choose an icon 
according to its frequency in peers’ choices. To reiterate briefly, we measured the 
mean probability of Imitation and Innovation for any icon not already included on a 
player’s team, based on the frequency of its appearance on peers’ teams in the 
player’s display, and compared them to expected chance baselines. 
Linear mixed-effects analysis of imitation probability versus choice 
frequency showed a positive frequency-dependent Imitation bias that was 
significantly greater than chance in the visible-scores condition (F(1,604)=943.25, 
p<.0001, B=.741), but significantly lower than chance in the invisible-scores 
condition (F(1,604)=231.67, p<.0001, B=.470; see Fig. 5.15a). There was a slight 
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positive frequency-dependent Innovation bias above chance in the visible-scores 
condition (F(1,604)=181.20, p<.0001, B=.441), and below chance in the invisible-
scores condition (F(1,604)=12.78, p=.0004, B=.131; see Fig. 5.15b).  
 We also repeated the analysis of “choice momentum,” by tallying the change 
in the number of players whose teams included the icon in the previous two rounds, 
as well as the number of the remaining players who added it to their team in the 
current round via Imitation or Innovation, and normalizing for group size. After log-
transforming the Imitation probability data to achieve a normal distribution, a t-test 
of Imitation probability for negative and positive changes in choice frequency 
showed a significant positive momentum bias in the visible-scores condition 
(t(640)=-14.192, p<.0001), and a smaller positive bias in the invisible-scores 
condition (t(661)=-9.98, p<.0001; see Fig. 5.16a). A slight positive momentum bias 
was found for Innovation in the visible-scores condition, but no corresponding 
significant bias was found in the invisible-scores condition (see Fig. 5.16b).  
 
 
(a)      (b) 
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Figure 5.15: There were biases toward choosing elements that were more 
frequently represented on other teams in the visible-scores condition, and less 
frequently represented on other teams in the invisible-scores condition for (a) 
Imitation and (b) Innovation decisions. 
 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 5.16: There were biases toward choosing elements whose representation on 
other teams was increasing in (a) both conditions for Imitation and (b) only the 
visible-scores condition for Innovation decisions. 
 
5.4. Experiment 3 Discussion 
 As predicted, results in the scores-visible condition were quite similar to 
those in Experiment 2, while the results in the scores-invisible condition differed in 
some ways we did not predict. 
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5.4.1. Differences in performance 
 Having demonstrated benefits for Imitation in the previous experiments, the 
impediment to social learning introduced in the invisible-scores condition lowered 
performance as predicted. Thus, the reduction in the efficiency of social learning 
implemented by hiding peers’ scores did lead to increased Innovation and solution 
diversity, but did not seem to improve collective search performance as in Mason, 
Jones, and Goldstone (2008) and Lazer & Friedman (1997). This difference from the 
studies cited above was likely due to the way that communication efficiency was 
reduced: whereas they decreased the connectivity of the social network through 
which information was exchanged, we left the network unchanged but eliminated an 
important part of the information that participants used to guide imitation 
decisions. Our results are substantially in accordance with the findings of Giraldeau, 
Valone, and Templeton (2002), who found that an inability to combine the use of 
social and asocial learning simultaneously would result in a lack of benefit for social 
learning; however, we did observe some benefit for social learning, in that 
participants in the invisible-scores condition still performed better than isolated 
participants. 
 
5.4.2. Differences in strategy 
Overall, the change in the availability of performance information seemed to 
shift participants’ tactics from making small changes to their guesses, combining 
asocial and social learning (incrementalist strategies) in the visible-scores condition, 
to making larger jumps around the problem space and often jumping back to 
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previous known good solutions (saltationist strategies) in the invisible-scores 
condition. This difference was discernible in a number of results. First, when scores 
were invisible, proportions of Innovation and Retrieval were higher and Retention 
was lower, implying that on average participants were keeping smaller portions of 
their guesses from round to round and changing often between new and old 
solution elements. Though the overall mean proportion of Imitation was the same in 
both conditions, Imitation was used less often and for a larger proportion of the 
guess in the invisible-scores condition – participants were significantly more likely 
to copy most or all of a peer’s solution. The lower mean Retention in the invisible-
scores condition implies that participants were often jumping to a peer’s guess and 
either keeping it if it increased their score, or jumping back to their Retrieved 
previous best guess if it did not.  
The ability to make incremental changes, mixing elements from all sources, 
should allow participants to assess the effect of smaller changes and make better 
judgments about the quality of individual elements and pairs from other 
participants; thus there were substantial increases in score across rounds and 
associations of Retention and Imitation with high scores observed in the visible-
scores condition. A reliance on large risky jumps around the problem space would 
likely pay off about half the time for the median participant, and those who jumped 
back to good previous solutions would lose less overall than those who continually 
jump around; thus there were shallower increases in score over rounds, and an 
association of higher scores with Retrieval but not Imitation in the invisible-scores 
condition. This saltationist strategy seems to have been more successful than not 
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using Imitation at all, however, as shown by the substantially lower performance of 
isolated participants. 
The removal of score information also affected the use of other kinds of 
information in participants’ imitation strategies; however, rather than 
strengthening socially-mediated information biases (as suggested by Abrahamson 
and Rosenkopf (1997) and Gibbons (2004)) such as frequency bias or similarity 
bias, participants actually showed weakened or opposite inclinations. The above 
interpretation in terms of changing the magnitude of movements in the problem 
space holds here as well. Copying a similar solution to your own is an inherently 
incrementalist strategy, so the presence of this bias in the visible-scores condition, 
and the presence of its opposite in the invisible-scores condition can also be 
explained in terms of an overall change from incrementalist to saltationist 
strategies. The unpopularity bias and reduced momentum bias we observed may 
have occurred because participants knew that imitation decisions were often not 
based on reliable performance information, and thus frequency-based biases should 
be avoided to keep from joining information herds (Banerjee, 1992), as suggested 
by Giraldeau, Valone, and Templeton (2002). 
 
5.4.3. Learning? 
Changes in strategy across game order can be thought of as learning or 
adaptation to the task over successive games. The changes we observed across game 
order imply that strategies in each condition were strengthened over the course of 
the session. In the visible-scores condition, the decreases in Innovation and 
126 
Imitation and increase in Retention show a more incrementalist approach, while in 
the invisible-scores condition, the increases in Imitation and Retrieval and decrease 
in Innovation displayed more solidly saltationist tendencies. It is fairly simple to see 
that an increasingly incrementalist strategy that included some Imitation would 
show an increasing payoff in terms of being able to distinguish good individual 
elements and pairs, and the improvement in score across game order in the visible-
scores condition reflects this. An increasingly saltationist strategy, however, is not 
likely to show benefits unless the solutions of one’s peers improve, and thus we saw 
no improvement in score across game order in the invisible-scores condition. There 
is no obvious better-performing strategy in this context, however, so participants 
seemingly doubled down on this one. 
 
5.4.4. Convergent / locally efficient search 
As seen in the increasing score and decreasing guess diversity trends across 
rounds, average performance increased via the convergence of group members on 
regions of the problem space that contained high-quality teams. This convergence 
combined with a small amount of individual exploration caused such regions to be 
explored more thoroughly and still better solutions to be found. However, in the 
invisible-scores condition, when imitation was not focused on a small group of 
better-performing neighbors (because performance information was not available), 
similar guesses, or popular solution elements, this convergence happened much 
more slowly, search was more diffuse and less efficient, and lower performance 
resulted. The weaker trends of increasing score and decreasing guess diversity 
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across group size in the invisible-scores condition showed that the lack of score 
information made searchers unable to effectively take advantage of the increasing 
numbers of their fellow searchers. 
 
5.4.5. Cumulative mutual improvement 
The significant correlation of improvement share with mean scores in the 
invisible-scores conditions shows that individuals who were relatively more skillful 
(or lucky) were rewarded with proportionately better overall scores compared to 
others; this was because their fellow players could not easily copy their 
improvements and achieve their scores, and because knowing that Imitation was 
unreliable made some participants more likely to seek out improvements on their 
own. In the visible-scores condition this correlation disappeared, but the more 
equitable distribution of improvements showed that more participants were 
contributing to their discovery, and mean scores increased significantly such that 
nearly all participants did better. In other words, when social learning was 
unimpeded in the visible-scores condition, high and low individual achievers had 
approximately the same payoffs, but absolute payoffs were higher for all compared 
to the invisible-scores condition, in which high-achievers got a bigger piece of a 
smaller pie. Thus impeding social learning led to relatively greater inequity and 
inefficiency, and presumably lower long-term performance (though we did not test 
this explicitly with longer games). 
This advantage for more efficient social learning accrued because imitators 
were not merely scroungers; the substantial proportion of Imitation present in 
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improvements shows that imitated guesses were often the basis for further 
cumulative innovations. The cumulative innovation hypothesis is supported by the 
fact that a larger proportion of improvements were the result of mutual Imitation in 
the visible-scores condition, in which solution elements were passed between 
players via copying and built into better solutions in the process. This enabled a 
more active sharing of the “labor” of producing improvements, and increased 
performance from participants overall. In the invisible-scores condition, the 
necessity of adopting others’ guesses in order to obtain information about their 
performance allowed fewer opportunities to evaluate variations on them; it also 
prevented group members from performing the “filtering” function of copying and 
consistently retaining only solution elements associated with relatively high scores, 
so that others would have less chance of obtaining low-scoring solution elements 
when copying. 
 
5.5. Conclusions 
 In Experiment 2, we noted the lack of a “tragic” outcome in the production 
and use of high-scoring solutions, despite the apparent incentive for individuals to 
under-produce innovations and free-ride on the innovations of others via self-
interested imitation. In this experiment, we showed that it was possible to induce a 
tragic outcome by reducing the capacity of individuals to make self-interested 
imitation decisions, even while they increased their production of innovation. 
It appears that lower performance in this task was not due to an 
underprovision of individual innovation, but a lack of evaluative filtering of solution 
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elements, which participants in the visible-scores condition did by choosing to 
imitate and retain solution elements associated with high scores, and which in the 
scores-invisible condition was made much more difficult. The consistent use of the 
better-performing solutions does not rely on altruistic or publicly-minded motives, 
but such filtering is important for supporting others' successful social learning, as 
was highlighted in a recent tournament of simulated social learning strategies 
(Rendell et. al 2010). In summary, we have shown through this experiment that 
when knowledge is cumulative, efficient and informed appropriation is an 
important step in further provision of the public good of knowledge. 
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6. Knowledge as Property  
6.1. Promoting progress 
In two parts of the social learning experiments described thus far (larger 
group sizes in Experiment 1, and the invisible-scores condition in Experiment 3), we 
have seen that despite apparently adequate provision of innovation, obstacles to 
accurate, strategic imitation of those innovations can lead to underperformance in 
further innovation. In this chapter we will explore some measures taken in the real 
world to (ostensibly) encourage efficient innovation and (eventual) imitation, and 
introduce several important concepts for understanding their implications on the 
related public and common goods of knowledge discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
6.1.1. The Progress Clause 
Practical research and development are costly activities in terms of money, 
effort, time, risk, and opportunity. These activities generally will not be undertaken 
unless their results have some expected value to justify their costs. The "Progress 
Clause" of the U.S. Constitution empowers the legislature "To promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Many other 
countries have enacted similar statutes and policies protecting "intellectual 
property" (IP), which generally allow the originators of certain innovations to 
control the dissemination or production (and thus the benefit) of the products of 
their innovations. (This clause covers the creation of both patents and copyrights; in 
this chapter and the next, we will be focusing on patents, though many of the same 
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arguments could apply to copyrights.) The owner of a patent granted by the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office is given the right to exclude others from "making, 
using, selling, offering to sell, or importing" the patented invention (35 U.S.C. § 271), 
and this right can be renewed until 20 years after the patent application was filed 
(35 U.S.C. § 154). In exchange, a patent applicant must describe the invention in 
enough detail so that a person who is skilled in the field would be able to make and 
use the invention (35 U.S.C. § 112). 
The disclosure required for a patented invention can be considered a 
contribution to a knowledge commons, in that the information that enables one to 
"make and use" the invention can also be used to improve it, or to create other 
inventions. As Ghosh (2003) notes, the characterization of a good as rivalrous 
depends on the property rights that govern it. The exclusive control over an 
invention that IP statutes give to creators can make that invention usable by only 
one individual or firm, and so artificially transform practical knowledge into a 
subtractable resource. Thus the exercise of IP rights can be considered 
appropriation of resource units from the commons, which cannot be done in an 
unrestrained way without threatening the viability of the resource.  
The balance of rights and responsibilities in these provisions implicitly 
acknowledges that individual innovation is encouraged for the purpose of the 
extending the collective benefits of the general progress of knowledge. The standard 
assumption about the intent of the "Progress Clause" is that it was motivated by the 
framers' view that "encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best 
way to advance public welfare" (Mazer v Stein, 1954). That is, public benefit is the 
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primary intended end, and the provision of a private incentive is the preferred 
means for achieving it. As discussed previously, however, privatization of a resource 
is not always the best way of ensuring its equitable, efficient, and sustainable use. 
 
6.1.2. Measuring the promotion of progress 
The progress of science depends on the incentives that inventors have to 
invest in research and development, as well as to disseminate their inventions to 
those who can productively adopt them in society at large. Thus, the success of 
patent statutes in the promotion of scientific progress can be usefully evaluated on 
the basis of the net effects of the IP system, both for those who directly advance the 
progress of science, and for the general populace. There are undoubtedly benefits 
that accrue to many patent holders as a result of their exchange of ideas for money, 
as there are plainly benefits to society in the form of patented modern technologies. 
The question is whether the rewards of the IP system outweigh its costs for all 
inventors (both those who are IP holders and those whose inventions are not 
protected by IP), and the society and economy in which they work. (The latter can 
be considered an extension of the former: as economies and societies grow, new 
technological needs arise and thus new opportunities for innovation.) Here we will 
take a short detour to examine previous attempts to answer this question 
empirically, as well as the theories underlying IP systems; these will help constrain 
and motivate our final experiment. 
Though "rights" can seem rather abstract, proxies have been developed for 
studying the quantitative effects of various factors on overall economic growth in 
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cross-national econometric studies, including protections for property rights. 
Generally, traditional property rights (those governing e.g. objects or real estate) 
have a strong and unambiguous relationship with growth (Svejnar, 2002; Keefer & 
Knack, 1995, 1997). Park and Ginarte (1997) performed a regression using indices 
of "market freedom" (i.e. traditional property rights) as well as IP rights, and 
confirmed that the former had a strong relationship with growth, but not the latter. 
In a follow-up study, Ginarte and Park (1997) actually found evidence for a 
correlation between 5-year lagged R&D spending and the strength of IP rights 
protection, implying that investment in innovations led to the development of 
protections for them ("reverse causality"). In contrast to traditional property rights, 
IP rights appear to have only an indirect or weak relationship to economic growth; it 
may hold only for certain groups of countries or certain kinds of measures (Falvey, 
Foster, and Greenaway, 2006), and the causal direction is unclear.  
Several lines of research have been pursued to address the question of 
whether IP rights are beneficial for inventors (and their employers and investors). 
Studies of innovation prior to and during the 19th century showed that many 
inventions made their inventors enormous profits and were judged to be highly 
innovative despite being unpatented or having their patents invalidated (Mokyr, 
1999; Moser, 2002). Bessen and Meurer (2008) and Boldrin and Levine (2008) 
reviewed a broad range of "natural economic experiments" on discrete changes in 
the patent laws of various countries in the 20th century. They found that, overall, 
there is strong evidence that strengthening patent protection leads to more 
patenting (as in the "reverse causality" noted above), but weak or no evidence that it 
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increases innovation. In fact, in the realm of software patents, firms that acquired 
relatively more patents subsequently tended to reduce their R&D spending relative 
to sales (Bessen & Hunt, 2007). Boldrin and Levine (2008) describe increases in 
patenting activity as "navigating the patent thickets," in which firms that fear 
infringement lawsuits from as-yet-unknown patentees acquire patents strictly for 
the purpose of filing countersuits and achieving settlements without having to 
modify their business, that is, to avoid being forced to innovate further.  
Bessen and Meurer (2008) examined patent renewal behavior in order to 
estimate the value of patents apart from their underlying technologies, and found 
that nearly 60% of U.S. patents filed in 1991 were not renewed to full term, which 
indicates that the majority of patents filed depreciate to a value less than the few 
thousand dollars of the average renewal fee. As one might expect, the distribution of 
patent values is skewed -- most patents are of relatively little value, while a small 
number are quite valuable. A variety of measures of patent and invention value 
adhere approximately to the 80-20 rule: 80 percent of the total value is contained in 
20 percent of the inventions (Harhoff, Scherer, & Vopel, 2003). Bessen and Meurer 
(2005) found that generally, patents granted to small inventors (individuals, 
nonprofits and corporations with less than 500 employees) are much less valuable 
than those granted to larger entities, about 50% in the mean, and the difference 
between individuals and organizations overall is even greater. Furthermore, the 
ownership of this value is found to be rather lopsided: more than half of the value of 
worldwide patents accrues to a small number of large pharmaceutical companies, 
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and more than two-thirds to firms in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries 
generally.  
Overall, there is strong evidence that patents can deliver significant value to 
(some of) their owners, but the patent system also imposes costs on patent owners 
through disputes over the rights to their inventions, as well as on nonpatenting 
inventors through disputes related to inadvertent infringement of others' patents. 
The process of "clearing" rights (by either making sure no trespass occurs or 
obtaining a license) is not necessarily simple for many patents, because the 
boundaries of what an invention does, and by what process or method it is done, can 
be arcane and open to costly legal interpretation (Moore, 2005). Bessen and Meurer 
(2005), after controlling for a wide variety of variables, found that increased 
spending on R&D is actually correlated with an increased risk of being sued for 
infringement, which suggests that infringement is often not willful, and occurs due 
to difficulties in determining patent boundaries. A comparison of aggregate 
litigation losses incurred by a sample of defendant public firms during the years of 
1984-1999 with the aggregate incremental profits derived by public firms during 
the same period showed that outside of the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, 
the costs of litigation clearly exceeded profits from patents (Bessen & Meurer, 
2008). Thus overall, the patent system appears to constitute a net disincentive for 
innovation.  
The results noted above suggest that in its present form, the patent system is 
not promoting the progress of technological advancement; that is, the equity, 
efficiency, and sustainability of the knowledge commons do not appear to be 
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improved by the patent system. This may simply be due to structural shortcomings 
of the system, remediable by adjustments to patent length or breadth (Gilbert & 
Shapiro, 1990). However, there may also be more subtle issues regarding the 
motivational principles and interdependencies of innovators that are not being 
adequately addressed by existing patent theory, law, and institutions. 
 
6.2. Prospecting for progress 
The monopoly granted by a patent is expected to cause "deadweight loss," a 
reduction in mutual value for producers and consumers that occurs when 
consumers who are willing to pay more than the marginal production cost of a good, 
but less than the patentee's monopoly price, are thus prevented from purchasing the 
good (Gilbert & Shapiro, 1990). Kitch (1977) introduced the "prospect theory" of 
patents to common legal usage, in which the cost to society of deadweight loss is 
explicitly justified and discounted by a perceived need to incentivize not just 
creation and disclosure of innovations, but also their efficient management. Kitch 
expounded upon this theory with an analogy to the exploitation of mineral 
resources in the American West, but he was responding to Barzel's (1968) call for a 
solution to a collective action problem among innovators. Barzel observed that firms 
who wanted to use the "free public good" of basic scientific knowledge to produce 
innovations for commercial use each had an incentive to introduce such innovations 
as soon as they were profitable. But he reasoned that innovators (and thus society at 
large) would collectively be better off if firms delayed the introduction of 
innovations until an "optimal" time, when marginal profit (relative to reliable 
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outside investments) could be maximized through the development of sufficient 
production capacity and demand. In the same year as Hardin's (1968) analysis of 
the Tragedy of the Commons, Barzel (1968) also recommended enclosure of the 
knowledge commons in the form of ownership of basic knowledge in order to 
prevent what he viewed as a tragic outcome in its use. But as with Hardin, the 
intellectual origins, analogies, and assumptions used to understand this complex 
situation must be closely examined for clues as to where proposed solutions may 
succeed or fail.  
Barzel's analysis of this "optimal" use depends on a number of simplifying 
assumptions; for our purposes the most salient are that (a) innovations have a 
constant cost and thus can be introduced at any time (ignoring the dynamic and 
cumulative development of knowledge), (b) there is only one innovator associated 
with a given innovation (ignoring collaborative innovation processes), (c) there are 
no benefits of the innovation passed on to the consumer (ignoring the existence of 
externalities or "spillovers" (Frischmann & Lemley, 2007) uncapturable by the 
producer, such as "network effects" (Katz & Shapiro, 1985)), and (d) the parameters 
of the system are widely and accurately known (ignoring the complex and uncertain 
nature of innovation). Kitch (1977) argued, among other things, that the U.S. patent 
system was structurally predisposed to "prospect" uses, and that granting broad 
and long-term patent rights on the basis of the "prospect" for efficient introduction 
and management of an innovation (rather than on the basis of the previously-
accepted "reward theory" of simply incentivizing production and disclosure of 
innovations) would result in a net positive for society.  
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Implicit in this approach are other assumptions about innovators and their 
motivations. Primarily, the above analyses treat innovation as an activity that is 
pursued only by firms who produce goods for the purpose of selling them to end 
users. The mining analogy used by Kitch (1977) implies that most practical 
inventions require a great deal of investment in the extraction and processing of the 
"ore" of basic knowledge, and thus that firms with exclusive claims will be the best 
informed and equipped to create and manage innovations. However, the history of 
technology should teach us that people are generally not skilled at anticipating the 
uses of new inventions or the needs of future users (Boyle, 2007); inventions such 
as mobile phones, DVD players, and financial database software have resulted in a 
variety of uses and a magnitude of economic and social benefits unimaginable and 
uncapturable by their creators (Baumol, 2002). Though prospect theory posits a 
decentralized, entrepreneurial implementation of innovation at large, it centralizes 
control of any particular innovation in one firm. In practice, holders of patents can 
delay or prevent future innovations by either refusing to license their patents to 
subsequent innovators, or charging sufficiently high licensing fees so that smaller 
innovators are prevented from entering the market (Merges & Nelson, 1990).  
Previous inventions can aid in the creation of new innovations either as 
“research tools” that enable a further innovative stage, or as the basis for an 
improved product (or sequential innovation) on the “quality ladder” (Hall, 2007). It 
is not necessarily the case that either the original innovator or only those with deep-
pocketed investors are best suited to improve upon or use a previous innovation to 
create another, but in some cases these may be the only agents who are able to do so 
139 
legally. Additionally, innovators may not have sufficient incentive to create or allow 
improvements on their original ideas, if they fear that a new use would compete 
with the old one (Scotchmer, 1991). When previous innovations necessary for the 
creation or development of a new invention are patented by multiple parties, a 
phenomenon called “the tragedy of the anticommons” can result (Heller & 
Eisenberg, 1998). In this situation, the tragedy results not from a lack of resource 
oversight, but from an excess of it; owners of technologies that are collectively 
necessary for a new innovation may fail to agree on licensing or revenue sharing 
terms, and thus any of them can veto further progress. 
To summarize, we have seen that patent systems are intended to incentivize 
the creation and disclosure of innovations, as well as their efficient management 
(under certain interpretations). In practice, however, patents can also (a) 
incentivize non-innovative strategic or rent-seeking behavior, (b) reduce the 
incentives to create and disclose through the accompanying risk of costly patent 
litigation, and (c) reduce the incentive to optimally manage through patent holders' 
ability to delay or prevent (but not capture or profit from) many positive 
externalities of their patented innovations. The above factors also constitute 
disincentives to imitate and build sequential improvements from the innovations of 
others. Returning to the concept of a knowledge commons, these problems are signs 
of an institution that is failing to ensure contribution and prevent overappropriation 
from a resource (the overall pool of existing knowledge) by its community of users. 
In the long term, such flaws threaten the viability of the resource. 
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6.3. Balancing motivations 
Another area of research in which the adequacy of exclusion in fostering 
innovation becomes suspect is the curious tendency of people to treat extrinsic 
incentives (such as monetary payment) and intrinsic or social motivations (such as 
personal satisfaction or social approbation) differently: as non-additive, mutually 
exclusive, or completely incommensurable. For example, given an activity that 
produces intrinsic rewards such as volunteer service or blood donation, the offer of 
monetary rewards may actually "crowd out" the motivation to pursue the activity 
and reduce its overall level. Thus, under certain circumstances the price mechanism 
for raising the supply of goods, one of the fundamental pillars of economics, may not 
hold. The study of this phenomenon has produced a large body of work in both 
economics (e.g. Titmuss, 1970; Frey & Jegen, 2001) and social psychology (e.g. Deci, 
1971; Deci, Koestner & Ryan, 1999).  
Heyman and Ariely (2004) posited that social and monetary rewards are 
mediated by separate "markets,” and that they cannot be mixed. They performed 
experiments in which they measured the effort put forth in response to varying 
levels and types of rewards offered to participants for performance of a task. It was 
found that effort was consistently high when no reward was offered, as well as when 
token non-monetary rewards (e.g. candy) of varying value were offered. When cash 
was offered or the cash value of the non-monetary rewards was mentioned, effort 
was proportional to the value of the reward offered, and only approached the level 
reached by no rewards at high levels of monetary rewards.  
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Frey and Jegen (2001) reviewed studies related to the crowding-out effect of 
extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivations and found that it was present for a 
variety of norm-related motivations and settings: work effort and reciprocity in 
supplying labor, altruism in service provision, civic duty and environmental care in 
managing a common-pool resource, and trust in legal systems. Deci, Koestner, and 
Ryan (1999) performed a meta-analysis of 128 studies on this effect and found that 
a wide variety of extrinsic rewards and reward criteria undermined intrinsic 
motivation and interest in effortful tasks.  
The presence of social or intrinsic rewards for some creative and innovative 
activity is in a sense evident by definition, from the fact that such behaviors continue 
in a multitude of contexts without any external monetary reward, and even in the 
presence of substantial costs (e.g. various hobbyist pursuits, amateur blogging, 
Wikipedia contributions, etc.) Beyond this evidence, the intrinsic motivations that 
people have for creative work have also been studied in some detail and a variety of 
reasons are found for participating: curiosity, the enjoyment of challenge or novelty, 
personal expression of values, building or maintaining a positive reputation among 
peers, and so forth (Lakhani & Wolf, 2003).  
To the extent that innovators understand the dependence of their work on 
that of previous innovators, and that spillovers can accrue to fellow innovators and 
to society at large as a result of their efforts, the motivations of reciprocity and 
public benefits may be included in this list of intrinsic motivations. In this case, the 
opportunity to exclude others from building upon one's work may be unattractive. 
To the extent that extrinsic rewards can undermine these motivations for certain 
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kinds of work, some innovative activity may simply not occur, or only at a greater 
relative cost. 
 
6.4. Other models of innovation 
These flaws prompt us to consider other models of innovation and its 
governance. The assumptions of the "reward" and "prospect" theories of innovation 
by producers exclude important classes of innovators: individuals or firms who 
create innovations for their own internal use, and those who produce innovations in 
open collaboration with others in order to share in the costs of their creation and 
the benefits of their use (Baldwin & von Hippel, 2009; Strandburg, 2009).  
Innovations created by individuals or firms for their own internal use (rather 
than for selling to users at a profit) need only to provide enough benefit to cover the 
effort of producing them. This means that small, incremental, or specialized 
innovations that might not justify investment or production by a non-user firm can 
be created without the provision of external incentives. Studies in a wide variety of 
industries such as chemical products (Freeman, 1968), scientific instruments and 
semiconductors (Von Hippel, 1976, 1977), and sporting equipment (Shah, 2000) 
have shown that a large proportion of important and novel products and processes 
were developed by users, and that substantial proportions of users engage in 
developing or modifying products they use (Gault & von Hippel, 2009). Moreover, 
user innovators often "freely reveal" (relinquish exclusive rights and allow general 
access to) their innovations (Harhoff, Henkel, & von Hippel, 2003). They do this both 
to avoid the costs and difficulty of excluding others through IP rights (as discussed 
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above) or trade secrecy, and to take advantage of private benefits such as access to 
the sequential improvements of others, reputation enhancement, or positive 
network effects resulting from increased use of their innovation (Harhoff, Henkel, & 
von Hippel, 2003). However, user innovators can also maintain some IP rights and 
pursue other legal measures for the purpose of avoiding expropriation of their 
efforts (O'Mahony, 2003).  
This concept can be taken to another level in open collaborative innovation, 
in which a group of users actively reveal and coordinate their creative contributions 
to each other for integration in a larger-scale project, effectively pooling their 
investments with assurances that all will share in the rewards. Such processes are in 
use most recently and visibly in open-source software development (Benkler, 2002), 
but this model of development has been used in other industries for many years 
(Allen, 1983). Open-source contributors do so because they want to include rather 
than exclude others from the use of their contributions, often for normative reasons 
related to the culture of open-source software, or for private benefits such as those 
mentioned above (Lerner, Tirole, & Pathak, 2006). Advances in computing power 
have enabled large reductions in design and development costs for user innovation, 
and related advances in networked communication and collaboration software have 
lowered barriers for the coordination of contributions in collaborative projects 
(Benkler, 2002). These developments, along with the incentives that such activities 
provide for both innovation and imitation (and related sequential innovations and 
other spillovers), make it increasingly attractive as a mode of scientific and general 
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academic practice (Boyle, 2007; Lougee, 2007), as well as more socially optimal 
governance of knowledge (Baldwin & von Hippel, 2009). 
 
6.5. Testing models of incentives and progress 
The complexity of IP systems as well as their large potential impact on 
economic, technological, and cultural outcomes in society makes them fertile 
breeding grounds for theories about underlying issues such as incentives, 
conformity, creativity, the optimal balancing of individual and common interests, 
the nature and structure of knowledge, and a host of other issues; these theories by 
necessity cross the disciplinary boundaries of law, political science, economics, 
psychology, and philosophy. The purpose of experiments in understanding 
"intellectual property" and the promotion of intellectual discovery, as in any other 
system, is to simplify the issues at hand in order to show more clearly how they 
operate and interact, and in so doing, to point out what is not well understood for 
further study. 
The previous experimental tasks in this dissertation can be conceptually 
compared to open collaborative development, because every participant's candidate 
solutions and (except in one condition) information about their performance are 
available for use by others in the group, with no cost or hindrance (though 
participants did not have a choice in the matter). However, the rewards for good and 
bad performance are materially the same -- course credit was the only 
compensation given to all participants. We wished to test the effect of a change to 
the incentives in this context by paying participants a small cash reward based on 
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their performance, as well as implementing a very basic and limited patent-like 
system. In this system, each participant would be allowed, at a certain cost and for a 
limited time, to automatically charge others who copy their innovations. The 
previously existing incentives for innovation (the possibility of receiving the benefit 
of an improved solution) would be enhanced by the payments that successful 
innovators could get for their solutions; the previously existing incentives for 
imitation would be reduced by the payment to the imitated player.  
This change would ostensibly increase the use of innovation, which could 
result in the discovery of better solutions, which could be copied by other users 
while rewarding originators. But we know from previous experiments that 
innovation is risky, and the gains of improvements can be canceled out by poorer-
performing solutions discovered in the process. We also know from these 
experiments that cumulative improvements are important to the collective 
performance of groups -- if this change caused less efficient imitation or less use of 
imitation overall, the gains achieved by successful innovators could fail to propagate 
and bear fruit in sequential improvements. There is also the risk that competitive 
motivations among participants could lead to excessive patenting to intentionally 
keep others from imitation, without regard to potential innovator gains via transfers 
from imitators.  
Previous laboratory experiments by others regarding the consequences of 
different systems for distributing and rewarding knowledge production do not give 
us reason for confidence in the performance of exclusionary patent systems. One 
such study compared "patent-like” (winner-take-all, according to first discovery of 
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the best solution elements) and "market-based" reward systems (in which 
participants can buy and sell shares in solution components, effectively making bets 
on the success of their solutions) for groups of individuals attempting to solve the 
Knapsack Problem (Martello & Toth, 1990), and showed substantially inferior 
performance for the patent-like system (Meloso, Copic, & Bossaerts, 2009). Another 
experiment using a multi-user invention game task showed that both “patent-only” 
and mixed "patent and commons" systems of cumulative invention underperformed 
a "commons-only" system on several measures, including innovation, productivity, 
and societal utility (Torrance & Tomlinson, 2009).  
We will discuss these experiments further in the next chapter in comparison 
with our own results in Experiment 4. In this experiment, we have not attempted to 
approach the level of verisimilitude to real patent systems seen in the 
abovementioned studies, because we are interested in the effects of changing 
incentives on generalized search tasks, and not necessarily in all of the specific 
details of a particular potential patent system. We expect that the results of this 
experiment will have some relevance to patent systems, as well as other situations 
in which environmental or institutional factors change the incentives of those who 
explore. The goals for Experiment 4 are to continue our study of the basic mechanics 
and dynamics of social learning seen in the previous experiments, by examining 
how they are influenced by concrete and differential rewards for different search 
strategies, and how individual-level processes affect group-level results. 
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7. Experiment 4 – Creature Game C (payment and protection) 
7.1. Experiment 4 Overview 
 The task used in this experiment was the same as in Experiment 3, with four 
major changes: (1) in half of the games in each experiment session, we allowed 
participants to forfeit a small number of points to “protect” their guesses so that 
others who used the same guess (or any very similar guess) were forced to pay a 
small number of points to the protector; (2) we lengthened the time of each round 
slightly, so that participants would have sufficient time to take note of whether their 
guess was protected by another player and change it if they wished, and the number 
of games in each experiment session was decreased, in order to fit the session in the 
allotted time; (3) participants received a small cash payment according to the 
number of points they earned in the game; (4) participants filled out a post-task 
survey about their perceptions of the task, and their own strategies and 
performance.  
Modification (1) allowed for the examination of differences in strategies and 
performance associated with changing the incentives for asocial and social learning. 
It is important to note that this is a very simple change, and intentionally omits 
many other relevant mechanisms of real patent systems, such as determinations of 
patentability and prior art, infringement, licensing negotiations, patent pools, and so 
forth; this was done for two reasons. First, attempting to create a convincing 
facsimile of a real patent system in the laboratory would require a much larger and 
more complex experiment. Even if there were some broadly agreeable set of 
elements we could introduce that were sufficiently similar to equivalents “in the 
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wild” such that we could claim optimal realism, the validity of our results would still 
be questionable for any number of other reasons, such as using a subject pool of 
undergraduates rather than businesspeople or patent attorneys. We do not doubt 
that such experimental investigation is valuable and interesting, but it was not 
feasible for us. (For discussion of some recent and somewhat more “realistic” 
experiments of patent mechanisms on innovation, see section 7.5.2 at the end of this 
chapter.) Second, introducing changes of this kind and magnitude would represent a 
large discontinuity from the previous experiments in this dissertation; we preferred 
to take a more focused, incremental approach that would allow us the possibility of 
understanding new results in light of the established patterns of strategies and 
outcomes from the (largely similar) previous experiments. 
Modification (2) was intended to avoid noise in the data associated with 
unintended or hurried choices. Modification (3) allowed for the examination of 
behavioral differences (from previous experiments) associated with extrinsic 
monetary rewards. Modification (4) offered further insight into the motivations and 
judgments of participants, which could be correlated with their behavior in the task. 
 
7.1.1. Predictions 
In the games where the “protection” feature was unavailable, we expected 
little change in behavior and only a small improvement in performance (compared 
to the visible-scores condition of Experiment 3) due to the small additional time per 
round and the expectation of cash rewards. When the protection feature was 
available, we expected differences in results compared to when it was not available. 
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The possibility of receiving additional points from imitators was predicted to cause 
participants to innovate more in order to find relatively high scoring solutions, and 
those with high scoring solutions would tend to protect them when possible. 
Though the “fee” for using a protected solution was set quite low relative to the 
average score earned in a single round, we expected that participants would avoid 
imitating protected solutions, thus reducing imitation behavior overall, and 
directing a larger share of imitation to unprotected lower-scoring solutions. Similar 
to Experiment 3, this was expected to reduce or reverse social learning biases such 
as frequency and similarity bias. The combination of these two influences would 
slow convergence of solutions, and keep guess diversity relatively high. As for 
performance, we expected that the extra incentive to explore would result in higher 
maximum scores, but the large number of lower scores encountered in the process, 
as well as the disincentive to build upon the (protected) better solutions found 
through this increase in exploration would lower search efficiency, thus making 
mean performance the same or lower than when protection was unavailable. 
 
7.2. Experiment 4 Methods 
159 participants were recruited from the Indiana University Psychology 
Department undergraduate subject pool, and were offered course credit for taking 
part in the study, as well as a small cash payment according to their performance 
(mean payment was approximately three dollars). Participants populated each 
session by signing up at will for scheduled experiments with a maximum capacity of 
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9 persons, and were distributed across 45 sessions as shown in Table 7.1. One 
participant’s data (from one of the 8-person sessions) was excluded due to 
extremely outlying performance. 
 
Table 7.1: Distribution of participants across group sizes in Experiment 3 
Group size 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
# Sessions 14 8 3 4 5 4 3 2 2 
# Participants 14 16 9 16 25 24 21 16 18 
 
The task used was nearly identical to that of the visible-scores condition in 
Experiment 3, with the following changes.  
Protection availability: in half of the games in each session (the protection 
available or PA condition), participants were presented with a choice for seven 
seconds at the end of each round (just after learning the score associated with their 
solution) to forfeit four points (approximately .042 in terms of normalized score) to 
“protect” the solution (if they made no selection while the choice was available, the 
default was not to protect). For the next three rounds after a solution was protected, 
any other player who used (at the end of the round) a solution within one element 
difference of the protected solution would automatically transfer two points 
(approximately .021 in normalized score) to the protector. Solutions within one 
element difference of a protected solution could not be protected.  
The protection fee and use fee, respectively, were intentionally set at fairly 
low values in order to ensure that the cost for these options would be visible but 
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would not unduly discourage participants from using them, or excessively warp 
incentives toward one option or the other. The wording of the options presented to 
participants at the end of each round is shown in Appendix 7.A. We ensured that 
participants understood these options with additional instructions and hands-on 
demonstrations before data gathering began. In order to ensure that participants 
were aware of the decisions they made concerning the use of protected teams 
during each round, any peers’ teams that were currently protected were shown with 
their background highlighted in bright red. In addition, when a participant changed 
their team such that it was protected by another player, its background was also 
highlighted in bright red, and the message “Protected by another player” was shown 
above it (these notifications occurred as soon as the change was made, not at the 
end of the round). In each round, we recorded whether each participant protected 
his or her team or used another’s protected team, and how many others (if any) used 
the player’s protected team. In the other half of the games in each session (the 
protection unavailable or PU condition), the protection option was not available to 
participants, and games were played as they were in the Scores Visible condition 
from Experiment 3. Games were played in a random order in each session. 
Longer rounds and fewer games: to give participants sufficient time to 
evaluate this choice and change their guesses if desired in the protection available 
condition, and to be able to properly compare behavior between conditions, we 
lengthened each round from 10 to 15 seconds in both conditions. Because of the 
longer rounds (including the additional seconds given to make the protection choice 
after each round), additional practice time for the new game features, and the post-
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task survey (discussed below), we reduced the number of games in each experiment 
session from six to four to fit the session in the one-hour time limit required for 
experiments using our subject pool. Of course, the distinction between games in the 
protection available and protection unavailable conditions only mattered in sessions 
that included more than one participant, but rounds and sessions were identical in 
length for all participant group sizes. 
Payment: participants were informed before each session that they would 
receive a small cash payment of “a few dollars” which would vary according to the 
total number of points they earned individually during the session. We set the 
payment per point ($0.00086) according to the distribution of scores from 
Experiment 3, such that the mean payment would be approximately $3.00. 
Post-task survey: we devised a 10-item questionnaire for participants to 
complete after the final game in each session in order to gather self-report data on 
participants’ attitudes and judgments about the task and their strategies, which 
included 8 multiple-choice questions with response options on a Likert scale, and 
two free-response items. The full text of the survey is shown in Appendix 7.B. 
The distribution of individual point values and interactions for the icons was 
the same as in Experiment 3, and scores were again normalized from [-6,88] to [0,1] 
for ease of analysis. Note that because the normalization did not include the 
increased range possible from the transfer of protection-related fees, it was possible 
for normalized scores to go beyond [0,1], but this did not occur. Unadjusted score 
refers to values which do not include the subtraction of protection or use fees paid 
or the addition of use fees received, corresponding to the plain value of the solution 
153 
according to its elements; adjusted score refers to the same values with the above 
fees added or subtracted (when present). All analyses of score will refer to 
unadjusted score except where noted; in general there were no differences between 
results for adjusted and unadjusted scores. 
 
7.3. Experiment 4 Results 
7.3.1 Overall means 
Mean dependent variables in each condition are shown in Table 7.2 (see also 
Fig. 7.1). For grouped participants, mean overall and final scores in each condition 
were nearly identical to each other and to those observed in the visible-scores 
condition in Experiment 3. On average, minimum scores were lower and maximum 
scores were higher in the protection available condition, but neither difference was 
significant. Isolated participants achieved slightly higher mean overall and final 
scores than those in Experiment 3. 
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Figure 7.1: Distribution of scores for all possible teams. 
 
Table 7.2: Mean score, guess diversity, and choice source proportions by condition 
(PU: Protection Unavailable, PA: Protection Available) 
Cond. 
Overall Score 
(Percentile) 
Final Score 
(Percentile) 
Guess 
Diversity 
Imitation Innovation Retention Retrieval 
PU .451 (93.3%) .525 (97.5%) 60.1%* 6.9%* 14.6%* 75.6%* 2.2% 
PA .446 (92.6%) .530 (97.5%) 65.9%* 6.2%* 17.8%* 72.9%* 2.3% 
Isolated 
Partic. 
.376 (86.1%) .466 (94.0%) -- -- 26.1% 61.0% 12.2% 
* significant differences between conditions 
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7.3.2. Rounds 
 Linear mixed-effects models were used to examine trends across rounds for 
score and guess diversity, with a random effect of participant group. Analysis of 
score versus round showed very similar positive trends for grouped participants in 
each condition (PU: F(1,712)=208.87, p<.0001, B=.627; PA: F(1,712)=283.72, 
p<.0001, B=.670). Isolated participants’ scores increased significantly across rounds 
as well, but significantly less so than for grouped participants (F(1,657)=95.52, 
p<.0001, B=.498, mean increase=0.150; see Fig. 7.2). Guess diversity showed 
corresponding decreases across rounds in both conditions (PU: F(1,712)=169.33, 
p<.0001, B=-0.458; PA: F(1,712)=165.94, p<.0001, B=-.485; see Fig. 7.2).  
 
 
Figure 7.2: Scores increased and guess diversity decreased at about the same rate 
whether protection was available or unavailable. 
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Trends for choice sources across rounds showed very similar patterns to 
those in Experiments 2 and 3, with approximately the same magnitude and 
significance: Imitation and Innovation decreased significantly over rounds, and 
Retrieval and Retention increased significantly. There was no significant difference 
in slope for any choice source between conditions, nor a substantial difference in 
comparison to the slope over rounds for each choice source found in Experiment 3. 
Protection decreased across rounds (F(1,712)=17.54, p<.0001, B=-0.170), while use 
of protected teams increased (F(1,712)=49.26, p<.0001, B=0.331; see Fig. 7.3). 
 
 
Figure 7.3: Protection decreased across rounds, while use of protected teams 
increased. 
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7.3.3. Game order 
 Similar linear mixed-effects models were used to examine trends across 
game order for each dependent variable within conditions. For this analysis, the 
game order value for each game was corrected to its order within the condition, i.e. 
Game 1 or 2 in each condition. Score showed no significant change across game 
order in either condition, and guess diversity displayed a decrease across game 
order in both conditions (PU: F(1,30)=5.94, p=.021; PA: F(1,30)=4.76, p=.037; see 
Fig. 7.5). There were no significant changes across game order for any choice source 
in either condition (see Fig. 7.5). 
 Within the protection available condition, protection decreased across game 
order (F(1,26)=9.79, p=.0043, B=-0.217, mean chg.=-0.020), but use of protected 
teams did not change significantly. 
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Figure 7.4: Score did not change significantly in either condition, and guess diversity 
decreased in both conditions. 
 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 7.5: (a) Imitation and Innovation did not show significant changes across 
game order in either condition, nor did (b) Retention or Retrieval. 
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Figure 7.6: Protection decreased significantly across game order, while use of 
protected teams showed no significant change. 
 
7.3.4. Group size 
Trends across participant group size for each dependent variable within 
conditions were examined using linear mixed-effects models, with the participant 
group used as a random effect on the intercept. Slopes across group size did not 
show differences between conditions for any dependent variable, except where 
noted. Score increased significantly with group size in both conditions (PU: 
F(1,43)=27.19, p<.0001, B=0.512; PA: F(1,43)=36.69, p<.0001, B=0.568; see Fig. 
7.7), and guess diversity showed a corresponding decrease in both conditions (PU: 
F(1,29)=28.96, p<.0001, B=-0.661; PA: F(1,29)=34.48, p<.0001, B=-0.672; see Fig. 
7.7). As for choice sources, Imitation increased significantly for larger groups in both 
conditions (PU: F(1,29)=37.72, p<.0001, B=0.680; PA: F(1,29)=37.20, p<.0001, 
B=0.699; see Fig. 7.8a),  while Innovation decreased significantly only in the 
protection available condition (F(1,29)=8.94, p=.006, B=-0.437; see Fig. 7.8a). 
Neither Retention nor Retrieval showed significant changes across group size (see 
Fig. 7.8b). 
Protection did not show a significant trend across group size, while use of 
protected teams increased in larger groups (F(1,29)=37.45, p<.0001, B=0.751; see 
Fig. 7.9). 
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Figure 7.7: As participant group size increased, mean scores in a group increased, 
and the diversity of offered solutions decreased. 
 
 
 (a)      (b) 
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Figure 7.8: As participant group size increased, (a) mean proportions of Imitation 
increased in both conditions and Innovation decreased only in the protection 
available condition, and (b) Retention and Retrieval showed no significant change. 
 
 
Fig. 7.9: As participant group size increased, protection did not change significantly, 
but use of protected teams increased. 
 
7.3.5. Differences in imitation 
 Across both conditions, approximately 94.7% of all guesses including 
Imitation were of a single participant. At the time of such single-source imitations, 
the score of the imitated participant was greater than that of the imitator in 
approximately 90% of cases in both conditions (see Fig. 7.10a). Of all instances of 
single-participant imitation, the probability of imitating the top-scoring solution in 
the group was significantly higher in the protection unavailable condition than the 
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protection available condition (t(34)=5.27, p<.0001; see Fig. 7.10b). An analysis of 
the probability of protection across score rank showed that the best two solutions 
present in any given round were nearly always protected (see Fig. 7.10c). 
To examine separately how often and how much participants imitated one 
another, we measured the mean incidence of guesses in which there was greater 
than zero Imitation (Imitation incidence), as well as the mean use of Imitation in 
those cases where it was greater than zero (Imitation proportion). Mean Imitation 
incidence was significantly higher in the protection unavailable condition (0.205 vs. 
0.162; F(1,92)=19.37, p<.0001), but mean Imitation proportion was lower (0.341 vs. 
0.390; F(1,89)=7.28, p=.008), and the distribution of mean imitation proportions 
was weighted slightly but significantly more heavily toward higher values in the 
protection available condition, as shown by a Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test of equality 
of distributions (D = 0.1116, p<.0001; see Fig. 7.11). In other words, participants in 
the protection available condition copied one another less frequently but in larger 
amounts at a time. 
 
 
163 
(a)      (b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 7.10: (a) There were strong biases toward imitating better-scoring 
participants than oneself in both conditions, and (b) a significantly stronger bias 
toward imitating the best-scoring participant in the protection unavailable 
condition than in the protection available condition; and (c) a related analysis 
showed that the best two solutions in any given round were highly likely to be 
protected. 
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Figure 7.11: For guesses that included at least some Imitation, participants in the 
protection available condition had higher proportions of Imitation in their guesses. 
 
7.3.6. Choice source strategy 
 As in Experiment 2, the choice sources of each non-isolated participant over 
the entire session were analyzed, and each participant’s choice source strategy was 
categorized according to their proportion of each source.  Participants whose 
choices contained one source in an average proportion greater than the global 
average for that source plus one standard deviation, were labeled with that strategy. 
For example, a player whose guesses over the course of a session consisted of a 
greater proportion of Imitate choices than the average for all other participants in 
the experiment, plus one standard deviation, were labeled as having an overall 
strategy of “Imitate.” Those who fit the above criteria for more than one choice 
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source, or none, were labeled as having a “Mixed” strategy. The score distribution 
for each strategy category in each condition is shown in Fig. 7.12. 
 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 7.12: Score vs. choice source strategy in (a) protection unavailable and (b) 
protection available conditions, showing that a conservative high-Retention strategy 
resulted in the best performance in both conditions, though highly Imitative 
strategies also performed well. 
 
A linear regression of mean individual score vs. mean individual Imitation 
guess proportion showed a significant positive relationship (that is, the greater a 
participant’s average proportion of Imitation, the better the participant’s score) in 
both conditions (PU: F(1,142)=7.91, p=.006, B=0.230; PA: F(1,142)=3.96, p=.048, 
B=0.165; see Fig. 7.13a). The opposite was true for individual score vs. Innovation, 
which displayed a significant negative relationship in both conditions (PU: 
F(1,142)=120.30, p<.0001, B=-0.677; PA: F(1,142)=98.01, p<.0001, B=-0.639; see 
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Fig. 7.13b). A positive relationship held for Retention in both conditions (PU: 
F(1,142)=56.24, p<.0001, B=0.533; PA: F(1,142)=53.38, p<.0001, B=0.523; see Fig. 
7.13c). Finally, a negative relationship was found for Retrieval in both conditions 
(PU: F(1,142)=4.88, p=.029, B=-0.182; PA: F(1,142)=7.15, p=.008, B=-0.219; see Fig. 
7.13d). 
As in Experiment 2, analyses of mean group score vs. mean group guess 
proportion for each choice source showed similar relationships of the same 
significance and directions as those noted above. Analyses of mean individual score 
vs. mean group (excluding the individual) guess proportion showed similar 
relationships as well, with the exception of the absence of significant relationships 
for Retention or Retrieval. Plots of these are omitted for clarity. All trends noted 
above were generally monotonic; that is, there were no thresholds or inflection 
points beyond which the relationships changed. 
Similar analyses of protection showed no significant relationship with score 
for individuals (see Fig. 7.14a), or at the other two levels discussed above (group 
and individual vs. group others), while score vs. use of protected teams showed a 
significant positive relationship for individuals (F(1,142)=67.42, p<.0001, B=0.567; 
see Fig. 7.14b), as well as for groups (F(1,60)=72.99, p<.0001, B=0.740), and for 
individual score versus protection by others in the group, excluding the individual 
(F(1,142)=40.86, p<.0001, B=0.471). All of the same relationships were found for 
both adjusted and unadjusted score. Plots of these are omitted for clarity. 
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(a)      (b) 
 
(c)      (d) 
Figure 7.13: Higher individual scores were associated with (a) higher individual 
Imitation, (b) lower Innovation, (c) higher Retention, and (d) lower Retrieval. 
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(a)      (b) 
Figure  7.14: (a) Protection showed no significant relationship with score, while (b) 
higher use of protected teams was associated with higher scores. 
  
7.3.7. Improvements 
As in previous experiments, improvements were tallied for each participant 
in each session and condition. Histograms of normalized improvement share in both 
conditions showed a less equitable distribution of improvements within groups 
(more participants with zero improvements, and fewer with shares near 1) relative 
to the scores-visible condition in Experiment 3 (compare Figs. 7.15 and 5.13). A 
Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test of equality of distributions indicated that the 
distributions in each condition were not significantly different. However, the upper 
tail of the distribution was essentially shifted upwards (i.e. the highest improvement 
shares in the PU condition were replaced by even higher shares in the PA condition), 
though the highest achievers in each condition were entirely different sets of 
individuals. Mean overall score also showed a strong positive correlation with 
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improvement share in the PA condition (F(1,112)=49.98, p<.0001, B=0.348), but 
this relationship was not evident in the PU condition. 
The mean choice source proportions for guesses that resulted in score 
improvements and those that did not are shown in Table 7.3. In the protection 
unavailable condition, guesses that yielded improvements had higher Innovation 
(t(417)=-9.78, p<.0001) and lower Retention (t(395)=6.01, p<.0001) relative to 
non-improvements. In the protection available condition, there was higher Imitation 
(t(549)=-2.78, p=.006), lower Innovation (t(574)=2.86, p=.004), and lower Retrieval 
(t(682)=3.37, p=.0008) for improvements than non-improvements. Of all 
improvements, about the same proportion in each condition resulted from guesses 
that included Imitation (PU: .252 vs. PA: .224).  
In 51.2% of improvements in the protection unavailable condition and 43.9% 
in the protection available condition, the focal player imitated at least one peer who 
had previously imitated the focal player. In other words, a player who was imitated 
by another player often later imitated that same player in the course of creating an 
improvement, and this happened more often when protection was unavailable. 
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Figure 7.15: Histograms showing distributions of improvements within groups in 
each condition. 
 
Table 7.3: Mean choice source proportions for improvement and non-improvement 
guesses in each condition. 
Condition Improvement % of guesses Imitation Innovation Retention Retrieval 
PU 
No 94.7% 7.9% 13.6%* 75.7%* 2.0% 
Yes 5.3% 9.1% 20.1%* 69.0%* 1.7% 
PA 
No 92.5% 7.0%* 16.8%* 73.0% 2.3% 
Yes 7.5% 10.0%* 14.4%* 73.9% 1.3% 
* significant differences between improvements and non-improvements 
within condition 
7.3.8. Guess similarity 
 A comparison between the mean similarity of participants’ most recent 
guesses to those whom they imitated, and to those whom they did not imitate, 
revealed slight but significant differences in both conditions. In the protection 
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unavailable condition, there were similarity values of .576 for imitated vs. .545 for 
non-imitated guesses (t(2511)=-2.90, p=.0037; see Fig. 7.16a). In the scores-
invisible condition, there were similarity values of .491 for imitated vs. .457 for non-
imitated guesses (t(2051)=-3.18, p=.0014; see Fig. 7.16b). In other words, prior to 
imitation, the average imitators’ guess was more similar to that of the imitated 
participant(s) than to those of others in the protection unavailable condition, and 
this relation was found but was slightly less prominent in the protection available 
condition. 
 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 7.16: (a) In the protection unavailable condition, imitators’ previous guesses 
showed greater similarity to the guesses they imitated than to those they did not 
imitate, while (b) in the scores-invisible condition, a similar but weaker effect was 
observed. 
 
7.3.9 Frequency and momentum bias 
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 As in Experiment 1, we measured the bias of participants to choose an icon 
according to its frequency in peers’ choices. To reiterate briefly, we measured the 
mean probability of Imitation and Innovation for any icon not already included on a 
player’s team, based on the frequency of its appearance on peers’ teams in the 
player’s display, and compared them to expected chance baselines. 
Linear mixed-effects analysis of imitation probability versus choice 
frequency showed a positive frequency-dependent Imitation bias that was 
significantly greater than chance in the protection unavailable condition 
(F(1,258)=355.39, p<.0001, B=.722), but significantly lower than chance in the 
protection available condition (F(1,258)=387.81, p<.0001, B=.714; see Fig. 7.17a); 
both became apparent at higher values of choice frequency than in Experiment 3. 
There were similar positive frequency-dependent Innovation biases above chance in 
both conditions (PU: F(1,258)=133.15, p<.0001, B=.517; PA: F(1,258)=192.79, 
p<.0001, B=.601; see Fig. 7.17b).  
 We also repeated the analysis of “choice momentum,” by tallying the change 
in the number of players whose teams included the icon in the previous two rounds, 
as well as the number of the remaining players who added it to their team in the 
current round via Imitation or Innovation, and normalizing for group size. After log-
transforming the Imitation probability data to achieve a normal distribution, t-tests 
of Imitation probability for negative and positive changes in choice frequency 
showed similar significant positive momentum biases in both conditions (PU: 
t(304)=-8.66, p<.0001; PA: t(299)=7.76, p<.0001; see Fig. 7.18a). Slight positive 
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momentum biases were also found for Innovation in both conditions (PU: t(385)=-
3.40, p=.0007; PA: t(346)=-5.54, p<.0001; see Fig. 7.18b).  
 
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 7.17: (a) There were biases toward choosing elements that were more 
frequently represented on other teams in the protection unavailable condition, and 
less frequently represented on other teams in the protection available condition for 
Imitation and (b) biases toward more frequent elements for Innovation decisions in 
both conditions. 
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(a)      (b) 
Figure 7.18: There were biases toward choosing elements whose representation on 
other teams was increasing in both conditions for (a) Imitation and (b) Innovation 
decisions. 
7.3.10. Survey responses 
The survey distributed to participants after the end of the last game in each 
session is included in appendix 7.A. The first eight questions on the survey were 
multiple-choice, with possible responses on a 7-choice Likert scale, coded 1-7. 
Questions 2, 3, and 4 were related to protection and had an additional option for 
“does not apply,” which was coded as 0. The last two questions were free-response; 
one asked participants to describe their strategies, and most responses were some 
variation on a “copy-if-better and then make small changes” strategy; the other 
asked for any further comments, and most responses were either blank, or short 
(generally positive) comments like “fun” or interesting.” For quick reference, the 
eight multiple-choice questions are shown in Table 7.4.  Stripcharts of responses 
with kernel density estimates are shown in Fig. 7.19. 
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Table 7.4: Multiple-choice survey questions, with responses associated with the 
extreme low and high ends of the scale. Those significantly associated with higher 
individual scores are shown in bold. 
Q1 
During the game, did you mostly try to…? 
increase your own score (without regard to the 
scores other players might have) 
score higher than other players 
Q2 If/when you protected your solutions, was it 
mostly to…? 
keep others from using your solutions 
get payment for others' use of your solutions 
Q3 When you wanted to use another player’s 
protected team, did you generally prefer to…? 
copy the whole team and pay the fee 
copy it and then change it to avoid paying 
Q4 
When you found a team with a relatively high 
score, did you ever intentionally leave it 
unprotected so that others could copy it for free?  
Never 
Every time 
Q5 
How did you feel about the difficulty of the task?  
Very easy 
Very hard 
Q6 
Did you choose creatures more often from …? 
other players’ teams 
the league 
Q7 Did you find that your scores were better when 
you chose creatures from …? 
other players’ teams 
the league 
Q8 Do you feel that success in this task was based 
more on …? 
Luck 
Skill 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
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(c) 
Figure 7.19: Responses to the multiple-choice survey questions in Table 7.4, plotted 
as stripcharts with kernel density estimates and mean lines, separated as follows for 
clarity: responses from grouped participants to (a) non-protection-related 
questions and (b) protection-related questions, and (c) responses from isolated 
participants to Q5 and Q8. 
 
Relationships between player scores and responses to each question were 
analyzed using a mixed-effects linear model with participant group as a random 
effect. Higher scores were associated with responses at the upper end of Q1 (score 
better than others) (F(1,256)=22.68, p<.0001, B=0.236), the upper end of Q2 (get 
payment from others) (F(1,252)=6.39, p=.0122, B=0.140), the lower end of Q3 (copy 
the whole team and pay) (F(1,243)=14.91, p=.0001, B=-0.210), the lower end of Q4 
(never leave unprotected) (F(1,242)=6.73, p=.0100, B=-0.142), the lower end of Q6 
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(choose from others’ teams) (F(1,254)=19.88, p<.0001, B=-0.225), and the upper 
end of Q8 (performance based on skill) (F(1,254)=8.15, p=.0047, B=0.148). In 
examinations of response trends across participant group size, we found just one 
significant trend: responses to Q2 were significantly higher (get payment from 
others) in larger groups (F(1,29)=8.88, p=.0058, B=0.243). 
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7.4. Experiment 4 Discussion 
7.4.1. Similarities with Experiment 3 
 As predicted, results in the protection unavailable condition of Experiment 4 
(E4PU) were generally similar to those in the visible-scores condition of Experiment 
3 (E3SV). Performance was slightly better in E4PU than E3SV as predicted, which 
may have been due to the incentive of cash payment, or the extra time to make 
decisions about each round's candidate solution, though unfortunately we cannot 
differentiate between these two factors as causes. Isolated participants in E4 also 
did better than those in E3, which reinforces this explanation. Imitation was 
markedly lower and Innovation higher in E4PU than in E3SV, which may have been 
a carryover effect from the PA condition, in which these differences were even more 
extreme. Trends of Retention and Retrieval over group size that were present in 
E3SV were not present in E4PU, and there was a negative correlation of score with 
Retrieval in E4PU that was not present in E3SV, but in each case the missing 
relationship was nominally present in the other experiment, but not significant. The 
less equitable distribution of improvement share in E4PU relative to E3SV could be 
attributed to a differential crowding-out (Frey and Jegen, 2001) of intrinsic 
motivation to achieve improvements for some participants and not others by the 
cash payment offered in E4. 
 
7.4.2. Performance 
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 Predictions concerning the PA condition were generally borne out as well. 
Maximum scores were slightly higher, but overall scores were actually slightly lower 
in the PA condition, though neither difference was significant. This, along with the 
increased Innovation, decreased Imitation, and increased guess diversity relative to 
PU, accords with the predictions made for this condition: the greater incentives for 
exploration led to increases in Innovation and less convergence, and some good 
returns in the form of slightly more improvements. However, the greater general 
risk of exploration, as well as less efficient propagation of better performing 
solutions through Imitation (because the best solutions were generally protected) 
led to a washing out of the benefits of improvements by lower scores encountered 
along the way, rather than further improvement of the better solutions that were 
found.  
 
7.4.3. Strategy 
 As predicted, the availability of team protection also affected the use of other 
kinds of information in imitation strategies: PA participants showed weaker 
similarity bias, and a reversal of frequency bias, at least for Imitation. The former 
could have been due to an inclination toward saltationist strategies as seen in E3SI, 
while the latter could have been due to higher-frequency icons typically being on 
protected teams. The decrease in Imitation incidence and increase in Imitation 
proportion when protection was available indicates that the fee for imitation was a 
disincentive for Imitation, but when Imitation was pursued, participants either kept 
the imitated guess unchanged (to take advantage of the presumed improvement in 
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score and “get their money’s worth” for the use fee), or changed relatively less (in 
order to “invent around” the protected solution without as much risk of lowering 
the score). 
The association of higher scores with higher use of protected teams was 
likely due to the fact that the use fee was quite small relative to the potential benefit 
in most cases. The lack of a relationship between protection and score could have 
been due to general overuse of protection; the typical response to Q4 on the survey 
indicates that for most participants the default action upon discovering a high-
scoring solution was to protect it, and this is borne out in Figure 7.10c. In the PA 
condition, the increased use of Imitation in improvements relative to non-
improvements shows that for those who recognized the value of using protected 
teams, Imitation was quite a productive strategy. 
The decrease in protection and increase in use of protected teams over 
rounds can both be explained by the fact that improvements available for discovery 
became increasingly rare as participants discovered better solutions and moved 
higher in the score distribution. Protection decreased because fewer and fewer 
guesses yielded protection-worthy, relatively higher scores, and the use of protected 
teams increased because the dwindling supply of score-improving solutions stoked 
the demand for using those of others and made participants more willing to pay the 
related fee. The increase in use of protected teams across participant group size can 
be considered an extension of the generally greater Imitation in larger groups. 
Though there was no significant change in score or choice sources across 
game order within conditions, the decrease in the number of games per condition 
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relative to previous experiments made for less data in which to detect trends of this 
sort. The decrease in protection over game order was likely an adaptation to the 
failure of the always-protect strategy (displayed in Q4 responses and the near-
universal protection of the best-scoring solutions) to turn a consistent profit (as 
shown in the flat score versus protection results). 
 
7.4.4 Self-reported motivations and methods 
Despite receiving instructions that the goal of the task was merely to 
maximize one’s own total score over the course of each game, as well as being 
informed that payment was contingent only on individual performance, responses 
to Q1 revealed that many participants were just as motivated (or more) to increase 
their performance relative to others. Those who reported such relative performance 
motivation also tended to score higher than others, as did those who saw 
performance in the game as a matter of skill rather than luck in Q8 (though most 
participants believed it was the latter). Q2 showed that participants were somewhat 
evenly divided between protecting to keep others from using their solutions and 
getting payment for them, and responses to Q3 showed that participants were also 
fairly evenly divided between “licensing” and “inventing around” others’ protected 
teams. 
 
7.5. Conclusions 
7.5.1. Similarities and differences with previous results 
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In this experiment, we found patterns of results very similar to those in 
previous experiments, but there were also some curious new combinations of these 
effects. Specifically, we observed in both conditions the by-now familiar result that a 
conservative approach to this task paid off: relatively high usage of Imitation and 
Retention were associated with high scores, and Innovation and Retrieval with low 
scores; trends displaying these relationships differed very little across conditions.  
Besides the resemblance between the protection unavailable condition of 
Experiment 4 (E4PU) and Experiment 3 (E3SV) noted earlier, the protection 
available condition (E4PA) showed some results that resembled those of the 
invisible-scores condition in Experiment 3 (E3SI) as well. For instance, there was a 
reduced tendency to imitate top-scoring solutions in E3SI was due to the 
impossibility of distinguishing the quality of solutions, and in E4PA due to the 
disincentive of paying the use fee for top-scoring solutions (which were generally 
protected). There was also increased diversity and innovation relative to the 
alternate condition for both, and a decrease in the use of similarity- and frequency-
biased imitation. However, these changes led to the discovery of fewer 
improvements in E3SI relative to E3SV, while there were more found in E4PA 
relative to E4PU, though this did not lead to greater overall or final scores. Overall, it 
appears that the extra incentive for Innovation in E4PA led to some improvements 
whose benefits were canceled out by the worse solutions encountered in the 
exploration process, and there was a disincentive for imitation that resulted in 
fewer sequential improvements, which otherwise could have improved average 
performance with less risk. 
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7.5.2. Similarities and differences between experimental and real-world patent 
systems 
This experiment featured a patent-like system for governing the use of 
innovations, but was in no way meant to accurately represent the complexities of a 
real patent system. Major differences between this task and such real systems 
include: our automatic “licensing” of patented innovations, with no ability for 
patentees to refuse to grant a license, negotiate the licensing fee, or infringe others’ 
patents without licensing; unambiguous patent scope and no ability to vary or 
dispute the breadth of patented features; no distinction between discovery and 
production of innovations; no ability to “open source” innovations such that they 
could be used freely by others but not patented; and no ability to sell or otherwise 
transfer patent rights between participants. We felt that testing the effect of a 
change in incentives to innovate in a more general search domain, and establishing 
continuity with our previous experiments in this domain were more important than 
attempting to replicate more features of patent systems. However, an experiment 
that did include all of the features noted above actually found that a completely 
commons-based (patent-free) system outperformed both a patent-only system and 
a mixed patent-commons system (Torrance & Tomlinson, 2009). 
Besides the distinction between discovery and production of innovations in 
the real world, there is also the fact that physically producing many innovative 
products depends on rivalrous raw material resources. Again, there was no 
provision for this fact in our experiment, but it was incorporated in another study to 
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create a market-based mechanism for promoting innovation (Meloso, Copic, & 
Bossaerts, 2009). Similar to our experiment, participants in this study explored 
varying combinations of options to solve a problem; the primary difference was that 
in the “patent” condition, a monetary prize was given to the first to discover the 
optimal solution, and in the “market” condition, participants bought and sold shares 
in each option, and shares of options contained in the optimal solution paid a 
monetary dividend at the end of the game. Meloso et al. (2009) found no benefit for 
the patent-based system over the market-based system: the optimal solution was 
found in an equal number of runs of each condition. However, the optimal solution 
was found by a greater proportion of participants in the “market” condition. The 
incentive of profiting from the sales of shares in the optimal solution motivated 
more participants to find the optimal solution than a prize that only one of them 
could win. The share price of each option in Meloso et al.’s study also signaled 
participants about the group’s collective belief in its value, which supported a 
learning strategy similar to the frequency bias seen in our results, and the “filtering” 
of options used in the social learning strategies tournament of Rendell et al. (2010). 
 
7.5.3. Polycentric innovation 
There remain large differences between the above experimental treatments 
and many real-world intellectual discovery contexts, most obviously in the scale of 
discoveries, and the investments of time and other resources required. But the fact 
that many predictions from the traditional “reward” and “prospect” theories of 
patents have been contradicted or remain unconfirmed in the above experimental 
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results, as well as cross-national econometric studies (Park & Ginarte, 1997), large-
scale reviews of data related to patenting behavior and changes in patent law 
(Bessen & Meurer, 2008; Boldrin & Levine, 2008), and a variety of other measures 
(see Chapter 6) should give us pause in continuing to endorse such theories. The 
increasingly well-studied performance of alternate models of innovation by 
individual users and groups engaged in open collaboration (Baldwin & von Hippel, 
2009; Strandburg, 2009; Benkler, 2006) show us that there are many possibilities 
for more equitable, efficient, and sustainable ways of creating beneficial innovations 
and supporting a knowledge commons.  
Mazzoleni and Nelson (1998) note that the theories used to justify IP (those 
of incentives for creation, disclosure, commercialization, and efficient exploration of 
innovations) are not universally applicable and in some circumstances conflict with 
each other. They also note that these theories make assumptions (implicitly or 
explicitly) about several important features of contexts in which innovation occurs: 
(1) “The nature and effectiveness of means other than patents to induce invention 
and related activities” (a general effectiveness question); (2) “Whether the group of 
potential inventors is likely to work on diverse and non-competing ideas, or 
whether the group is likely to be focused on a single alternative or a set of closely 
connected ones.” (i.e. the structure of the search space); (3) “The deterrent effect of 
the presence of patents on unauthorized use of a technology and on the transaction 
costs involved in licensing an invention.” (issues related to competing follow-on 
innovations and anticommons concerns); (4) “Whether the multiple steps in the 
invention, development, and commercialization of a new technology tend to proceed 
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efficiently within a single organization, or whether efficiency is enhanced if different 
organizations are involved at different stages of the process.” (issues related to 
competition and centralization); (5) The “topography of technological advance,” i.e. 
“the manner in which inventions are linked to each other temporally, and as 
systems in use” (also dealing with sequential innovations and the structure of the 
problem space) (Mazzoleni & Nelson, 1998, p. 1033). 
Variations in these conditions across different innovation contexts prompt a 
change from asking “Which theory is correct?” to “Where does each theory apply?” It 
is easy to see where alternate modes such as user innovation or open collaboration 
could gain purchase under this framework, by making changes to the assumptions 
embodied in traditional IP theories. Rather than centralizing innovation decisions in 
patent-holding individuals or firms, these alternate modes increase the flexibility of 
the governance of provision and appropriation in a knowledge commons, and 
subject them to norms determined by the relevant communities of users and 
innovators. As seen in the analyses of patent performance and value across 
industries (Bessen & Meurer, 2008), conditions around invention processes in 
different fields (e.g. pharmaceuticals versus software) could support a variety of 
different practices and organizational structures around the discovery and use of 
innovations, with different rules governing actions such as coordination and 
disclosure of contributions to the commons. Some of these practices are already in 
use in situations such as a nonprofit patent pool for AIDS treatments in developing 
countries (UNITAID, 2010), and royalty-free license requirements for internet 
technology standards (World Wide Web Consortium, 2004). At the same time, there 
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is a place for higher levels of organization and governance. As mentioned earlier, IP 
rights can be used to resolve or pre-empt legal disputes between knowledge users 
or user communities (O’Mahony, 2003). It has also recently been argued that the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (historically a coalition for the promotion 
of IP rights and enforcement) should be re-tooled as a more general international 
administrative forum for considering and implementing policies related to evolving 
modes of innovation (Strandburg, 2009). This reliance on mixtures of various forms 
and scales of authority with overlapping jurisdictions (as opposed to completely 
centralized or decentralized authority) has been found to be an important factor in 
the governance of public goods and common-pool resources, in which it has become 
known as “polycentric” governance (Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren, 1961; Andersson & 
Ostrom, 2008; Ostrom, 2008). 
There are undoubtedly some innovations that may have been delayed or not 
created at all apart from some form of patent system, but there are also innovations 
that were made mostly without it (such as many open-source software projects and 
much academic research) which would probably not have been created if each 
component were subject to patent protection. Rather than arguing for the 
abolishment of the patent system, these innovations demonstrate that a polycentric 
system of knowledge commons governance is possible, desirable, and in fact is 
already upon us. Studies such as those described in this dissertation can aid in 
understanding the causes, consequences, and dynamics of discovery under various 
forms of governance, and therefore in improving the practical processes of 
discovery for the benefit of all.
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7.A. Protection choice wording in Experiment 4 
Protection choice dialog: at the end of each round except the last, participants 
in the protection available condition whose team was not already protected by 
another participant were shown a dialog box with the following text (in quotes) and 
buttons (in brackets): 
 
“Do you want to protect your team? This will cost you 4 points.” 
[Protect My Team]  [Don’t Protect My Team] 
 
Protection confirmation: If the participant clicked the [Protect My Team] 
button, a dialog box was displayed with the following text until the next round 
began: 
 
“Your team wil be protected for 3 rounds. You have been charged 4 points.” 
 
Protection denied: If the participant clicked the [Protect My Team] button and 
another participant had protected the same team first during the same post-round 
choice period, a dialog box was displayed with the following text until the next 
round began: 
 
“Sorry, someone else protected this team before you.” 
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Protection decline confirmation: If the participant clicked the [Don’t Protect 
My Team] button, a dialog box was displayed with the following text until the next 
round began: 
 
“You chose not to protect your team.” 
 
Previous protection: If a different player had protected the same team or a 
team within one icon difference in a previous round, the following message was 
displayed instead of the Protection choice dialog: 
 
“Your team this round cannot be protected. Waiting for others to protect their 
teams…” 
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7.B. Post-task survey in Experiment 4 
The following survey was distributed to participants following the end of the 
last game in each session. 
Front 
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Back 
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8. General Discussion  
8.1. Conclusions and continuations 
When one observes others for clues about beneficial behaviors, it is 
important to be attentive to the many possible differences between the contexts 
they encounter and the related situations in which one expects to find oneself. These 
can be due to changes in an environment over time, or differences within and 
between environments due to things like climate, culture, or the capabilities brought 
to the present from previous experience. Similarly, the experimental results we have 
shared in this dissertation are subject to caveats about the context in which we 
obtained them, but we believe they offer some insight into common conflicts and 
merit substantial further study. 
The goal of these experiments was to examine how groups of people find 
solutions to problems, by adapting their behavior to their environments and to each 
other over time, under varying combinations of information and incentives. 
Situations that fit this description are ubiquitous in the lives of humans and other 
social animals, but not yet well understood. They are full of complicating and 
confounding factors that make it difficult to find the important factors that cause the 
outcomes we see. In these experiments, we pared away many of the complexities of 
real-world social learning to enable relatively simple interactions in a controlled 
problem environment, so that we could observe participants' behavior 
unencumbered by at least some of these complicating factors. For instance, we did 
not allow participants to spend points on imaginary lawyers with which to sue each 
other for virtual patent infringement (Torrance & Tomlinson, 2009), nor did we 
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build an artificial foraging apparatus for them to peck at. We hoped to find 
commonalities between aspects of different kinds of exploration, such as birds 
searching for food and people searching for good ideas, by abstracting from many of 
their specifics. 
This quest for an ideal abstraction can create two kinds of flaws: first, it can 
leave out important qualities of the events we are attempting to model; second, the 
specific details that are chosen to implement the general qualities we wish to study 
will by necessity introduce distortions of their own. To conclude this dissertation, 
we will discuss some of the relevant aspects of real-world social learning and 
exploration that our tasks did not take into account, as well as some of the artificial 
characteristics that may have distorted participants' behavior, before summarizing 
the findings that we believe have validity beyond our specific paradigms and should 
be examined further. 
 
8.2. Omissions and commissions 
We attempted to provide appealing, understandable, and fairly neutral 
problems for participants to solve, which did not unduly favor certain cognitive 
assets (e.g. verbal or mathematical knowledge) that could have introduced 
differences in behavior unrelated to our desired phenomena. In real search 
situations, of course, history and preparation matter -- people bring all sorts of 
previous knowledge and experience to bear on novel situations, and these affect 
outcomes enormously. There is no such thing as a "pure" search task, unmoored 
from any specific skills. Traits that are presumably important to performance in our 
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tasks such as large working memory and strategic thinking are by no means evenly 
distributed among the population, nor is enthusiasm for puzzles, virtual pets, or 
fantasy sports leagues, elements of which we tried to incorporate in order to make 
the task interesting. 
In addition, much of the knowledge and experience that people bring to new 
tasks concerns their fellow problem solvers, particularly trust and other beliefs 
about others' capabilities and intentions. People are political animals as well as 
social animals, and these beliefs, and how they are created, maintained, and 
manipulated, are absolutely central to sustained interactions in groups. Using 
participants who (presumably) knew little about each other beforehand reduced the 
possibility of these important phenomena having effects on the coordination of 
behavior. The development and use of such interpersonal knowledge was also 
prevented by limiting participants' interactions strictly to the passive sharing of 
information about their solutions; they were not permitted other methods of 
communication with each other (such as a chat interface), or manipulation of the 
environment (such as tagging of icons). We also omitted explicit identifying 
information about peers, and prevented implicit identification by avoiding 
consistent positioning of each participant's choices in the task displays. Capabilities 
such as stable evaluation of group members' behavior, discussion and collective 
determination of norms are particularly known to affect outcomes in public good 
and common-pool resource dilemmas (Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 1994). 
Relatedly, each game in our task lasted only a few minutes, and the whole session 
was less than an hour; in reality, the long-term sustainability of any system, let alone 
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something as complex as a knowledge commons, cannot be estimated in such a 
short time. 
Beyond the specific details of patent systems that we mentioned omitting in 
Chapter 7, the economic validity of our task is limited by the fact that there was no 
cost for exploration beyond the opportunity cost of foregoing other options. Many 
real exploration tasks (e.g. pharmaceutical trials, mineral exploration, or software 
debugging) involve substantial investments of time and other resources both up 
front and on a continuing basis. The relatively short length and narrow breadth of 
protection, amounts for protection and use fees, and the overall level of monetary 
payment could raise similar objections. 
Because of the above differences, we must be cautious about generalizing our 
results too broadly, and our conclusions must be tested in other social learning and 
exploration paradigms to observe the effects of these and other contextual factors. 
 
8.3. Summary of findings 
Despite these concerns, we believe that (a) our results make a substantial 
contribution to knowledge about the causes, consequences, and dynamics of social 
learning and search; (b) that they have substantial validity beyond the task and 
participants that generated them; and (c) that they can lead to further fertile 
investigation in the laboratory and the field. 
We found that our human participants used several social learning strategies 
previously studied in other species (Laland, 2004), such as copying better-
performing peers, copying solution elements that are more frequent among peers, 
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and copying when uncertain about the returns to asocial learning. We also found 
evidence for copying solutions similar to one's own, which has been examined in 
studies of innovation diffusion as backwards compatibility (Rogers, 2003), as well 
as copying solution elements that are increasing rather than decreasing in 
frequency among peers, as observed in a recent study of baby-naming data 
(Gureckis & Goldstone, 2009). We also found that, rather than simply falling back on 
alternate social learning strategies (such as frequency bias) when performance-
based imitation was unavailable, the use of each source of information was used in 
different ways according to the specific incentives and risks involved. 
Participants used fairly conservative, incrementalist strategies to explore 
complex problem spaces, so that initial satisfactory solutions could be used as a 
basis for further development via small amounts of both imitation and innovation. 
These tactics allowed participants to progressively and collectively narrow their 
search toward better regions of the problem space without taking excessive risks 
that could hurt aggregate performance. 
Some simple models (Rogers, 1988; Giraldeau, Valantone, & Templeton, 
2002) predict that imitation will not improve the overall performance of a group, 
because agents will simply use it to take advantage of the information provided by 
others, and avoid the costs of exploration. In contrast, we found that participants 
often used imitation (in combination with innovation and retention of previous 
solution elements) to cumulatively improve on one another's solutions and enhance 
both individual and overall group performance. 
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When we introduced contextual factors that caused imitation to be either 
disrupted (hiding performance information about peers' solutions) or discouraged 
(charging a small fee for using a solution that a peer had previously discovered and 
"protected"), the use of innovation increased, but improved performance did not 
result. In the former case, participants could not use imitation to propagate good 
solutions, and the increased exploration was essentially wasted because the search 
remained unfocused and inefficient. In the latter case, the additional exploration 
actually resulted in an increased discovery of improved solutions, but also the 
discovery of worse solutions in the process, which canceled out the gains; the cost 
for imitation meant that participants imitated less often and were thus less likely to 
build on one another's solutions. 
 
8.4. Applications and future directions 
In the context of scientific and cultural progress, there are parallels to the 
models of Rogers (1988) and Giraldeau, Valone, and Templeton (2002) mentioned 
above, which predict that innovation will be in short supply and inefficiently used 
unless those who innovate can exclude others from imitating them without 
permission (e.g. Kitch, 1977). 
Our work shows that the above models are perhaps overly simplistic when it 
comes to human social learning and exploration. Individuals have a capacity to use 
others' innovations not just to obtain a static benefit in good performance, but to 
create a dynamic benefit for many by producing sequential improvements; so a 
disincentive to imitate (in the form of exclusion rights for innovators) may result in 
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less productive innovation, not more. The work of others in this area (e.g. Torrance 
& Tomlinson, 2009; Bessen & Meurer, 2008; see Chapters 6 & 7) confirms these 
findings and shows that there are other theoretical and practical disadvantages to 
granting exclusive rights to knowledge. 
There is a countervailing movement to treat knowledge as a resource that 
benefits from community management at multiple scales, rather than strict private 
ownership or centralized state control (Ostrom & Hess, 2007). There are naturally 
debates between proponents of these various methods of management, but it is 
clear that the future of knowledge is inextricably bound up in learning how to 
equitably, efficiently, and sustainably govern the products of its past and present. 
Tomasello (1994) contends that the capabilities of humans for selective and 
cumulative social learning constitute a “ratchet effect” that allows culture to develop 
stably across generations, and that this effect may be unique to humans. Though the 
experiments in this dissertation present a greatly simplified environment for such 
social learning, they confirmed and extended several previous theoretical and 
empirical results in the field. 
The concerns about our experiments noted above (as well as related work 
discussed in previous chapters) suggest potentially useful variations of our core 
tasks. For instance: use of various practical knowledge domains for search and 
various levels of expertise among participants; use of noisy (rather than simply 
present or absent) score feedback; variations in the structure of the social network 
that connects participants; explicit costs for innovation and more substantial 
incentives for performance; and communication among participants, and therefore 
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opportunities for coordination of their search behavior and more stakeholder-
driven governance of the use of the resulting improvements. 
The resounding refrain of the large body of research on commons dilemmas 
and other collective action problems is that many can be solved through careful 
investigation and modification of the related environmental, cultural, and 
institutional variables, but there is "no panacea," no universal solution on which we 
can rely (Ostrom, 2010). Continued study is necessary, of the structure and 
dynamics of human collaborative exploration, the nature of incentives and 
innovative effort, and their interaction as manifested in the dynamics of creativity in 
our economy and culture. We present our work in the hope that others will also find 
it useful in illuminating our shared problems. 
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